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ABSTRACT
COSMIC CITY - COSMIC TELEOLOGY: A READING OF METAPHYSICS Λ 10
AND POLITICS I 2

Brandon Henrigillis
Marquette University, 2020
The goal of my project is to provide a reading of Metaphysics Λ 10. Λ 10 states that
there is an order in the cosmos, or a cosmic nature. The problem for the interpreter of
Aristotle is how to make sense of this claim given Aristotle’s arguments elsewhere
regarding nature/substance and the priority of substances over the parts of a substance.
To explain what Aristotle means when he states that there is a cosmic nature and
arrangement, I first examine the army and household analogies offered by Aristotle in Λ
10. I contend that the household analogy in particular provides the reader with a way to
explain Aristotle’s concept of a cosmic nature, since it leads us to Aristotle’s account of
the naturalness and priority of the polis. It is then through understanding Aristotle’s
concept of the naturalness and priority of the polis, found in Politics I 2, that one can
understand the naturalness and priority of the cosmic order defended in Λ 10. The
naturalness of the polis is found in the fact that it is a part of the natural process of
practical reasoning in which all human beings participate. The polis is prior because
outside of the polis it is impossible to live the fully human life, and thus one largely
ceases to exist outside of the polis. I will conclude by arguing that this reading of Politics
I 2 allows us to see that the cosmic ordering or arrangment in Λ 10 is natural in so far as
it arises out of the teleologically ordered motions of the individual entities within the
cosmos, and it is prior in so far as no entity can carry out its essential functions outside of
the cosmic arrangement and structure. This reading allows us to understand Λ 10 and
Aristotle’s conception of the cosmos in a way that does not conflict with other claims that
are basic to Aristotle’s conception of reality.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In this dissertation I set out to provide an interpretation of Metaphysics Λ 10 and
Politics I 2 for the purposes of providing a new reading of Aristotle’s teleology, which is
famously difficult to understand.1 Does Aristotle believe that teleology in nature is solely
and exclusively a matter of appealing to the purpose of a specific kind in order to explain
the motion or development of an entity that belongs to this kind? Or does Aristotle hold
that there is a broader teleology found somehow in the arrangement of the whole cosmos,
as is seemingly expressed in Λ 10? And if it is the latter, how can this broader teleology
be natural for Aristotle?
In particular, I propose to take seriously the brief hint of a broader teleology
which Aristotle provides in Metaphysics Λ 10; and I provide a reading of this passage
that understands Aristotle as arguing that there is a cosmic teleology, in the sense that
there is a broader teleological ordering which arises from the teleological movements of
the various natural kinds within the cosmos. In addition to proposing this reading of Λ
10, I show just how it is that we can make sense of a broader teleological ordering
without thereby undermining other important claims that Aristotle makes within his
corpus. To accomplish this, I argue that Politics I.2 actually provides us the best account
for just how this broader teleological ordering can be considered natural. In analyzing
Politics I.2, I claim that Aristotle’s conception of the polis involves an entity which is
natural but which is not a substance, which is prior to the individual but which does not

1

To avoid repeating citations and ruining the flow of the presentation, all references will have a citation
somewhere in the body of the dissertation rather than in the introduction itself.
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make the individual merely a part of a larger teleological whole, and which is emergent
from human action but which is not a product of intentional productive action. I believe
that this understanding of the polis is the key to how Aristotle understands the naturalness
of the cosmic teleology that Aristotle is defending in Λ 10. In other words, Aristotle’s
account of the polis allows us to see just how the broader teleology can be natural without
thereby committing him to various inconsistences that would inevitably arise otherwise.
The goal of this project is to provide a new reading of these two passages which is
consistent with the rest of what Aristotle has to say regarding teleology, nature, and
priority but which at the same time does not dismiss the overt claims of these two
passages or force a reading which does not fit with what Aristotle explicitly states. This
reading, I argue, provides a new way of understanding the interrelationships which exist
between entities that could be the subject of further explorations in future projects in
Aristotle scholarship. This latter point is especially relevant when one considers the
possibility of constructing an Aristotelian view of ecosystems, biomes, and other
structured orders which clearly manifest themselves between living entities. My project
also provides a foundation for future research into the ontological foundations of the
cosmic order mentioned in Λ 10.
I proceed as follows. The second chapter primarily lays the groundwork for
arguments in following chapters, and accomplishes three goals. The first goal is focused
on Aristotle’s account of a natural object and natural explanation. Providing this account
will supply the rest of the dissertation with the context necessary for understanding the
interpretive moves and arguments that will be discussed. This part will also discuss the
standard conception of Aristotle’s account of a natural object and natural explanation so
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that the problems with the claims that are made in Λ 10 and Politics I 2 become more
apparent. Specifically, given Aristotle’s account of what is a natural thing and how we
explain something acting teleologically, how it is possible for Aristotle to claim that the
cosmos as a whole possesses a nature, and that there is a good found in the arrangement
of the whole.
The second goal of the second chapter is to introduce and discuss two interpretive
camps which concern one’s understanding of Aristotle’s teleology in relation to the rather
difficult passages of Physics II 8, Politics I 8, and Metaphysics Λ 10. The first is the
internalist camp, which argues that Aristotelian teleology should be understood as
restricted to the teleological actions of individual entities. This camp holds that it is
wrong to interpret Aristotle as arguing that there is a broader teleology being defended in
the corpus. They accordingly interpret the three passages mentioned through this lens
and argue that there is nothing in these passages which argues for taking Aristotle’s
teleology in any other way than the restricted sense that they defend.
The second camp, the externalist camp, holds the opposing position that these
passages clearly defend a broader, hierarchical and perhaps even an anthropocentric
teleology. I will argue that the latter camp is correct in their interpretation of these
passages, albeit in a restricted sense. I do not believe that these passages in any way
support the position that Aristotle’s teleology is anthropocentric, and I will argue that
Politics I 8 does not really express anything about Aristotle’s conception of teleology in
nature. But I do believe that Physics II 8 and Metaphysics Λ 10 are difficult to interpret
without admitting that there is something about Aristotle’s conception of teleology which
holds that there is a broader teleology at work within the cosmos. I will conclude the
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second chapter by arguing that one’s interpretation of Physics II 8 depends upon one’s
interpretation of Metaphysics Λ 10. It is by understanding the claims in Λ 10 that one
gains an understanding of Aristotle’s conception of a cosmic nature, and thus a cosmic
teleology. Once one is able to do this, then one is able to provide an interpretation of
Physics II 8, which will be provided in the last chapter following an investigation of Λ
10.
The third chapter investigates Λ 10 itself, focusing on two goals. The first goal of
the third chapter will be to establish that Aristotle does express that there is both a
separate good as well as a good found in the arrangement of the whole cosmos. The
separate good is, I argue, the Unmoved Mover (UMM), since it is the UMM which serves
as the ultimate aim of all striving and thus of all teleological motions in the cosmos. The
good in the arrangement is clearly defended by Aristotle in Λ 10 both explicitly as well as
through the analogies, which are provided by Aristotle to serve as a kind of explanation
of how Aristotle understands the good in the arrangement. What this entails for us, then,
is that Aristotle is defending a ‘nature of the whole’ in Λ 10, and thus a cosmic nature.
The second goal of Chapter 3 will be to discuss how we are to understand the
cosmic nature being defended in Λ 10. I will argue that understanding the ‘nature of the
whole’ or the cosmic nature in an Aristotelian context requires us to analyze the analogies
that Aristotle provides. I will then discuss the army and household analogies and show
how they help us to understand the good arrangement of the cosmic nature. However, I
will conclude the chapter by arguing that the specific analogies provided by Aristotle fail
to fully explain what a cosmic nature might look like in an Aristotelian context,
especially regarding the ontological status of the cosmic nature. I will then argue that the
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clue for understanding the cosmic nature defended here is found in Politics I 2, in which
Aristotle speaks of the nature and priority of the polis. I believe that this is the right
claim precisely because Aristotle points us there in Λ 10 through the household analogy
itself, since the household for Aristotle develops into the polis and is discussed in Politics
I 2. Another reason for my claim that we should examine Politics I 2 is that the final
statement Aristotle makes in Λ 10 hints at the idea that the cosmos is a monarchy, which
is a kind of polis for Aristotle. In order to understand the cosmic nature, and especially
its naturalness and priority, an examination of Politics I 2 is appropriate.
Having accomplished the preliminary goals of chapters two and three, chapter
four begins to build upon these foundations. The fourth chapter will examine the nature
of the polis. Specifically, how it is that Aristotle understands the polis to be a natural
thing in an ontological sense. However, it also must be acknowledged that his arguments
concerning the naturalness of the polis have been questioned to some extent. If we are to
understand how the nature of the polis provides us with the material that we need to
understand the nature of the cosmic order Aristotle defends in Λ 10, it is first necessary to
show that his arguments concerning the nature of the polis are good ones. This will not
only dispense with the idea that the polis cannot be a natural entity, but it will also shed
light on how the naturalness of the polis is understood by Aristotle. I will consider the
argument that the polis should be considered, even by Aristotle’s own principles, to be an
artifact. As Aristotle makes clear in the Physics, natural generation differs from artificial
generation in a significant way; for Aristotle argues that a thing which is naturally
generated has as an efficient cause something which is identical to it in form. But the
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cause of a polis seems to be something that possesses a form other than that which is
possessed by the polis. This seems to show us that the polis must be an artifact.
This contention, however, has been disputed as well, and there are those who have
attempted to defend the naturalness of the polis despite the above criticism. I will
consider some of these arguments and show how they specifically fail to demonstrate that
the polis is natural according to Aristotle’s own principles. I will argue that the polis is
natural because it is a part of the very practical rationality that human beings inevitably
exercise. Since human beings are defined through the possession of logos by Aristotle, it
follows that human beings have no choice but to act according to the dictates of reason.
This of course involves a discourse concerning the good and the bad, the just and the
unjust, and it inevitably demands the establishment of a polis, for it is only in the polis
that such aspects of human nature can be exercised to its fullest extent. And it is in and
through the polis that human beings express their logos in a fully realized manner; since
that which constitutes the expression of logos according to Aristotle, namely reasoning
about the good and bad, the advantageous and the harmful, the just and the unjust, is fully
realized in the complete political entity: the polis. This entity then emerges from the very
practices of living a human life and is therefore natural precisely because it is a very part
of this process of practical rationality. This view also holds that the polis is not a
deliberate creation on the part of an artificer or lawgiver, but that it is rather an emergent
entity which is a necessary part of the logos-centric and logos-infused activities of human
beings.
The fifth chapter will then proceed to discuss the priority of the polis. Aristotle
clearly states that the polis is prior to the individual, but understanding what Aristotle
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means by this is important for understanding the ontology of the polis as well as the
ontology of the cosmic nature of Λ 10. Aristotle states that the individual stands to the
state much as a hand stands in relation to the whole body. Crucially, Aristotle considers a
hand, or an eye or any other particular organ for that matter, as defined only in so far as it
is a functioning part of the whole organism of which it is a part. To be a hand then is to
carry out the respective functions of a hand in so far as these are defined in relation to the
whole body. So, if a hand is severed, it is a hand in name only; or a hand
homonymously. However, if we are to understand the hand analogy as a literal depiction
of what Aristotle means when he states that an individual is posterior to the state, it
would mean that the individual of a state would be ontologically posterior to the state
itself, and in the same sense as a hand is posterior to the whole organism. This would
imply that an individual as such would be defined wholly through the state of which it is
a part, and that any individual outside of the state would be a human in name only. I will
also point out that this conception of the relation between the polis and the individual
seems to justify a totalitarian state.
I then argue that the priority of the polis should be understood in close relation
with my understanding of the naturalness of the polis. The polis is natural for Aristotle
because it is a part of the practical rationality of human beings living the human life.
When human beings begin to carry out their practical rationality, a polis emerges and in
turn makes possible the full realization of that practical rationality itself. The priority of
the polis then should be understood as an ontological priority, but not one which is
identical to the relationship which exists between a hand and the whole of which it is a
part. Rather, the priority of the polis should be understood through the fact that the
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practical components of the human person cannot be really exercised outside of the polis.
So although it is certainly possible for a human being to survive outside of the polis, such
a life would be more similar to the life of a beast than to the life of a human being.
Understanding the priority of the polis then is simply to understand the close relationship
which exists between the practical rationality of the human person and the polis which
emerges from it and which allows for its full practice. Not only does understanding this
relationship ground the naturalness of the polis, but it also shows us that outside of the
polis, the human person is unable to really live the essentially human life. So although it
is true that the human person can survive outside of the polis, and that thus the priority
relationship being expressed by Aristotle here is not identical to the relationship which
exists between the hand and the body, it remains true that what it is to live the human life
is impossible outside of the polis. The polis is thus necessary for the human person to
live the human life and it is therefore prior in an important sense.
I conclude the chapter by showing how it is possible, even when one
acknowledges that the polis is prior to the individual, to show that Aristotle did not justify
or defend a totalitarian state. The priority relationship which exists between the
individual and the polis is not one which allows for the polis to control every aspect of an
individual life, but rather merely shows us that Aristotle believed that the polis was
essential for the human person to achieve the fully realized human life.
The sixth chapter will extrapolate upon my reading of Aristotle’s account of the
polis to show how this account can apply to Aristotle’s view of the cosmic order. The
naturalness of the polis has thus been determined to be an aspect of the logos that every
human possesses. In order to actualize this faculty, particularly in the practical sense, one
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must reason about the good and bad, which in turn is only possible in the context of that
entity which allows for the good life to be attained: the polis. But this is not to say that
the polis is natural simply because it is necessary for the actualization of the logos, but
rather that the polis is a necessary manifestation that emerges from the fact that human
beings practice logos. The polis is natural, then, because it is a part of the natural faculty
of reasoning and emerges as a part of this faculty.
This provides what is necessary for how Aristotle understood the cosmic order
that he discusses in Λ 10. This order is not an artifact, somehow created by a god who
moves itself to create, nor is it a substance. This order rather emerges from each thing
within the cosmos acting so as to achieve the best life possible for it. Given Aristotle’s
conception of how the polis relates to the attainment of the best life for humans, it would
also seem to follow that a good order is necessary for each thing within the cosmos to
attain what it desires. This ordering is natural, and prior, and represents a broader
teleology then what has been normally ascribed to Aristotle. This cosmic order is natural
and prior in so far as it constitutes a necessary part of each thing attempting to realize
itself, and from the fact that nothing can really be whatever it is outside of this ordering.
Given this conception of the cosmic order defended in Λ 10, I return to Physics II
8 and argue that Physics II 8 does indeed defend a broader teleology, which can now be
understood through the conception of a cosmic order that I have defended. This broader
teleology represents the cosmic nature and is manifested in the ordering of the various
entities within the cosmos which require such an ordering so that they are able not only to
survive but realize their own natures.
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Finally, I will argue that the best way for us to understand the cosmic order
according to the comparison with the polis that I have been defending is to conceive the
cosmic order as being like a perfect monarchy. What I mean by this is that the role that
the UMM plays in the cosmos is much like the role that the monarch plays in Aristotle’s
conception of a perfect monarchy. Not only is this reading justified by Aristotle’s own
comparison of the cosmic order to a monarchy at the end of Λ 10, but it also best fits with
my argument that the ontology of the cosmic order is comparable to the ontology of the
polis. The unmoved mover is fundamentally unlike everything else within the cosmos, it
is fully actualized and does not move or grow or develop in any way. In its role as final
cause for the development of every single organism in the cosmos it is also
fundamentally responsible for the order manifested in it. The unmoved mover is clearly
beyond anything found in nature, much like the monarch is beyond anyone found in the
polis in virtue, and the unmoved mover at the same time acts as the end of the actions that
produce, as an emergent entity, the teleological order that the cosmos possesses.
To summarize my reading of Λ 10: The analogies that Aristotle uses in this
passage clearly compel us to take more than what a minimalist may have taken them to
mean, but less than the hierarchical/anthropocentric interpretation. There is an ordering
that is teleological, which necessarily manifests itself as an emergent entity through the
teleological motions of each thing within the cosmos in its attempt to achieve the divine.
This ordering is natural in that it constitutes a necessary part of the actualization of each
essence, and it is prior in that no entity can really exist outside of it.
In conclusion, I will have shown that there is a good of the whole, a good which is
found in the order of all things, and this good is defined through both the good that is
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separate as well as the good that emerges from the teleological actions of each individual
kind within the cosmos. The separate good is the UMM, which causes each individual
entity to be as like the UMM as possible. The good of the order is found in the
teleological ordering of the cosmos, which allows each kind of thing in the cosmos to
realize its end. Λ 10 indeed shows us that there is an Aristotelian world order which
emerges from the teleological motions of the individual entities within the cosmos, much
like the polis emerges from the practical rationality of human beings realizing their own
natures.
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CHAPTER II
TWO INTERPRETIVE APPROACHES TO ARISTOTLE’S ACCOUNT OF
TELEOLOGY IN PHYSICS II 82

1. Introduction

The goal of this chapter will be to explain and set up the context and the initial
problems that the rest of this dissertation will attempt to resolve. This chapter will do this
in two parts. The first part will simply introduce a basic account of Aristotle’s theory of
natural entities and natural explanation. This topic will remain relevant throughout the
arguments of this dissertation as the discussion concerning natural entities and
explanation will be precisely what is at issue concerning the interpretation of the passages
that this dissertation will be focusing on. To be clear however, the first part of this
chapter merely intends to provide the most accepted and popular interpretations of
Aristotle’s account of natural objects and explanation. I do not intend therefore to
attempt to resolve interpretive difficulties concerning Aristotle’s understanding of these
topics. The relevant interpretive difficulties, if and when they are encountered, will be
addressed in later chapters. Instead, I hope that by clarifying this topic, we will be
allowed see just how Aristotle understands natural entities to be teleological in the most
basic sense of the term.

Parts of this chapter have already appeared in Brandon Henrigillis, “Man, God and Rain: Is Aristotelian
Teleology Hierarchical?,” Akropolis 1 (2017): 92-110. The views expressed in that paper represents an
approach to interpreting Physics II 8 and Metaphysics Λ 10 earlier than that which is contained in this
dissertation. Accordingly, what I will be arguing here represents my current interpretive stance on the
relevant passages concerning the cosmic order that Aristotle identifies in Λ 10.
2
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The rest of this chapter will then focus upon the interpretive approaches and
difficulties concerning the argument of Physics II 8. This disagreement concerning the
interpretation of Physics II 8 has for the most part been divided into two interpretive
camps.3 On the one hand, there are those who argue that Aristotle held that teleological
concepts are applicable when one is attempting to explain the regular motions and
developments of individual organisms, elements, and celestial bodies, but that any use of
teleological concepts that go beyond this specific type in one’s explanation of nature is
simply un-Aristotelian and that therefore Physics II 8 merely repeats this basic
Aristotelian position.4 I will refer to those who hold this position concerning Physics II 8
and Aristotle’s teleology in general as the ‘internalist’ camp. On the other hand, there
have been a number of Aristotle scholars who have argued that Aristotle provides
indications at the very least and perhaps even positively and explicitly maintains that
teleological explanation involves to some degree references to a broader and interactive
teleology in which particular entities and/or organisms aim at the benefit of other entities
and/or organisms of a different kind.5 Correspondingly, these interpreters understand the
Margaret Scharle originally makes this distinction. For her discussion see Margaret Scharle, “The Role of
Material and Efficient Causes in Aristotle's Natural Philosophy,” in Apeiron 41, no. 3 (2008) (Special
Issue: Aristotle on Life, J. Mouracade, ed.): 27–46. For the remainder of this dissertation, I will refer to the
interpretive position which holds that Aristotle defended a broader teleology as the ‘externalist’ camp, due
to the fact that this interpretation holds that entities for Aristotle naturally aim at the benefit of entities that
are different in kind; which in turn implies that there is a teleological goal that has its origin in the nature of
entities the satisfaction of which is accomplished through the benefit provided to a nature that is external to
the original entity. On the other hand, I will refer to the opposing interpretive camp as the ‘internalist’
camp, on account of this camp holding that the teleological motion of every entity is undertaken only in
order to satisfy a goal internal to the nature of that entity.
4
Allan Gotthelf, “Aristotle’s Conception of Final Causality,” in Philosophical Issues in Aristotle’s Biology,
ed. Allan Gotthelf and James Lennox (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 204-243; Monte
Ransome Johnson, Aristotle on Teleology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Lindsay Judson,
“Aristotelian Teleology,” in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy XXIX, ed. David Sedley (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2005), 341-367; Robert Wardy, “Aristotelian Rainfall or the Lore of Averages,”
Phronesis 38, no. 1 (1993): 18-30.
5
John M. Cooper, “Aristotle on Natural Teleology,” in Language and Logos, ed. Malcolm Schofield and
Martha Nussbaum (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 197-223; David Furley, “The Rainfall
Example in Physics ii 8,” in Aristotle on Nature and Living Things, ed. Allan Gotthelf (Bristol: Bristol
3
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arguments of Physics II 8 to defend this broader and even anthropocentric teleology. I
will refer to these interpreters as the ‘externalist’ camp.
The goal of these two parts of the chapter then will be to clarify the respective
positions within this controversy and to demonstrate how both camps fail to adequately
address the arguments of Physics II 8, especially since in my view any adequate
interpretation of the passage requires a thorough analysis of other passages in the corpus,
especially Metaphysics Λ 10 and Politics I 2. Finally, the chapter will end with a
perplexity of sorts. Given the inability of either interpretive approach to adequately
account for Aristotle’s claims concerning the nature of teleology in the cosmos, will it be
possible to provide an alternative interpretation that can in fact do this? I believe that this
will be possible, and that this can be accomplished by first analyzing more thoroughly the
claims, and especially the analogies, of Metaphysics Λ 10 as well as other texts which
imply a greater role for the unmoved mover and an account of the kind of thing that an
order of the whole could be for Aristotle, given his general approach to ontology and
teleology. The argument then will continue in my analysis of Metaphysics Λ 10 in the
third chapter.
2. Natural Objects and Natural Explanations in Aristotle
a) Natural Objects6
Classical Press, 1985), 177-183; David Sedley, “Is Aristotle’s Teleology Anthropocentric?” Phronesis 36,
no. 2 (1991): 179-196.
6
It is important to note that Aristotle understands nature (ἡ φύσις) in several ways. In the philosophical
lexicon of Δ 4 specifically, Aristotle identifies five senses of nature. Firstly, he calls nature the “…genesis
of growing things” (1014b16; ἡ τῶν φυομένων γένεσις). This definition of nature seems to stem from
Aristotle’s belief that phusis is the abstract noun cognate of phuesthai, which is a verb meaning to grow,
and that therefore Aristotle sees nature as the beginning of a growth which ends in nature, or in other words
which ends in the fully formed adult. Secondly, he calls nature “The primary immanent element in a thing,
from which its growth proceeds” (1014b17-18; ἐξ οὗ φύεται πρώτου τὸ φυόμενον ἐνυπάρχοντος). This
definition seems to refer to whatever is immanent in a thing in such a way that it provides the basis for its
growth. The third definition is that nature is “the source from which the primary movement in each natural
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In the second book of the Physics, Aristotle defines nature, and specifically a
natural object, by stating that:
Some existing things are natural, while others are due to other causes. Those that
are natural are animals and their parts, plants, and the simple bodies, such as
earth, fire, air and water; for we say that these things and things of this sort are
natural. All these things evidently differ from those that are not naturally

object is present in it in virtue of its own essence” (1014b18-20; ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις ἡ πρώτη ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν
φύσει ὄντων ἐν αὐτῷ ᾗ αὐτὸ ὑπάρχει). Generally, this definition of nature is meant to identify that which
causes the growth and movement of a natural thing, and which helps to explain for Aristotle the fact that
there is more than just mere contact between the various parts of an organic unity. Rather, Aristotle states
that “Organic unity differs from contact; for in the latter case there need not be anything besides the
contact, but in organic unities there is something identical in both parts, which makes them grow together
instead of merely touching, and be one in respect of continuity and quantity, though not of quality”
(1014b21-26; διαφέρει δὲ σύμφυσις ἁφῆς, ἔνθα μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν παρὰ τὴν ἁφὴν ἕτερον ἀνάγκη εἶναι, ἐν δὲ
τοῖς συμπεφυκόσιν ἔστι τι ἓν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν ἀμφοῖν ὃ ποιεῖ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἅπτεσθαι αυμπεφυκέναι καὶ εἶναι ἓν κατὰ
τὸ συνεχὲς καὶ ποσόν, ἀλλὰ μὴ κατὰ τὸ ποιόν). Aristotle also identifies nature with matter and form
respectively. Firstly, Aristotle states that “Nature is the primary matter of which any non-natural object
consists” (1014b26-27; ἔτι δὲ φύσις λέγεται ἐξ οὗ πρώτου ἢ ἔστιν ἢ γίγνεταί τι τῶν φύσει ὄντων). So
Aristotle means that the nature of a wooden instrument for instance would be the wood out which it is
made, so that one can say that wood is the nature of the acoustic guitar. Of course, this identification of
nature with matter does not just apply to non-natural objects; Aristotle also states that “In this way people
call the elements of natural objects also their nature…” (1014b32-33; τοῦτον γὰρ τὸν τρόπον καὶ τῶν φύσει
ὄντων τὰ στοιχεῖά φασιν εἶναι φύσιν). Finally Aristotle also identifies nature with the form or substance of
a thing, stating that “…as regards the things that are or come to be by nature, though that from which they
naturally come to be or are is already present, we say they have not their nature yet, unless they have their
form or shape” (1015a3-5; διὸ καὶ ὅσα φύσει ἔστιν ἢ γίγνεται, ἤδη ὑπάρχοντος ἐξ οὖ πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι ἢ
εἶναι, οὔπω φαμὲν τὴν φύσιν ἔχειν ἐὰν μὴ ἔχῃ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὴν μορφήν). Aristotle, in other places, also
sometimes simply understands nature as describing the natural world as a whole, which consists of entities
which possess a nature and are thus by nature as meant in one of the senses just outlined. Aristotle also
states in other places that nature is for the sake of an end, stating that “Now action is for the sake of an end;
therefore the nature of things also is so…” (Physics II 8 199a11; πράττεται δ' ἔνεκα του· καὶ πέφυκεν ἄρα
ἕνεκά του). The end is identified by Aristotle with the form, and thus the definitions of nature as an end
and as form are sometimes conflated by Aristotle such as when he states that “…since nature is twofold, the
matter and the form, of which the latter is the end, and since all the rest is for the sake of the end, the form
must be the cause in the sense of that for the sake of which…” (Physics II 8 199a30-33; καὶ ἐπεὶ ἡ φύσις
διττή, ἡ μὲν ὡς ὕλη ἡ δ' ὡς μορφἡ, τέλος δ' αὕτη, τοῦ τ'λους δὲ τἆλλα, αὕτη ἂν εἴη ἡ αἰτία, ἡ οὗ ἕνεκα). In
summary then, nature is primarily restricted to that which grows and which also possesses both a matter,
namely what the thing is made up of and from which it grows and which is divided according to Aristotle
into a proximate and general kind, as well as a form, which serves as the end of the process of becoming.
Aristotle sums all of this up by saying that nature is the substance of that which possesses a principle of
movement in itself. All of these definitions of nature are ultimately quite similar to how Aristotle
understands the concept of nature in the Physics. I am going to focus upon the arguments of the Physics
throughout this dissertation as it is my concern to discuss the status of natural objects in Aristotle as they
relate to the interpretation of Λ 10, Politics I 2, and Physics II 8. The Physics account then will be
sufficient to provide the necessary context for the interpretive issues that I will be focusing upon, and any
alternative definition of nature, such as one of the definitions just discussed, which becomes relevant will
be mentioned at that point.
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constituted, since each of them has within itself a principle of motion and stability
in place, in growth and decay, or in alteration.7
For Aristotle then, everything in the world is either a natural object in so far as the object
exists φύσει or it is a non-natural object that exists for other reasons or causes as such.
And, for an object to be natural, it must possess within itself a principle of motion and
stability. And although this definition of the natural may seem a little obscure to the
modern reader, what this precisely means is quite obvious and somewhat intuitive upon
reflection. When one considers a living animal for instance, one immediately recognizes
that the animal in question seems to have a principle of order within it which helps
explain the kind of thing that it is. This ordering principle in turn helps us to see why the
animal is of such a shape, why it eats the specific kind of food that it does, and why it
carries out the characteristic motions that it does. In general then what we find when we
observe such animals is that these animals have a principle which explains to us why the
animal is what it is, and this is precisely what Aristotle is pointing to in his definition of a
natural object. Moreover, when we examine this principle of a natural entity such as an
animal, we find, according to Aristotle, that the principle in question is an internal one.8

Τῶν ὄντων τὰ μέν ἐστι φύσει, τὰ δὲ δι’ ἄλλας αἰτίας, φύσει μὲν τά τε ζῷα καὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ φυτὰ
καὶ τὰ ἁπλᾶ τῶν σωμάτων, οἷον γῆ καὶ πῦρ καὶ ἀὴρ καὶ ὕδωρ (ταῦτα γὰρ εἶναι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα φύσει
φαμέν), πάντα δὲ ταῦτα φαίνεται διαφέροντα πρὸς τὰ μὴ φύσει συνεστῶτα. τούτων μὲν γὰρ ἕκαστον ἐν
ἑαυτῷ ἀρχὴν ἔχει κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως, τὰ μὲν κατὰ τόπον τὰ δὲ κατ’ αὔξησιν καὶ φθίσιν, τὰ δὲ κατ’
ἀλλοίωσιν κλίνη δὲ καὶ ἱμάτιον. Phyics II 1 192b8-16. This definition of natural things is also found in Δ 4
when Aristotle states that “…it is plain that nature in the primary and strict sense is the substance of things
which have in themselves, as such, a source of movement…” (1015a13-15).
8
It is interesting to note however that one way that we can in fact understand Aristotle’s theory of nature is
that a natural thing exists as though it were the creation of a divine craftsman. Now, it is certainly true that
Aristotle did not believe that there was such a divine craftsman. His understanding of God and the role that
God plays in his theory crucially argues that God does not act, in the sense of a craftsman, upon the world.
However, the natural entities of the world seem for Aristotle to exhibit those properties which would exist
if there were such a divine craftsman. Evidence for this, in my view, is found in the many passages in
which Aristotle ascribes to nature itself a purpose as though it were a craftsman producing a certain craft.
A few instances of these passages include Pats of Animals 641b12, 687a7, De Anima. 415b16 and Poitics.
1253a9. For a discussion of this point see Jonathan Lear, Aristotle: The Desire to Understand (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1988), 18-19.
7
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And not only is it internal, but the principle itself must be understood as acting as a
dynamic principle propelling the animal to grow into the mature adult representative of
the kind in question, and which in turn produces new individuals of that respective kind.9
And this internal principle is not applicable to animals alone; rather Aristotle includes
plants, the simple elements and the celestial bodies.10 Correspondingly, these entities are
also considered to be natural for Aristotle, and they are to be considered such precisely
due to the presence of an internal principle which explains the specific kind of motion
and characteristic activities that each of these entities exhibit.
As an extension of Aristotle’s definition of a natural object, it is also relevant to
note that a natural entity’s internal principle cannot simply be explained by the matter
which makes up the body of a natural kind. Aristotle makes this point quite clear at the
end of Metaphysics Ζ when he states that an “…[organized] composite is composed of
something in such a way that the whole thing is one, not as a heap is, but as a syllable
is.”11 To put this point as simply as possible, Aristotle believes that nature is not made up
of composite bodies whose motions can be explained by the bodily parts and elements
which make up a composite body, but rather all natural bodies are organized through the
very principle that they possess, and thus they are explained primarily through this

9

By dynamic and active, I mean that the form of an entity acts as a kind of force for Aristotle. Certainly
not a force understood in the Newtonian sense, but rather a principle of the very motions that the entity
undergoes. The form acts as the efficient cause, the formal cause, and the final cause of an entity. It
provides to an entity the reason for the growth, behaviors, and goals of the entity. The reasons for
reproduction in the animal world are in my view more complex and difficult then what I have stated here,
and I will discuss these reasons in the third chapter. However, at this point it is enough to simply show that
a natural thing possesses within itself the reason for the production of more things of the same kind. As we
will see, this is a key distinction for Aristotle between natural objects and artifacts.
10
De Caelo. I 2-4.
11
ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἔκ τινος σύνθετον οὕτως ὣστε ἓν εἶναι τὸ πᾶν, [ἂν] μὴ ὡς σωρὸς ἀλλ' ὡς ἡ συλλαβή.
Metaphysics Ζ 1041b12-13.
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principle. This point leads us then to Aristotle’s concept of form.12 A thing’s form is that
organizing principle to which we have been referring, and accordingly it is that which
organizes the particular matter of something, and generally allows us to understand the
characteristic motions internal to a natural thing. Returning to Aristotle’s example of a
syllable then, Aristotle would argue that in a way we can understand the natural world as
being made up of entities that are analogous to the syllable. A syllable for Aristotle is not
simply to be explained through the letters that make up that syllable, but rather there is in
addition to the letters an organizing principle which allows us to make sense of the
syllable and which organizes the letters in a certain and specific way. In the natural
world, this principle would be the form of natural things, and crucially a natural thing’s
form cannot be explained by or in any way reduced to the matter or material bodies and
elements that make up the body of a particular natural thing. Unlike a syllable however,
the form does not simply arrange by juxtaposition the matter of an animal so that the
animal can carry out its characteristic activities. Rather, the form also provides to the
animal those very characteristic activities, and acts as a dynamic and active principle
which provides the reason for the natural movements of the animal in question. In his
commentary on the Metaphysics Ζ passage, David Bostock emphasizes Aristotle’s
argument here by stating that “…what Aristotle means by the form of a living thing is not
literally the arrangement of its elements, but its soul, and this is not to be regarded as
subject to a similar flux [as the matter of a particular thing]. On the contrary, when
Aristotle is thinking of the soul as a cause, then he takes it that it itself is the cause of all
growth and development, and more generally the cause of every life-manifesting

See the second book of the De Anima for Aristotle’s discussion of form as it particularly relates to plants
and animals.
12
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activity.”13 Simply put, Aristotle is not a reductionist, and he states as much clearly when
he asserts that “…further, matter is relative (ἔτι τῶν πρός τι ἡ ὕλη); for there is one
matter for one form, and another for another.”14

No doubt the body of a natural thing is

an important part of understanding what it is to be a certain kind of natural entity, but it
will not be its defining feature since such a feature will not be reducible in explanation or
in being to the matter/elements/parts that make up a natural thing.
This concept of the form of a natural entity being the necessary feature for a thing
to be a natural, and specifically Aristotle’s claim that natural entities possess their form as
an internal principle, also allows Aristotle to significantly limit that which exists φύσει.
For one, this feature bars such entities that are accidental compounds, or ‘heaps,’ from
being natural. But this limit also applies to artifacts, which for Aristotle do not possess
an internal principle of motion and stability.15 This does not mean that Aristotle did not

13

David Bostock, Aristotle: Metaphysics Z and H (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 247. For
Aristotle’s assertion that the form of a living thing is its soul see De Anima II 1-3.
14
ἔτι τῶν πρός τι ἡ ὕλη· ἄλλῳ γὰρ εἴδει ἄλλη ὕλη. Physics 194b8-9 (My emphasis).
15
The problem of identifying the difference between artifacts and natural entities in Aristotle is complex,
especially as to how Aristotle believes that artifacts are not substances but natural entities are indeed
substances. If artifacts are not substances, does Aristotle simply consider them to be ‘heaps?’ But ‘heaps’
are understood by Aristotle as disorganized matter which happens to be gathered together, and artifacts are
organized in such a way as to accomplish a purpose, even if the organizer is something other in form from
the artifact. Errol Katayama in his book Aristotle on Artifacts has argued that artifacts are not substances
because “…their existence is ontologically depended on other beings (God, heavenly spheres, and natural
substances) that are eternal actualities” (Katayama, Aristotle on Artifacts, 101). Furthermore, Katayama
points out that Aristotle also believes that other groups of things in the world are non-substances, and he
does not have a name for these kinds of non-substances, so the question of what artifacts are if they are not
substances is answered by Katayama when he states that “Unfortunately, except for elements (which are
said to be like heaps), Aristotle does not have names for all the subgroups of nonsubstantial pragmata. I
can, therefore, only specify that artifacts belong to a group of nonsubstantial pragmata – that is, artifacts
are simply things…” (Ibid, 108). I generally agree with Katayama’s conclusion here, but I do not have the
room in this dissertation to investigate this complex and interesting topic sufficiently. All that I wish to
point out here is that it is enough for the purposes of my argument to emphasize that one of the key
differences that Aristotle makes in distinguishing between artifacts and natural entities is the fact that
artifacts are created from artificers who have a different form than that which the artifact possesses and
artifacts lack an active dynamis internal to them which can explain and which gives rise to their motions.
This will be an important point to discuss when I consider the claim that the polis is a natural entity in the
fourth chapter. For Katayama’s discussion of Aristotle’s theory of artifacts see Errol G Katayama,
Aristotle on Artifacts: A Metaphysical Puzzle (New York: State University of New York Press, 1999).
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believe that artifacts possess a form however. On the contrary, Aristotle recognizes that
artifacts have a particular organization and motion, and correspondingly a form.
However, the form of an artifact is not a principle internal to the artifact. Rather the
specific organization and therefore the form of a particular artifact is imposed upon it by
an ‘alien’ craftsman, someone who possesses a different form than the artifact.16
Aristotle provides an example of this distinction when he states that “if you planted a bed
and the rotting wood acquired the power of sending up a shoot, it would not be a bed that
would come up, but wood which shows that the arrangement in accordance with the rules
of art is merely an accidental attribute…”17 Aristotle is arguing here that if there is
anything natural concerning the bed, it would be the wood which makes up the bed. And
this would be the case here precisely because nature is an internal principle of motion,
and the bed as an organized body is not the result of an internal force propelling the given
material to form a bed. Rather the bed is the result of a craftsman imposing a certain
organization, and therefore a certain form, on the relevant materials. The wood of the
bed on the other hand is in fact the result of an internal principle, and it would be that
which grows if the bed were planted (if anything were to grow at all). So the point here
is not to say that natural bodies are the only kind of organized bodies, but rather that
natural entities possess their principle of organization and motion, and therefore their
form, internally. Aristotle explicitly states this when he argues that “art is a principle and
form of what is generated, but in another; but natural change is located in the thing

‘Alien’ is here meant simply to illustrate the difference in the form of the artifact that is being produced
and the form of the craftsman who is producing the artifact. Natural production for Aristotle does not have
this difference, and thus the generation of a new individual of a natural kind is the result of something
which possesses the same form as the individual who has been produced by it.
17
εἴ τις κατορύξειε κλίνην καὶ λάβοι δύναμιν ἡ σηπεδὼν ὥστε ἀνεῖναι βλαστόν, οὐκ ἂν γενέσθαι κλίνην
ἀλλὰ ξύλον, ὡς τὸ μὲν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὑπάρχον… Physics II 1 193a13-15.
16
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itself.”18 Clearly, for Aristotle artifacts have their form and principle imposed upon them
through the productive activity of a craftsman. 19 The form of an artifact also lacks the
active dynamis which natural entities possess and is given to the artifact through the
activity of an artificer whose form is other than the form possessed by the artifact. These
facts ground Aristotle’s distinction between artifacts and natural entities.
In general then, Aristotle believes that the world as we experience it is made up of
entities which exist φύσει and entities which exist for other reasons. Those that exist
φύσει possess an internal principle which not only allows us to understand the
characteristic features and motions that that entity possesses, but also in part allows us to
distinguish that entity from artifacts. Artifacts on the other hand do not possess such a
principle internally qua artifact, and, if they possess any internal principle at all, they do
so on account of the material that they are made from. Finally, the form of a natural
entity cannot be reduced to the material which makes up that entity, but rather the
material is relativized by Aristotle to the specific form of a natural entity. And it is this
feature of Aristotle’s concept of nature that leads him to declare that the form is “…the
nature more (μᾶλλον) than the matter is.”20 Crucially, this is not to say that the matter of
a natural body is to be ignored altogether when considering natural entities, but it is
indeed to say that the matter of a natural entity is relativized according to the form of that
entity. And it is this point that leads Aristotle to claim that nature is to be equated with
the form of a natural entity more so than the matter which makes it up.

18

Generation of Animals. II 1 735a2-3.
By productive activity, I mean only that branch of activity which is identified by Aristotle as involving
artistic production. This is generally taken by him to mean knowledge of crafts, and more generally the
knowledge and action involved in producing or making some artifact. For example, agriculture is
considered to be productive and thus an artistic endeavor for Aristotle. I will be discussing this distinction
between the sciences briefly. For Aristotle’s discussion of this see Nicomachean Ethics VI 1140a.
20
καὶ μᾶλλον αὕτη φύσις τῆς ὕλης· Physics 193b6-7.
19

22

A natural entity then defined as possessing a form which is actualized in the
matter and which is an internal principle of motion forms the heart of Aristotle’s doctrine
of substance (οὐσία).21 Regarding substance Aristotle states that “Among substances are
by general consent reckoned bodies and especially natural bodies; for they are the
principles of all other bodies. Of natural bodies some have life in them, others not; by
life we mean self-nutrition and growth and decay. It follows that every natural body
which has life in it is a substance in the sense of a composite.”22 Natural entities
therefore are the basic ontological entities for Aristotle, and it is these which he seems to
call substances more than anything else.23 This definition then of a natural entity
provides the groundwork for Aristotle to show in what way the natural philosopher
should go about studying nature, and importantly how one should approach natural
explanation.
b) Natural Explanation and the Four Causes24
21

I will discuss this issue in more detail in the third and fourth chapter of this dissertation. It is enough at
this point for my purposes to simply point out what a substance is in its most basic sense for Aristotle.
22
οὐσίαι δὲ μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκοῦσι τὰ σώματα, καὶ τούτων τὰ φυσικά· ταῦτα γαρ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχαί. τῶν δὲ
φυσικῶν τὰ μὲν ἔχει ζωήν, τὰ δ' οὐκ ἔχει· ζωὴν δὲ λέγομεν τὴν δι' αὑτοῦ τροφήν τε καὶ αὔξησιν και φθίσιν.
ὥστε πᾶν σῶμα φυσικὸν μετέχον ζωῆς οὐσία ἂν εἴη, οὐσία δ' οὕτως ὡς συνθέτη. De Anima II 1 412a1116.
23
Aristotle certainly believes that the term substance applies to more than just natural composite entities.
In this same passage he lists matter, form, and the composite as substances. He eventually takes the form
of the natural entity to be the soul of that entity, and thus states that the soul is a substance in a sense. Be
that as it may, it is still safe to say at this point that Aristotle takes as fundamental that natural entities as
such are substances.
24
The concept of natural explanation, and how Aristotle understands the nature of explanation as well as its
goal, truly requires more clarification and discussion then I have room to fully explore within this
dissertation. Generally, one of the overriding issues concerning explanation in Aristotle is the relationship
between the theory of the syllogism as it is laid out in the Organon and explanation as it is practiced by
Aristotle in the natural and biological works. Briefly, Aristotle seems to argue in the Posterior Analytics
that scientific knowledge consists in an organized body of systematically arranged information. This
organized information is attained through systematic deductions which explain the ‘why’ something is the
case, rather than just merely the ‘what.’ Details aside, if one were to take Aristotle at his word in the
Posterior Analytics, one would expect to find a series of Euclidean-like demonstrations in his scientific
works or at least something close to such a series. And yet, one fails to find even one syllogistic deduction
in those works. What is to be made of this is at the heart of the controversy regarding scientific explanation
in Aristotle. On the one hand, there are those who argue that there is indeed a unity here. Lennox for
instance argues that the kind of unqualified understanding demanded of scientific explanation in the
Organon is exemplified at the least in Parts of Animals. G. E. R. Lloyd, on the other hand, argues that it is
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At this point, we have a good understanding of what Aristotle means when he is
discussing that which exists φύσει and correspondingly that which the natural
philosopher studies. The question now seems to be how to understand the goal of
explanation within natural science, and specifically how a natural explanation proceeds
and what questions it attempts to answer. To start, it is relevant to note that Aristotle
argues that natural science, since it studies those entities which have an internal principle,
is a theoretical science, as opposed to a productive or practical science. Aristotle explains
this by stating that:
…since natural science (ἡ φυσικὴ ἐπιστήμη), like other sciences, confines itself to
one class of beings, i.e. to that sort of substance (οὐσίαν) which has the principle
(ἡ ἀρχὴ) of its motion and stability present in itself, evidently [natural science] is
neither practical (πρακτική) nor productive (ποιητική). For the principle of
production is in the producer – it is either reason or art or some capacity, while
the principle of action is in the doer – viz. choice, for that which is done and that
which is chosen are the same. Therefore, if all thought (διάνοια) is either practical
or productive or theoretical, natural science must be theoretical, but it will
theorize about such being as admits of being moved, and only about that kind of
substance (οὐσίαν) which in respect of its formula (κατὰ τὸν λόγον) is for the
most part (ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ) not separable from matter.25
a mistake, one which is common among those who wish to over-systematize Aristotle, to assume that
Aristotle simply had one theory of demonstration. Rather if one were to examine just how Aristotle uses
ἀπόδειξις in his writings as a whole, one will find that its meaning varies somewhat. This in turn leads one,
according to Lloyd, to recognize that there are several different kinds of demonstrations for Aristotle,
which in turn are determined by the specific subject matter under consideration and the nature of the
inquiry undertaken. Given this, Lloyd argues that one should not look to the Organon for a theory of
demonstration that is universally applicable for all subject matters, even the scientific works. Whichever
way one takes the applicability of Aristotle’s theory of demonstration then will influence how one
understands the goal of natural explanation in the natural works of Aristotle. Having said this however, it
is not my intention to defend a particular position in this matter for this dissertation. I simply intend to
focus on how Aristotle understands teleological explanation in the context of the passages I am considering
in this dissertation. However natural explanation is to be connected with the theory of demonstration then
is not relevant to the goal of this chapter and dissertation. I will therefore leave aside this important issue in
order to accomplish the task that I am taking on for this dissertation. See James Lennox, “Form, Essence,
and Explanation in Aristotle’s Biology,” in A Companion to Aristotle, ed. Georgios Anagnostopoulos
(Sussex: Blackwell, 2009), 348-368; G. E. R. Lloyd, Aristotelian Explorations (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), 7-38.
25
ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ἡ φυσικὴ ἐπιστήμη τυγχάνει οὖσα περὶ γένος τι τοῦ ὄντος (περὶ γὰρ τὴν τοιαύτην ἐστὶν
οὐσίαν ἐν ᾗ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως ἐν αὐτῇ), δῆλον ὅτι οὔτε πρακτική ἐστιν οὔτε ποιητική (τῶν
μὲν γὰρ ποιητῶν ἐν τῷ ποιουν῀τι ἡ ἀρχή, ἢ νοῦς ἢ τέχνη ἢ δύναμίς τις, τῶν δὲ πρακτῶν ἐν τῷ πράττοντι, ἡ
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By identifying natural science as a theoretical science, Aristotle is arguing that natural
science possesses a few essential characteristics which are common among all of the
theoretical sciences, but which marks such sciences off from other forms of knowing.
One of these characteristics is that a theoretical science is first and foremost any branch
of knowledge which is capable of attaining necessary and demonstrative knowledge.26
The goal therefore of natural science would presumably be to attain certainty regarding
those entities which he considers to be natural. A second characteristic of any theoretical

προαίρεσις· τὸ αὐτὸ γὰρ τὸ πρακτὸν καὶ τὸ προαιρετόν), ὥστε εἰ πᾶσα διάνοια ἢ πρακτικὴ ἢ ποιητικὴ ἢ
θεωρητική, ἡ φυσικὴ θεωρητική τις ἂν εἴη, ἀλλὰ θεωρητικὴ περὶ τοιοῦτον ὂν ὅ ἐστι δυνατὸν κινεῖσθαι, καὶ
περὶ οὐσίαν τὴν κατὰ τὸν λόγον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, οὐ χωριστὴν μόνον. Metaphysics Ε 1 1025b18-28. The
topic of substance in Aristotle is an enormously difficult task in itself, particularly when one considers the
sheer number of mutually inconsistent interpretations of Metaphysics Z. At this point though, it is enough
to simply point out that Aristotle understands substances as the fundamental beings inhabiting the world.
Natural entities which possess their corresponding internal principles then are the paradigmatic substances
for Aristotle. I will explore this concept of natural substances more both in this chapter as well as in the
fourth chapter. However, it needs to be said that Aristotle’s theory of substances is of such importance that
it will be referred to throughout this dissertation.
26
The fact that necessity attained through syllogistic deductions is a defining feature of theoretical science
for Aristotle poses a bit of a problem for him, one which he seems to explicitly recognize. In short, the
issue with understanding natural science as theoretical becomes problematic due to the obvious fact of
experience that nature changes and sometimes natural entities fail to actualize themselves in accordance
with their nature and thus fail to achieve their τέλος. The fact that natural entities fail to invariably achieve
their τέλος, and that sometimes deformities can result, seems to speak against the claim that absolute
certainty can be achieved in natural science since the very objects of natural science do not necessarily and
always act and produce the same things. As W. K. C. Guthrie states, the science of nature “may sometimes
seem to be admitted only on sufferance to the inner sanctum of the theoretical sciences. It is
theoretical…but concerned with what admits of change, whereas in the strict logic of Posterior Analytics
(71b9-12, 73a21) the object of knowledge in the full sense cannot be otherwise than it is” (W. K. C.
Guthrie, Aristotle: An Encounter, 131). Aristotle recognizes this however and first provides a thorough and
interesting explanation of the ‘accidental’ (κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς), which Aristotle associates with matter, and
which is the reason behind the rare and spontaneous events that interrupt the regularity of nature.
Crucially, that which is accidental cannot be known through a science. Closely connected moreover to
Aristotle’s concept of the accidental is how Aristotle understands lucky (τύχῃ) and/or spontaneous
(αὐτόματον) events, which in themselves are also barred from being the study of science due to their being
unknowable except in a very qualified sense. Secondly, Aristotle also seems to allow knowledge to be
attainable even of events which occur ‘for the most part’ (ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ). In general, natural science is able
to attain certain knowledge then primarily due to Aristotle’s emphasis on the general patterns of nature,
rather than any particular exceptions, and also argues that exceptions are such precisely because of these
knowable patterns. As a final point, Aristotle’s distinction between a spontaneous event and an ordered
one is crucially made through Aristotle’s understanding of how natural events are teleological. For
Guthrie’s discussion of Aristotle’s account of the theoretical sciences and the science of nature see W. K.
C. Guthrie, Aristotle: An Encounter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
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science, and therefore of natural science, is that they do not concern themselves with
human activity. It is this characteristic especially then that Aristotle uses to distinguish
theoretical sciences from the practical and productive sciences. To clarify, practical
sciences, which Aristotle identifies with Politics and its subordinate branch Ethics, are
indeed concerned with knowledge of a certain sort as defined by the first principles of the
science as such, but in addition they are also concerned with using that knowledge, by
making one’s own life and the life of the community better through certain actions of the
right sort. And since such sciences are concerned with particular actions, and thus with a
potentially infinite amount of situations that the practical knower must take into
consideration, Aristotle argues that absolutely certain knowledge cannot be the goal of
the practical knower since it is impossible for her to achieve.27 The theoretical sciences
on the other hand are not concerned with particular actions, but are rather aimed at the
attainment of knowledge regarding independent truth, and correspondingly the theoretical
sciences’ final aim is to know, not to act. In addition to natural science then, Aristotle
also picks out both mathematics (μαθηματική) as well as first philosophy/theology
(φιλοσοφία πρώτη, θεολογική) as theoretical sciences.28 And that which distinguishes,
according to Aristotle, the three theoretical sciences does not consist in the goal of these
sciences as such, which is simply to attain knowledge of reality in one form or another,
nor in their goal to attain certainty in their respective subject areas, but instead in what it
is precisely that they study. On the one hand, first philosophy/theology studies being in
itself, which might, depending on one’s interpretation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, consist

27
28

Nicomachean Ethics I 3 1094b15-1095a
Metaphysics K 7 1064b1-2.
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in the study of that being which is pure act: namely the unmoved mover.29 The subject
matter of mathematics on the other hand is, perhaps surprisingly, closely associated for
Aristotle with the subject of natural science. Regarding what it is that mathematics
studies, Aristotle states that:
The next point to consider is how the mathematician differs from the student of
nature; for natural bodies contain surfaces, volumes, lines and points, and these
are the subject-matter of mathematics…Now the mathematician, though he too
treats of these things does not treat them as the limits of a natural body; nor does
he consider the attributes indicated as the attributes of such bodies. That is why
he separates them, for in thought they are separable from change and it makes no
difference nor does any falsity result if they are separated. 30
The difference then between mathematics and natural science is found in the fact that the
natural philosopher must focus on natural things which must be embodied in matter and
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The actual nature of first philosophy/theology according Aristotle is far from clear, and it has demanded
a great deal of attention from the vast majority of Aristotle’s commentators. Regarding what it is that first
philosophy/theology studies, Jonathan Barnes claims that Aristotle actually provides at least three answers.
At Metaphysics A 2 982b 8 Aristotle states that “Judged by all the tests we have mentioned, then, the name
in question falls to the same science; this must be a science that investigates the first principles and
causes…” (ἐξ ἁπάντων οὖν τῶν εἰρημένων ἐπὶ τὴν θὐτὴν ἐπιστήμην πίπτει τὸ ζητούμενον ὄνομα· δεῖ γὰρ
αὐτὴν τῶν πρώτων ἀρχῶν και αἰτιῶν εἶναι θεωρητικήν…). At Metaphysics Γ 1 1003a21-22 he states that
“There is a science which investigates being as being and the attributes which belong to this in virtue of its
own nature” (᾿´Εστιν ἐπιστήμη τις ἣ θεωρεῖ τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὂν και τὰ τούτῳ ὑπάρχοντα καθ'αὑτό). And at
Metaphysics E 1 1026a29-30 he states that “We answer that if there is no substance other than those which
are formed by nature, natural science will be the first science; but if there is an immovable substance, the
science of this must be prior and must be first philosophy, and universal in this way, because it is first. And
it will belong to this to consider being qua being – both what it is and the attributes which belong to it qua
being” (εἰ μὲν οὖν μὴ ἔστι τις ἑτέρα οὐσία παρὰ τὰς φύσει συνεστηκυίας, ἡ φυσικὴ ἂν εἴη πρώτη ἐπιστήμη·
εἰ δ' ἔστι τις oὐσία ἀκίνητος, αὕτη προτέρα και φιλοσοφία πρώτη, και καθόλου οὕτως ὅτι πρώτη· και περιͺ
τοῦ ὄντος ᾗ ὂν ταύτης ἂν εἴη θεωρῆσαι, καὶ τί ἐστι καὶ τί ἐστι καὶ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ᾗ ὄν.) Which one of these
descriptions of the science is the appropriate one then, or whether they all are appropriate, is not made
entirely clear by Aristotle. Finally, it is also important to point out that Aristotle does not remain consistent
on what he actually calls this science. Many of the references to this science simply call it φιλοσοφία
πρώτη, however at Metaphysics K 7 1064b1-2 Aristotle calls it θεολογική when he states that “Evidently,
then, there are three kinds of theoretical sciences – natural science, mathematics, theology” (δῆλον τοίνυν
ὅτι τρία γένη τῶν θεωρητικῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἔστι, φυσική, μαθηματική, θεολογική). I am going to use both
terms interchangeably throughout the dissertation. For Barnes’ discussion of the nature of Metaphysics for
Aristotle see Jonathan Barnes, “Metaphysics,” in The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle, ed. Jonathan
Barnes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 66-109.
30
μετὰ τοῦτο θεωρητέον τίνι διαφέρει ὁ μαθηματικὸς τοῦ φυσικοῦ (καὶ γὰρ ἐπίπεδα καὶ στερεὰ ἔχει τὰ
φυσικὰ σώματα καὶ μήκη και στιγμάς, περὶ ὧν σκοπεῖ ὁ μαθηματικός… περὶ τούτων μὲν οὖν
πραγματεύεται καὶ ὁ μαθηματικός, ἀλλ' οὐχ ᾗ φυσικοῦ σώματος θέρας ἕκαστον· οὐδὲ τὰ συμβεβηκότα
θεωρεῖ ᾗ τοιούτοις οὖσι συμβέβηκεν· διὸ καὶ χωρίζει· χωριστὰ γὰρ τῇ νοήσει κινήσεώς ἐστι, καὶ οὐδὲν
διαφέρει, οὐδὲ γίγνεται ψεῦδος χωριζόντων. Physics II 2 193b23-35 (Lear Translation).
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thus must be studied in so far as they have a body.31 The mathematician on the other
hand studies the quantitative properties of physical bodies, but studies them as separable
and in no sense as attached to a specific body. Both of these subjects however are
capable of attaining certain knowledge and their goal is solely to attain the knowledge of
what they are studying. The difference is just that mathematics studies the properties of
natural bodies in so far as the properties are separable, and the other studies the properties
of natural bodies in so far as they are embodied.
One final point that needs to be mentioned at this stage regarding the nature of
Aristotle’s philosophy of science is his claim that each science must be independent of
every other one. What this means is that for Aristotle each branch of knowledge must
possess its own first principles which thereby serve as the starting point of the series of
demonstrations that each theoretical science seeks to attain. Regarding this point,
Aristotle states that “…you cannot prove anything by crossing from another kind…(Nor
can you prove by any other science what pertains to a different science, except when they
are so related to one another that the one falls under the other – as e.g. optics is related to
geometry and harmonics to arithmetic).”32 The point that Aristotle is making here is that,
though there certainly are sub-sciences of other sciences (Ethics::Politics,
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This point is not inconsistent with the earlier claim that matter is relative to form. Although it is true that
for Aristotle the matter of a thing is knowable precisely through the form, it nevertheless remains true that a
natural form must be embodied. In order to be clear on this, it is important to keep in mind that the form of
a living thing for Aristotle is also an active dynamis which provides an individual entity its developmental
and characteristic activity. But these activities require a certain kind of body to be actualized, and thus a
natural explanation must refer to the body and its parts in order to understand the kind of activities for
which a natural entity’s form is responsible. This insight is at the heart of Aristotle’s claim that the soul,
with perhaps one exception, does not survive the death of the body. For Aristotle’s discussion of this see
De Anima II 2 413b9-414a4.
32
Οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν ἐξ ἄλλου γένους μεταβάντα δεῖξαι… οὐδ' ἄλλῃ ἐπιστήμῃ τὸ ἑτέρας, ἀλλ' ἢ ὅσα οὕτως
ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα ὥστ' εἶναι θάτερον ὑπὸ θάτερον, οἷον τὰ ὀπτικὰ πρὸς γεωμετρίαν καὶ τὰ ἁρμανικὰ πρὸς
ἀριθμητικήν. Posterior Analytics I 7 75a38-75b17.
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Optics::Geometry) and thus an interrelation that occurs among some of the sciences,
there is a strict independence to be sought after for each of the architectonic sciences.
This move is made by Aristotle so as to avoid Plato’s claim that there is a theory of
everything that is in turn derivable from the same set of first principles and which leads to
the reality of a unified super-science.33 Aristotle does not believe that this sort of thing is
possible, and instead argues for a kind of autonomy of the sciences. What this implies for
the natural scientist then is that a complete explanation of a natural entity must be done in
accordance with the principles exclusive to natural science as such. Thus, in order to
attain knowledge of the natural world and thus possess a complete explanation which
answers the why of something, one must do so within the principles and thus limitations
of natural science alone.
It is now possible for us to examine how it is that the natural scientist actually
goes about attaining a complete explanation of a natural entity. A complete explanation
in natural science then aims to grasp the why of those things that are studied by the
natural scientist. And to explain the why of something in turn is to explain the primary
cause (αἴτιον) of something, which for Aristotle is finally to provide an answer to four
distinct ways in which the natural scientist actually explains the primary cause of some
natural entity.34 These four ways in which one provides an explanation of something
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Posterior Analytics I 7, I 32.
In Greek usage, the term αἴτιον is related to the adjective αἴτιος, which describes an object as being
responsible or blameworthy for something. This is a key point to understanding Aristotle’s conception of
causality. A cause for Aristotle is not what modern scientists and philosophers generally take it to be.
Rather, it is best to understand αἴτιον as representing something that is responsible for the thing that is
being explained. Understanding αἴτιον in this way then helps one to see more clearly how it is that
Aristotle seeks to answer the why of something. If one were to ask why the rabbit has teeth shaped in such
and such a way, one is more than likely not asking for a set of previous causes which lead to the shape of
the rabbits teeth, but rather is searching for an answer that refers to the purpose of the rabbit possessing the
kind of teeth that it does. Of course, for Aristotle the purpose or end of something is part of a complete
explanation, and thus a valid answer, although perhaps not a complete one, in natural explanation.
34

29

have been subsequently identified as the ‘Four Causes,’ and Aristotle defines each cause
by asserting that “…some are cause as substratum (e.g. the parts), others as essence (the
whole, the synthesis, and the form). The semen, the physician, the man who has
deliberated, and in general the agent, are all sources of change or of rest. The remainder
are causes as the end and the good of the other things; or that for the sake of which other
things are, is naturally the best and the end of the other things…”35 The four causes here
identified by Aristotle then are vital for one to attain a complete explanation within
natural science.
The first of these causes would refer to the matter (ὕλη) of which a thing is
composed. This is what Aristotle calls the substratum (ὑποκείμενον), which is that
underlying matter which makes up a thing and which serves as the subject of change.
Broadly speaking then, the material cause of something is for Aristotle the cause out of
which (τὸ ἐξ οὖ αιτια), which includes letters, parts of wholes, and arguments from which
the conclusion is derived.36 Thus, to refer to an earlier example, the matter of a syllable
would be the letters out of which the syllable is formed. Aristotle also states that it would
be the bronze of a statue which would be the statue’s substratum and its matter.37 For
living things, it would be the parts which make up the body of a living thing; namely its
organs and, further down the scale, the homogeneous material that make up these
organs.38 Accordingly, to explain something in terms of what makes up that thing would

ἅπαντα δὲ τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα αἴτια εἰς τέτταρας τρόπους πίπτει τοὺς φανερωτάτους…τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν ὡς
τὸ ὑποκείμενον, οἷον τὰ μέρη, τὰ δὲ ὡς τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, τό τε ὅλον καὶ ἡ σύνθεσις καὶ τὸ εἶδος. τὸ δὲ σπέρμα
καὶ ὁ ἰατρὸς καὶ ὁ βουλεύσας καὶ ὅλως τὸ ποιοῦν, πάντα ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς μεταβολῆς ἢ στάσεως. τὰ δ’ ὡς
τὸ τέλος καὶ τἀγαθὸν τῶν ἄλλων· τὸ γὰρ οὗ ἕνεκα βέλτιστον καὶ τέλος τῶν ἄλλων ἐθέλει εἶναι…
Metaphysics Δ 2 1013b17-26.
36
Physics II 3 195a16-21.
37
Physics II 3 194b24-26.
38
Aristotle calls matter which when divided is divided into more of the same, such as flesh or water,
homogeneous. When one divides water for instance, one gets more water and therefore water is
35
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be to explain it according to its matter (letters, premises, physical materials such as
bronze, simple organic parts, organs etc…) and thus one would be providing the material
cause of a thing. But, as we have already seen, Aristotle does not believe that the
material cause by itself needs no further explanation. Rather, the matter of a thing, at
least for living things, is relative to the kind of thing that it is.39 Jonathan Lear makes this
point by saying that “…while human lungs, liver, hands, etc., are the matter of a human
being, a human is not a mere heap of liver and lungs. He is liver, lungs, etc., organized in
such a way: there is thus required…a principle responsible for organizing human organs
and limbs into human form.”40 And this principle of organizing the matter of something
is not only, as we have already seen, the basis for Aristotle’s claim that a natural entity
cannot be explained through reducing it to the matter of which it is composed, but it also,
in order to provide a complete explanation of a certain natural kind, crucially points us in
the direction of that which accounts for a thing’s motions and its particular
arrangement.41 In the most general sense then, matter represents a substratum. And
specifically, the matter of something can refer to a variety of things which make up a
certain something. The material cause then represents a part of a complete natural
explanation, and points to that out of which a thing is composed. In the natural world,
this would be to point to the body and parts of a natural kind.

homogeneous. On the other hand, matter which when divided does not make more of the thing which is
divided, is called by him heterogeneous. Heterogeneous parts would include hands or arms. For
Aristotle’s discussion of this see GC. I 1 314a20.
39
See the discussion on natural explanation provided earlier.
40
Lear, Aristotle: The Desire to Understand, 21.
41
As we have also briefly discussed, this points us to the form of a thing. It is correspondingly the form of
an entity which must be the focus of natural explanation for the natural scientist. The matter of something
accordingly will not provide a complete explanation of the entity as such.
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But, as we have already seen, the body and parts of a natural kind are to be
understood in light of their organizing inner principle since it is this principle which
specifically determines and organizes the relevant matter of a natural entity. The
necessity to explain the organization of something then leads Aristotle to identify the
second of the four causes, the formal cause (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι). Aristotle describes this cause
by stating that “According to another [manner of speaking], the form or model is a cause;
this is the formula of what it is to be some thing, and its kinds – for example, the cause of
the octave is the ratio of two to one, and more generally number – and the parts which
come into the account.”42 The formal cause then points to the nature of a thing, and more
so than its matter, for it is precisely because of the form of something that we can see
why it has the matter that it does. It is, correspondingly, the form of some such thing
which makes something knowable, and which makes sense of the activities that that thing
is carrying out. To give the formal cause of something then would be to account for its
essence, which is its form. This form in turn is the inner principle of motion and stability
which distinguishes natural entities from artificial entities. And once one has identified
this, one can then proceed to understand the bodily parts of a particular kind, and thus the
matter of that kind, since it is precisely the form of a thing which gives it its
intelligibility.
The third cause mentioned by Aristotle in the above passage would be what has
been commonly called the efficient cause; that which is the principle of change
(ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως). This αἴτιον is understood by Aristotle as being that which

ἄλλον δὲ τὸ εἶδος και τὸ παράδειγμα, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ τὰ τούτου γένη (οἷον
τοῦ διὰ πασῶν τὰ δύο πρὸς ἑν, καὶ ὅλως ὁ ἀριθμός ) καὶ τὰ μέρη τὰ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ. Physics II 3 194b26-29.
(translation Monte Ransom Johnson).
42
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serves to explain an actualizing of a potentiality in a thing that is being changed.43 To use
one of Aristotle’s favorite examples, namely a house being built, the builder who is
building the house would constitute the efficient cause of the activity in so far as she is
the source of the change that is currently underway. The change that is occurring within
the patient is moreover an actualization of a potentiality, namely the actualizing of a
house which is potentially there within the materials that are being operated upon. What
is being actualized in this process is importantly not just any thing whatsoever, but that
which the thing that is being acted upon possesses potentially. Aristotle states then that
the moving cause must be understood as that which possesses a form which is being
actualized within the thing being acted upon, and even more specifically the form itself.
Aristotle makes this claim in the third book of the Physics by arguing that “The mover
will always transmit a form, either a ‘this’ or such or so much, which, when it moves,
will be the principle and cause of the motion, e.g. the actual man begets man from what is
potentially man.”44 Regarding the production of a house, the form that is being
actualized in the material, and thus the organization and structure that is coming to be in
the wood that will make up the house, is found within the craftsman who is in the process
of building the house, and in an important sense the form of the house within the
craftsman is the actual efficient cause of the house itself.45 And as far as natural kinds are
concerned, the thing which produces a new individual through reproduction possesses the
same form as the new thing. In other words, the parent is the same in kind and thus in
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The actualizing of a potentiality is how Aristotle defines change. See Physics III 1.
εἶδος δὲ ἀεὶ οἴσεταί τι τὸ κινοῦν, ἤτοι τόδε ἢ τοσόνδε, ὃ ἔσται ἀρχὴ καὶ αἴτιον τῆς κινήσεως, ὅταν κινῇ,
οἷον ὁ ἐντελεχείᾳ ἄνθρωπος ποιεῖ ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος ἀνθρώπου ἄνθρωπον. Physics III 2 202a9-11.
45
Jonathan Lear has a good discussion of how the form, acting as a force for its own realization, is
responsible for the production of artifacts. For his discussion of this see Lear, Aristotle: The Desire to
Understand, 29-35.
44
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form as the offspring, and the change that takes place is explained through the same form.
Thus, the motion which is underway in reproduction is an internal motion in so far as the
moving cause possesses the same form as that which is being produced. Essentially,
Aristotle believes that the fully actualized form in the parent is responsible for the
production of the offspring, and thus the form of the kind under consideration is
ultimately responsible for the production of the new individual of the same kind.
The actual development of the newly produced offspring into a fully-fledged
adult in its own right, as well as the characteristic activities of an adult member of a
natural kind, also demands an additional explanation which is other than the one’s
provided by the previous three causes. For although the previous causes do explain the
characteristic activities of the entity in question, there is still a need to explain the end
toward which these activities aim. In other words, Aristotle believes that it is necessary
to provide an explanation of the goal of the activities, what the entity is attempting to
achieve when carrying out its characteristic motions. Aristotle recognizes this need and
identifies the fourth cause in part as a way of explaining this sort of development. This is
what has been called the final cause (τὸ οὖ ἕνεκα). This cause in its simplest version
points to the ‘purpose’ or ‘end’ towards which a movement is directed. So, if we take a
juvenile offspring of a particular animal, Aristotle believes that we must explain why it is
that it grows the way that it does. And this is explained by him in turn through the idea
that the form of that thing in a sense exercises a kind of active dynamis which directs the
movements and growth of the young individual in such a way so as to ensure, given the
right external conditions, that it attains the full realization of the form that it possesses.
But this cause does not simply explain the genetic development of juvenile organisms in
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nature, it also explains the motions of adult members of a kind as well. For since the
form of an individual thing provides it with its nature, the motions of that thing will be
directed in such a way as to actualize the nature of the form that it possesses. And this in
turn implies that the motions of an individual organism are purposeful and thus enddirected in a very important sense; namely they are attempts to fully attain the nature that
they possess as a form. It follows from this then that, much like the efficient cause, the
final cause seems to be reducible to the formal cause. However, the goal-directed
movements that are necessarily a part of nature in turn allow us to recognize the form and
thus the ‘nature’ of a natural entity. Thus in the Meteorology, Aristotle makes it quite
clear that the end or function of a thing is the first principle of explaining a thing: “What
a thing is is always determined by its function: a thing really is itself when it can perform
its function; an eye, for instance, when it can see. When a thing cannot do so it is that
thing only in name, like a dead eye or one made of stone, just as a wooden saw is no
more a saw than one in a picture.”46 So in an important sense the ‘for the sake of which’
allows one to identify the form and subsequently the cause which brought a particular
individual of that kind about.
The fact that the characteristic activities of a natural entity define what they truly
are also leads us to an important consideration when discussing Aristotelian teleology,
namely that goal directed activities are ontologically real for Aristotle. Thus Aristotle
would deny the modern tendency to view teleological explanations as merely an
unnecessary addition placed upon mechanistic explanations.47 This happens it is said

τὰ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμενα ποιεῖν τὸ αὑτῶν ἔργον ἀληθῶς ἐστιν ἕκαστον, οἷον ὀφθαλμὸς εἰ ὁρᾷ, τὸ δὲ μὴ
δυνάμενον ὁμωνύμως, οἷον ὁ τεθνεὼς ἢ ὁ λίθινος· οὐδὲ γὰρ πρίων ὁ ξύλινος, ἀλλ´ ἢ ὡς εἰκών. οὕτω τοίνυν
καὶ σάρξ· Meteorology IV 12 390a10-14.
47
Monte Ransom Johnson, Aristotle on Teleology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), 182-188.
46
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either necessarily, as a heuristic that cannot be avoided by the human mind, or as simply
a tendency to anthropomorphize nature.48 However, Aristotle does not see teleological
explanation in this way. Rather, Aristotle believes that it is necessary to first understand
the goal or end towards which a specific natural motion is striving, before one can
account for the motion itself. Nature for Aristotle is fundamentally goal oriented, and
this serves as a starting point for attaining any explanation whatsoever. 49 Aristotle states
this quite clearly in Parts of Animals when he argues that:

48

An example of teleological explanations being a necessary heuristic for interpreting nature as human
beings experience it, but not actually a description of real causes, is clearly found in Kant. According to
Johnson, Kant argued that “Final causes are held to be merely regulative concepts of judgment, and are not
constitutive of the entities being explained…since it is a limitation of human knowledge that we cannot
explain organisms on the basis of mechanism alone, we are forced to invoke final causes and teleological
explanations” (Johnson, 182). An example of the argument which holds that teleological explanation
merely anthropomorphize nature would be Lucretius, who states in his On the Nature of the Universe that
“Indeed the earth is now and has been always devoid entirely of any kind of feeling. The reason why it
brings forth many things in many ways into the light of sun is that it holds a multitude of atoms. If anyone
decides to call the sea Neptune, and corn Ceres, and misuse the name of Bacchus rather than give grape
juice its proper title, let us agree that he can call the earth mother of the gods, on this condition – that he
refuses to pollute his mind with the foul poison of religion” (Lucretius, On the Nature of the Universe, 54).
For the views of the atomists such as Lucretius see Lucretius, On the Nature of the Universe, trans. Ronald
Melville (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
49
The claim that for Aristotle nature is fundamentally goal oriented, and that an explanation of a thing
involves the explanation of what a thing is striving to achieve, and that it is impossible to conceive of
purely mechanistic explanation that could explain all of the motions of natural entities, is for the most part
the common and overwhelmingly agreed upon interpretation of Aristotle’s account of nature and natural
explanation. There are however exceptions to this interpretation of Aristotle’s account of explanation.
Martha Nussbaum for instance argues that the elements do not have a teleological explanation for their
motions, but merely a (presumably) mechanical one. Nussbaum states that “…the idea that [Aristotle
thinks] natural phenomena…are best explained teleologically is a misconception that [Aristotle tries]
frequently to avoid…To explain the downward motion of a stone, we need mention only its own matter or
an external source of change that constrains it; changes of natural bodies…are regularly explained with
reference to underlying matter alone…” (Nussbaum, Aristotle’s De Motu Animalium, 94). And David
Charles argues that “…there is no reason to accept that Aristotle thought that it was irrational to believe
that a complete physical account of the relevant kind could be given: i.e. an account stated in independent
physical terms of conditions sufficient for the occurrence of an organism of kind K…” (Charles, “Aristotle
on Hypothetical Necessity and Irreducibility,” 5). A slightly different approach to teleological explanation
in Aristotle is to hold the position that Aristotle’s use of teleological explanations is due to his recognition
that natural explanations cannot be complete when one reduces the natural objects to the mere elements
which make up the object in question. Allan Gotthelf holds this position and even goes so far as to state
that “There is nothing in the fundamentals of Aristotle’s philosophy, and nothing in his philosophical or
scientific method, which would prohibit the adoption of a reducibility thesis, should the scientific evidence
be judged to warrant it” (Gotthelf, “Aristotle’s Conception of Final Causality, 229). My view on the
matter is that it is incomprehensible to state that Aristotle believed that a materialistic reductionist theory
was possible in principle, or that certain natural entities like the elements and other natural bodies are not to
be explained in teleological terms. For Aristotle, the final cause was basic, and one would not know what
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Since we see multiple causes in natural generation…one must determine
concerning these, which naturally comes first, and which second. But evidently
first is that which we call ‘for the sake of something’ (φαίνεται δὲ πρώτη, ἣν
λέγομεν ἕνεκα τινος). For this is an account, and the account is the starting point
in the same way both in the things composed in accordance with art, and in the
natural things. For it is when (either in thought or perception) the doctor has
defined health, or the architect the house, that they retail the accounts and the
causes of that which they do, and give the reason why one must do it in this way.
But that for the sake of which and the good exist more in nature’s works than in
the things of art.50
Aristotle’s claim here that that for the sake of which and the good exist more in nature
than in art is his way of emphasizing the importance of recognizing the final cause of
natural motion, and thus the teleological attributes inherent in nature, before one can
provide an explanation of any natural entity whatsoever.
3. The Externalist and Internalist Interpretations of Aristotle’s Teleology

a) The Externalist Interpretation
As we have seen then, Aristotle’s concept of natural entities and natural explanation
is a complex and dense topic. The upshot that I have tried to show however is that all
natural things are defined as such through their respective forms, which represent an

to explain at all concerning anything without first understanding what the thing being explained is aiming
at or what it is for, and that this is a part of explaining the form of an entity or class of entities as well.
However, I will not be considering this dispute in any real depth in this dissertation as the question as to
precisely how Aristotle saw teleological explanations as fitting in with modern reductionist theories is
beyond the purview of this project. It is enough for my purposes to simply state that Aristotle certainly
believed that teleological explanations were a fundamental part of explaining natural entities. For a sample
of the debate concerning the place of teleological explanation in Aristotle see David Charles, “Aristotle on
Hypothetical Necessity and Irreducibility,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 69, no. 1 (1988): 1-53; Allan
Gotthelf, “Aristotle’s Conception of Final Causality,” in Philosophical Issues in Aristotle’s Biology, ed.
Allan Gotthelf and James G. Lennox (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 204-242; Martha
Nussbaum, Aristotle’s De Motu Animalium (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).
50
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, ἐπεὶ πλείους ὁρῶμεν αἰτίας περὶ τὴν γένεσιν τὴν φυσικήν… φαίνεται δὲ πρώτη ἣν
λέγομεν ἕνεκά τινος· λόγος γὰρ οὗτος, ἀρχὴ δ' ὁ λόγος ὁμοίως ἔν τε τοῖς δατὰ τέχνην καὶ ἐν τοῖς φύσει
συνεστηκόσιν. ἢ γαρ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἢ τῇ αἰσθήσει ὁρισάμενος ὁ μὲν ἰατρὸς τὴν ὑγίειαν ὁ δ' οἰκοδόμος τὴν
οἰκίαν, ἀποδιδόασι τοὺς λόγους καὶ τὰς αἰτίας οὗ ποιοῦσιν ἑκάστου, καὶ διότι ποιητέον οὕτως. Parts of
Animals I 1 639b11-21 (Johnson translation).
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inner principle of motion and stability. The motions that such a principle produces then
would be those motions characteristic of the kind that it is. A natural explanation
accordingly would seek to explain the form of a natural entity, and through its form one
would be able to explain the material, efficient, and final causes. Providing an account of
these four causes would moreover allow one to answer the why of something, and thus
complete one’s natural explanation. In addition, we have also seen that Aristotle’s
definition of a natural entity implies that a natural form, as internal principle, is an active
principle which propels an entity to actualize those properties that are characteristic of the
entity that it is. This process of actualization then produces motions that Aristotle would
take to be inherently teleological, in so far as they would represent the realization of the
form which the entity possesses as an internal principle. Thus the characteristic motions
of a life form would be explained for Aristotle solely through the form of that thing.
Aristotle seems to explicitly make this point by asserting that “We must explain the why
in every way, namely, that from this necessarily that (‘from this’ either without
qualification or for the most part); that this must be so if that is to be so (as the conclusion
from the premises); that this was the essence; and because it is better thus – not without
qualification, but with reference to the essence of each thing.”51 So, at this point, we
seem to have a tidy and limited sense of how far Aristotle sees nature to be teleological,
namely through the realization of the form of natural entities. There would be no room
accordingly to ascribe a natural teleology that is broad or hierarchical and which covers
the order or arrangement of all the entities within the natural world. However, as I have

καὶ ταύτην εἰδέναι δεῖ, καὶ πάντως ἀποδοτέον τὸ διὰ τί, οἷον ὅτι ἐκ τοῦδε ἀνάγκη τόδε (τὸ δὲ ἐκ τοῦδε ἢ
ἁπλῶς ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ), καὶ εἰ μέλλει τοδὶ ἔσεσθαι (ὥσπερ ἐκ τῶν προτάσεων τὸ συμπέρασμα), καὶ ὅτι
τοῦτ´ ἦν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, καὶ διότι βέλτιον οὕτως, οὐχ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς τὴν ἑκάστου οὐσίαν. Physics II 7
198b4-9.
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already mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, there are passages within the
Aristotelian corpus which seem to contradict this tidy interpretation of natural teleology
in Aristotle’s works. Of these passages, there are three in particular that have directly
caused some to interpret Aristotle as defending a natural teleology which includes the
interaction and benefits provided by certain natural entities and phenomena with/to other
entities and phenomena and thus a teleology which is fundamentally hierarchical.
The first of the controversial passages on natural teleology within Aristotle is of
course Metaphysics Λ 10.52 The second of the three controversial passages we will be
discussing comes from the Politics, and provides the most explicit and at first sight best
case for the view that Aristotelian teleology is hierarchical. In this passage, which is
worth quoting in full, Aristotle states that:
In like manner we may infer that, after the birth of animals, plants exist for their
sake, and that the other animals exist for the sake of man, the tame for use and
food, the wild, if not all, at least the greater part of them, for food, and for the
provision of clothing and various instruments. Now if nature makes nothing
incomplete, and nothing in vain, the inference must be that she has made all
animals for the sake of man.53
There are two rather striking implications that can be derived from this passage. Firstly,
contrary to the description of teleology that I have just provided in the first part of this
chapter, Aristotle seems to be asserting here a teleology which is hierarchically structured
and which involves the end of each kind of thing, except perhaps man, as being directed
in some sense outside of itself. Thus an explanation of the teleology of the various kinds

I analyze in detail Λ 10 in the third chapter of this dissertation. These two sections in particular will
focus for the most part on Physics II 8.
53
ὥστε ὁμοίως δῆλον ὅτι καὶ γενομένοις οἰητέον τά τε φυτὰ τῶν ζῴων ἕνεκεν εἶναι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα τῶν
ἀνθρώπων χάριν, τὰ μὲν ἥμερα καὶ διὰ τὴν χρῆσιν καὶ διὰ τὴν τροφήν, τῶν δ´ ἀγρίων, εἰ μὴ πάντα, ἀλλὰ τά
γε πλεῖστα τῆς τροφῆς καὶ ἄλλης βοηθείας ἕνεκεν, ἵνα καὶ ἐσθὴς καὶ ἄλλα ὄργανα γίνηται ἐξ αὐτῶν. εἰ οὖν
ἡ φύσις μηθὲν μήτε ἀτελὲς ποιεῖ μήτε μάτην, ἀναγκαῖον τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἕνεκεν αὐτὰ πάντα πεποιηκέναι
τὴν φύσιν. Politics I 8 1256b15-22.
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of things extends beyond merely focusing on the internal process of actualizing certain
capacities that are inherent in the thing itself and rather seems to include the contribution
of an entity that is other than the entity being explained. And, secondly, not only is
Aristotle’s teleology hierarchical if we are to take this passage seriously, but it also
asserts that at least some things are for the benefit of man. This latter point tells us that
human beings play an important and even essential part of the cosmic hierarchy, in so far
as they seem to be placed at the top of such a hierarchy. And if plants and animals exist
for the sake of human beings, then Aristotle’s teleology would have to be considered as
fundamentally anthropocentric. Of course, given what I have just discussed concerning
nature and natural teleology in relation to the final cause, this passage and its implications
seem to be inconsistent with Aristotle’s general take on natural teleology as it is generally
understood.
The third passage comes from the Physics, and is made in the context of
Aristotle’s attempt to defend the necessity of final causes existing in nature. In this
passage, Aristotle states that:
A difficulty presents itself: why should not nature work, not for the sake of
something, nor because it is better so, but just as the sky rains, not in order to
make the corn grow, but of necessity? (What is drawn up must cool, and what has
been cooled must become water and descend, the result of this being that the corn
grows.) Similarly if a man’s crop is spoiled on the threshing-floor, the rain did
not fall for the sake of this - in order that the crop might be spoiled - but that
result just followed. Why then should it not be the same with the parts in nature,
e.g. that our teeth should come up of necessity – the front teeth sharp, fitted for
tearing, the molars broad and useful for grinding down the food – since they did
not arise for this end, but it was merely a coincident result; and so with all other
parts in which we suppose that there is purpose… Yet it is impossible that this
should be the true view. For these things and all other natural things either
invariably or for the most part come about in a given way; but of not one of the
results of chance or spontaneity is this true. We do not ascribe to chance or mere
coincidence the frequency of rain in winter, but frequent rain in summer we do;
nor heat in summer but only if we have it in winter. If then, it is agreed that
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things are either the result of coincidence or for the sake of something, and these
cannot be the result of coincidence or spontaneity, it follows that they must be for
the sake of something; and that such things are all due to nature even the
champions of the theory which is before us would agree. Therefore action for an
end is present in things which come to be and are by nature.54
This latter passage is an extremely important one for understanding Aristotle’s teleology,
and why it is that there are some who argue that Aristotle defended a broader teleology.
To begin then, the argument of Physics II 8 is not entirely clear. It seems, upon
one’s initial reading of the argument, to take rain as an event which works through
necessity rather than for a purpose; for if one were to say that it rains in order for the
crops to grow, one would also be compelled to claim that it rains in order for one’s crops
to rot on the threshing floor, an effect which one would be inclined to say is not a result
of some purpose. And there have been a notable number of scholars who have taken this
passage to be arguing for exactly this conception of rain. Martha Nussbaum for instance
simply sees nothing controversial here whatsoever, stating that “The very opening of
[Aristotle’s] account of teleology in Ph. II.8 cites the example of rain as an illegitimate
case of teleological explanation...”55 According to Nussbaum then, all that Aristotle is

ἔχει δ´ ἀπορίαν τί κωλύει τὴν φύσιν μὴ ἕνεκά του ποιεῖν μη δ´ ὅτι βέλτιον, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ ὕει ὁ Ζεὺς οὐχ
ὅπως τὸν σῖτον αὐξήσῃ, ἀλλ´ ἐξ ἀνάγκης (τὸ γὰρ ἀναχθὲν ψυχθῆναι δεῖ, καὶ τὸ ψυχθὲν ὕδωρ γενόμενον
κατελθεῖν· τὸ δ´ αὐξάνεσθαι τούτου γενομένου τὸν σῖτον συμβαίνει), ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἴ τῳ ἀπόλλυται ὁ
σῖτος ἐν τῇ ἅλῳ, οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα ὕει ὅπως ἀπόληται, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο συμβέβηκεν — ὥστε τί κωλύει οὕτω καὶ
τὰ μέρη ἔχειν ἐν τῇ φύσει, οἷον τοὺς ὀδόντας ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀνατεῖλαι τοὺς μὲν ἐμπροσθίους ὀξεῖς,
ἐπιτηδείους πρὸς τὸ διαιρεῖν, τοὺς δὲ γομφίους πλατεῖς καὶ χρησίμους πρὸς τὸ λεαίνειν τὴν τροφήν, ἐπεὶ οὐ
τούτου ἕνεκα γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ συμπεσεῖν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων μερῶν, ἐν ὅσοις δοκεῖ ὑπάρχειν τὸ
ἕνεκά του. ὅπου μὲν οὖν ἅπαντα συνέβη ὥσπερ κἂν εἰ ἕνεκά του ἐγίγνετο, ταῦτα μὲν ἐσώθη ἀπὸ τοῦ
αὐτομάτου συστάντα ἐπιτηδείως· ὅσα δὲ μὴ οὕτως, ἀπώλετο καὶ ἀπόλλυται, καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς λέγει
τὰ βουγενῆ ἀνδρόπρῳρα. ὁ μὲν οὖν λόγος, ᾧ ἄν τις ἀπορήσειεν, οὗτος, καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος τοιοῦτός ἐστιν·
ἀδύνατον δὲ τοῦτον ἔχειν τὸν τρόπον. ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ καὶ πάντα τὰ φύσει ἢ αἰεὶ οὕτω γίγνεται ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ
πολύ, τῶν δ´ ἀπὸ τύχης κα ὶτοῦ αὐτομάτου οὐδέν. οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ τύχης οὐδ´ ἀπὸ συμπτώματος δοκεῖ ὕειν
πολλάκις τοῦ χειμῶνος, ἀλλ´ ἐὰν ὑπὸ κύνα· οὐδὲ καύματα ὑπὸ κύνα, ἀλλ´ ἂν χειμῶνος. εἰ οὖν ἢ ἀπὸ
συμπτώματος δοκεῖ ἢ ἕνεκά του εἶναι, εἰ μὴ οἷόν τε ταῦτ´ εἶναι μήτε ἀπὸ συμπτώματος μήτ´ ἀπὸ
ταὐτομάτου, ἕνεκά του ἂν εἴη. ἀλλὰ μὴν φύσει γ´ ἐστὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, ὡς κἂν αὐτοὶ φαῖεν οἱ ταῦτα
λέγοντες. ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ ἕνεκά του ἐν τοῖς φύσει γιγνομένοις καὶ οὖσιν. Physics II 8 198b16-199a8. (My
modification of the oxford translation).
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M. Nussbaum, Aristotle’s De Motu Animalium, 94.
54

41

arguing here is that from the fact that animals and plants regularly and for the most part
grow, develop, and function in the same way according to their respective species we
must acknowledge that there is an internal teleology at work within the individual
members of these various species. However, there is no implication here, according to
Nussbaum, that rain should be understood as a teleological event. Rather, rain is to be
explained through the mechanistic account provided by Aristotle at the beginning of the
passage; namely that what goes up gets cold and must come back down as water.
The matter is not as simple as Nussbaum would have one believe however. John
Cooper for instance argues that Nussbaum is simply mistaken, and claims that there is no
doubt that Aristotle held the view that some meteorological events were teleological.56
Specifically Cooper argues that Aristotle defends the claim that heavy rains in winter and
warmth in summer and fall are teleological events. He states that “…Aristotle
unequivocally endorses the teleological explanation of these meteorological
regularities…Nussbaum is therefore wrong to cite 198b 18-21 as evidence that Aristotle
rejected such arguments as illegitimate.”57 David Furley moreover has presented a wellknown and convincing case for showing that this passage does argue that there is a
teleological aspect to rain, and specifically to winter rain.58 Furley points out that
Aristotle is clearly offering an exclusive disjunction between something either happening
by chance and something happening for a purpose. In the case of the argument that
Aristotle seems to be presenting then, Aristotle is seemingly making the claim that that

John Cooper, “Aristotle on Natural Teleology,” in Language and Logos, ed. Malcolm Schofield and
Martha Nussbaum (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 197-223.
57
Cooper, “Aristotle on Natural Teleology,” 217.
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David Furley, “The Rainfall Example in Physics ii.8,” in Aristotle on Nature and Living Things, ed.
Allan Gotthelf (Bristol: Bristol Classical Press, 1985), 177-183.
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which works for the benefit of something either does so spontaneously or it does so
because of the benefits that it provides. And since that which occurs spontaneously is
necessarily rare, anything that occurs for the benefit of something regularly, does so for
the sake of the benefit that it provides.59 And when one keeps in mind that, in Attica,
summer rain was an unexpected event and thus one which failed to occur regularly and
that winter rain was a regular and expected event which also provided a benefit, one
cannot understand Aristotle to be saying anything other than winter rain is in fact for the
sake of something.
David Sedley, moreover, has even argued that the distinction between the
regularity of winter rainfall and the irregularity of summer rainfall actually tells us that
Aristotle’s teleology is hierarchical and anthropocentric.60 Sedley argues that Aristotle is
not only asserting in this passage that rain has a purpose, but that its purpose is to provide
for the growth of crops. But Aristotle would then have argued that the crops too have an
end external to their own internal growth and development, and that this end could be
nothing other than the benefit and nutrition of human beings. Sedley defends this point
by considering what Aristotle has to say soon after the passage that we have been
considering, in which Aristotle states that “…generally art in some cases completes what

This analysis of the argument of Physics II 8 is close to that which Judson provides. For Judson’s
discussion of the argument see Lindsay Judson, “Aristotelian Teleology,” in Oxford Sturdies in Ancient
Philosophy 29, ed. David Sedley (Oxford: oxford University Press, 2005), 342-343.
60
Both Furley and Cooper argue that Physics II 8 imply a broader teleology as well. However, neither one
of them explicitly defends a hierarchical teleology as such. Cooper for his part argues that regular and
beneficial natural processes occur for the sake of life. Sedley, on the other hand, explicitly endorses an
anthropocentric interpretation of Aristotle’s natural teleology. Sedley’s anthropocentric view is primarily
defended by him in David Sedley, “Is Aristotle’s Teleology Anthropocentric?,” Phronesis 36 (1991): 179196 and David Sedley, “Metaphysics Λ 10,” in Aristotle’s Metaphysics Lambda: Symposium Aristotelicum,
ed. Michael Frede and David Charles (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), 327-351. I will be focusing on the
first of these works by Sedley in this chapter, as it primarily deals with Sedley’s interpretation of Physics II
8. I will discuss Sedley’s arguments in the second of these sources in the next chapter where I will be
examining Λ 10 in greater detail.
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nature cannot bring to a finish, and in others imitates nature.”61 Sedley uses this passage
to argue that since art perfects the nature of certain things, we can say that the agricultural
art perfects the plants that are involved in agricultural processes in so far as the purpose
of these plants would be to benefit human beings. Sedley further provides evidence for
this view by citing Phys. II 2 where Aristotle states that “…the arts too make their
material: some of it they make simpliciter, some of it they make workable. And we use it
on the ground that everything exists for our sake. For we ourselves too are, in one sense,
an end.”62 And the crops in question, who are benefited through the purposeful activity
of winter rainfall, are in turn perfected through the agricultural art, which thereby allows
the natural end of crops to be fulfilled; namely to provide nutrition for human beings. All
of this would indicate that the purposeful activity of winter rain has as its apex the
benefits provided to human beings, especially through the intermediary of the plants and
animals that are benefitted by the winter rain.
If this interpretation is correct, then Aristotle’s teleology must be deeply
anthropocentric. When one combines this interpretation of Physics II.8 with Politics I.8,
it is easy to see Aristotle as arguing that plants and beasts are in a teleological
subordination to human beings. This is especially apparent when one considers Sedley’s
point that Aristotle saw the arts as perfecting the nature of things (e.g. domestic animals,
agricultural crops) in order that they may naturally provide their benefits to man. Of
course, Sedley is aware that it would seem strange to argue that it is in the nature of the
plant or the animal to be eaten and thereby to benefit man; for we would then have to

ὅλως δὲ ἡ τέχνη τὰ μὲν ἐπιτελεῖ ἃ ἡ φύσις ἀδυνατεῖ ἀπεργάσασθαι, τὰ δὲ μιμεῖται. Physics II.8 199a1517.
62
ἐπεὶ καὶ ποιοῦσιν αἱ τέχναι τὴν ὕλην αἱ μὲν ἁπλῶς αἱ δὲ εὐεργόν, καὶ χρώμεθα ὡς ἡμῶν ἕνεκα πάντων
ὑπαρχόντων (ἐσμὲν γάρπως καὶ ἡμεῖς τέλος· Physics II 2 194a33-35. (translation and italics by Sedley).
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understand Aristotle as arguing that a rabbit is directed by its nature to both develop and
mature into a healthy and fully realized rabbit as well as to be eaten by something else.
And we have also seen that when considering Aristotle’s account of natural objects and
natural explanation, Aristotle does not seem to believe that one must take into
consideration the kinds of benefits that one kind may provide to another kind in order to
attain knowledge of the kind in question.63 Rather, the process of explaining natural
kinds for Aristotle refers to the form of that natural kind, its essence so to speak, which in
turn is signified and allows us to attain certainty of the teleological motions of that kind
in so far as they are the actualizations of an internal principle of motion and stability.
The fact that such explanations, attained through providing an account of the four causes
of a thing, always refers to the nature/form of that kind seems to bar us from including
the nature of other kinds of things in our explanation. It is true that the organs of an
animal require for their explanation a reference outside of itself, and that thus there are
teleological explanations in Aristotle which extend beyond the entity being explained.
However, Aristotle recognizes that there are basic substances in the natural world, and
which possess a form which organizes the body of the substance in question. The point
then is that nowhere, with an important exception, does Aristotle seem to believe that the
complete explanation of a natural entity or substance require entities different in kind to
the entity being explained. And in general, the biological works of Aristotle seem to
perfectly follow this demand for explanation.
However, Sedley, could argue that there is evidence for his view even in the
biological works. An exception to the general Aristotelian position that an explanation of
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See my discussion of this point in the first part of this chapter.
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something does not involve explaining entities other in kind than the entity being
explained is in Parts of Animals. At one point, Aristotle claims in his discussion
concerning the eating habits of dolphins and sharks that:
Fishes also present diversities as regards the mouth. For in some this is placed in
front, at the very extremity of the body, while in others as the dolphin and the
Selachia, it is placed on the under surface; so that these fishes turn on the back in
order to take their food. The purpose of nature in this was apparently not merely
to provide a means of salvation for other animals (φαίνεται δ' ἡ φύσις οὐ μόνον
σωτηρίας ἕνεκεν ποιῆσαι τοῦτο τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων), by allowing them opportunity
of escape during the time lost in the act of turning – for all the fishes with this
kind of mouth prey on living animals – but also to prevent these fishes from
giving way too much to their gluttonous ravening after food. For had they been
able to seize their prey more easily than they do, they would soon have perished
from over-repletion. An additional reason is that their snout is round and small,
and therefore cannot admit of a wide opening.64
This passage, at the very least, does provide Sedley with textual support from the
biological works for the thesis that there is a broader teleology for Aristotle. For
Aristotle seems here to be presenting a teleological explanation of a natural feature
exemplified in dolphins and sharks, namely the location of their mouths, which he
explains by referencing the benefits that a wide range of species distinct from dolphins
and sharks receive. Nonetheless, Aristotle does not here nor anywhere else in the
biological works show how a natural explanation through solely referencing the
nature/form of a natural entity, can incorporate the regular benefits provided to certain
other entities higher up on the teleological hierarchy that Sedley’s interpretation

ἔχει δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸ στόμα διαφορὰς. τὰ μὲν γὰρ κατ' ἀντικρὺ ἔχει τὸ στόμα καὶ εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν, τὰ δ' ἐν
τοῖς ὑπτίοις, οἷον οἵ τε δελφῖνες και τὰ σελαχώδη· και ὕπτια στρεφόμενα λαμβάνει τὴν τροφήν. φαίνεται δ'
ἡ φύσις οὐ μόνον σωτηρίας ἕνεκεν ποιῆσαι τοῦτο τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων (ἐν γὰρ τῇ στρέψει σῴζεται τἆλλα
βραδυνόντων· πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ζῳοφάγα ἐστίν), ἀλλὰ δαὶ πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν τῇ λαιμαργίᾳ τῇ
περὶ τὴν τροφήν· ῥᾷον γὰρ λαμβάνοντα διεφθείρετ' ἂν διὰ τὴν πλήρωσιν ταχέως. πρὸς δὶ τούτοις περιφερῆ
και λεπτὴν ἔχοντα τὴν τοῦ ῥύγχους φύσιν οὐχ οἷόν τ' εὐδιαίρετον ἔχειν. (My italics) An alternative
translation of φαίνεται δ' ἡ φύσις οὐ μόνον σωτηρίας ἕνεκεν ποιῆσαι τοῦτο τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων would be
“And nature appears to do this not only for the sake of the preservation of the other animals.” Either
translation however implies that the purpose of the part of the animal is in part understood through the
benefit it provides to other animals. Parts of Animals IV 13 696a24-34
64
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demands. Regarding the sharks passage just mentioned, as Lindsay Judson puts it
“…there is no suggestion here of any subordination of the τέλος, or end, of the sharks or
dolphins to that of the smaller fish – still less of any connection with the τέλος of human
beings.”65 What Sedley needs to account for then is to show whose nature is being
explained and thereby exhibited through the regular benefits provided by individual
entities to other entities higher up on the teleological hierarchy since it seems to be the
case for Aristotle that it is not the individual natures of the various entities within the
cosmos that is being exhibited.
Sedley’s solution to this issue is his claim that Aristotle thought that the nature of
the cosmos as a whole is what is exhibited through the purposeful activity of the plants
and animals being consumed for the benefit of human beings, and that therefore it is not
in the nature of the animals and plants themselves to be consumed.66 But this is not to
say, according to Sedley, that Aristotle believed that the cosmos as a whole was a living
organism whose purpose was being realized through the anthropocentric hierarchy.
Rather, Sedley argues that, through analyzing Metaphysics Λ 10, the universe for
Aristotle possesses a good in the same sense that the household and the polis possesses a
good, asserting that “the good orderly arrangement which he associates with ‘the nature
of the whole’ can, in attenuated form, be traced all the way down into the sublunary
world…”67 All things in the universe would be comparable to that of the household and

Judson, “Aristotelian Teleology,” 363.
Sedley, “Is Aristotle’s Teleology Anthropocentric,” 192.
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Sedley, 193. I will end up arguing something similar in my interpretation of Metaphysics Λ 10 in this
dissertation. The difference between my interpretation and Sedley’s view is that I do not for one believe
that Aristotle’s teleology is anthropocentric, nor is it hierarchical in the same sense that Sedley believes that
Aristotle defended. Secondly, I also believe that Sedley’s view of the nature of the cosmic order which he
and I defend is mistaken, since one must account for the ontological status of the nature of the cosmic order
and how Aristotle understood its relationship to the individual entities within the cosmos. I believe that the
only method available for us is to take what Aristotle has to say regarding the nature of the polis, and to
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polis in which the specific arrangement would contribute to the good of the whole. So
the slaves and beasts found at the bottom of the household hierarchy would be
represented in the cosmos by the plants and animals that find themselves at the bottom of
the cosmic hierarchy and are therefore in part there for the benefit of that which is higher
on that hierarchy, namely man.
However, Sedley’s interpretation of Aristotle’s teleology does not seem to
sufficiently prove the point that he is defending. The only text of the four that I have
mentioned in defense of Sedley’s anthropocentric view that explicitly describes the kind
of teleological relationship that Sedley is asserting would be Politics I 8. The other three
texts, although they certainly seem to indicate a broader view of teleology than what has
been ascribed to Aristotle at times, do not explicitly defend a teleological hierarchy which
puts human beings at the top in the sublunary realm. What Sedley must show then is not
that these passages merely present to us a view of Aristotelian teleology that is broader,
and therefore at odds with how Aristotle seemingly construed natural teleology according
to the interpretation that I provided in the first part of this dissertation, but that these texts
specifically defend a teleological hierarchy of subordination in which human beings are
placed at the apex and all other sublunary natural entities are somehow to be construed
according to their teleological relationship with those things higher up in the hierarchy.
This claim is not explicitly defended in any of the passages we have discussed excepting
Politics I 8. Accordingly, in order to come to terms with the anthropocentric
interpretation of Aristotelian teleology, it is necessary to first consider what Aristotle
might intend in the argument of Politics I 8.

understand the nature of the cosmic order in same sense. I will therefore return to Sedley’s view of the
cosmic order in the following chapters.
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Firstly, although, as I will argue in later chapters, there are certain claims within
the Politics that are clearly important when one wants to get a clear picture of Aristotle’s
metaphysics, it is important to keep in mind that the work as a whole is not meant to be a
metaphysical treatise concerning nature nor is it meant to be a discussion of teleology
simpliciter. Rather the work is a description of how human beings necessarily live, and
how this involves the polis as a necessary component of human nature. None of this
entails that we should take such claims as we find in Politics I 8 as indicative of
Aristotle’s view of nature as such. Rather, it seems more likely that Aristotle intends us
to take such claims as involving how human beings within a polis view the world. And
as far as human beings are concerned, animals are for their benefit. Admittedly, this
observation does not show us that we shouldn’t take Politics I 8 as defending an
anthropocentric natural teleology, but it at the least should give us pause before taking it
as such. What we should find if indeed Aristotle intended this passage to describe natural
teleology is an application of its claims in the works which actually seek to provide
natural explanation. And as I have already indicated, there is just no explicit evidence of
such an approach on the part of Aristotle.
But then, given the fact that Aristotle does not seem to use an anthropocentric
view of teleological explanation in his natural works and theory of natural explanation as
provided in the early chapters of Physics II, how specifically should we understand the
claim that nature has “made all animals for the sake of man?” I would argue that this
claim of Aristotle’s is perfectly in line with the claims concerning nature and natural
science discussed earlier. In order to see how Aristotle understands animals as being for
the sake of man however, it is first necessary to point out that Aristotle clearly recognizes
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two senses of final causality. In just one of the passages in which Aristotle explicitly
makes this distinction, Aristotle states “But ‘that for the sake of which’ is twofold, both
the ‘of which’ and the ‘for which’ (διττῶς δὲ τὸ οὖ ἕνεκα, τό τε οὗ καὶ τὸ ᾧ).”68 The
distinction here then is between an end of a motion understood as the aim of (οὗ ἕνεκαοὖ) something, and the end in the sense of the beneficiary (οὗ ἕνεκα- ᾧ). So something
can strive toward an end for Aristotle in the sense that it is attempting to achieve that end,
which would fall under the first of the two senses of final causality, whereas something
can benefit, in either a non-accidental sense or in an accidental sense, from the motions of
a particular thing, which would be the second sense of final causality. In terms of the
soul then, Johnson describes the distinction that Aristotle is making here by saying that
“The body exists for the aim of the soul’s functioning, and the soul’s functions exist for
the benefit of the individual organism that lives through the soul and with the body.”69
This distinction is vital for correctly understanding Politics I 8, as it certainly seems that
Aristotle is there invoking the second of the two senses of final causality he has
distinguished.
I think that a correct interpretation of Politics I 8 can be had once one keeps in
mind the distinction that I have discussed between natural science and the practical
sciences. As we have seen, natural science is understood by Aristotle to be a theoretical
science. And as a theoretical science its goal as such is to attain knowledge of the objects
that fall under its purview. This attainment of knowledge, which for the natural scientist
is achieved through the study of the form of natural entities, is the sole goal of natural
science. It is not the goal then to show how it is that human beings can use natural

68
69

De Anima II 4 415b21 (Translation Monte Ransom Johnson).
Johnson, Aristotle on Teleology, 75.

50

entities for their own benefit. To see how natural entities can be used for the benefit of
humans would be the goal of the various practical sciences that concern themselves with
those natural entities, such as agriculture. But crucially the fact that practical sciences
concern themselves with the human good and thus how to use various things for the good
of human beings bears no indication concerning the actual nature of the thing being used.
So it is reasonable to infer that when Aristotle states that nature has made “all animals for
the sake of man,” what he means to say is that animals can be used as food through the
practical and productive arts for the benefit of man. But there is nothing here that implies
that it is in the nature of those animals to be consumed for the benefit of man, nor that it
fulfills some cosmic nature for such animals to be consumed. Rather, the sciences which
concern themselves with the use of animals and plants do not focus upon the good and
the teleological aim of the plants and animals themselves, which they possess through
their form, but rather they focus upon the human good. We can therefore see that Politics
I 8 is perfectly consistent with the classification of the sciences that Aristotle provides.
Finally, we can also see that Aristotle’s understanding of οὗ ἕνεκα- ᾧ involves the
fact that this type of final causality does not strictly apply to the nature of that thing
which provides a benefit to something else. Rather this second type of final causality is
brought about by the human arts, i.e. the practical and productive sciences. Kullmann
states that “Plants and beasts contain the cause of their existence in themselves but can
secondarily be made subservient to the end of procuring food, clothing, and so on, for
man. The expediency of plants and beasts is secondary.”70 And all of this seems to be
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perfectly consistent with the biological works and how Aristotle seeks to attain
knowledge of natural entities theoretically.
However, one may question this point regarding the fact that οὗ ἕνεκα- ᾧ
causality is not reflected in the benefits provided by certain animals and plants to other
animals and plants by referring to Physics II 2, mentioned earlier, in which Aristotle
states that “…the arts too make their material: some of it they make simpliciter, some of
it they make workable. And we use it on the ground that everything exists for our sake.
For we ourselves too are, in one sense, an end.”71 Is it not true that Aristotle is here
arguing that everything exists for our sake? I would argue that this is not what Aristotle is
asserting here. Firstly, the ὡς plus participle construction that Aristotle uses here is
generally understood to imply a counterfactual. Thus the passage is more commonly
thought to be asserting that we use things as though they are for our sake. This
translation would perfectly fit with my argument that Aristotle does not mean to describe
the nature of things when he states that we use them for our sake, but rather is merely
implying that the practical and productive arts, whose goal is the attainment of the human
good, aims at using things for our sake. Sedley’s translation of this passage is defended
by him through his observation that the ὡς plus participle construction is not always used
as a counter-factual assertion. And I grant that this is true, but since either translation
works and the counter-factual translation of the passage best fits with how Aristotle
explicitly understands the goal of the practical and productive sciences as well as the
method used by Aristotle in the biological works, it seems far more preferable to take this
statement as a counter-factual and not as a defense of anthropocentrism.
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At this point then, the anthropocentric interpretation of Sedley’s does not have
much to rely on. The only text which explicitly seems to support such a view is Politics I
8, and it can be easily read as an expression of the second type of final causality in which
the benefits provided by various animals and plants to human beings are not found in the
nature of those animals and plants but are rather procured by the practical and productive
arts whose aim is the good for human beings. This distinction between the practical and
the theoretical for Aristotle in relation to my interpretation of Politics I 8 is further
supplemented by the fact that the Politics is a text which by Aristotle’s own classification
concerns that science which has as its main concern the human good and how to achieve
it. However, the precise interpretation of Physics II 8 and Metaphysics Λ 10 and the
implication such an interpretation has on understanding how teleology applies to nature
for Aristotle is still an open question. Be that as it may, at this point I have shown that
the anthropocentric interpretation fails to accord with Aristotle’s general take on natural
teleology. Since Politics I 8 is the only text which explicitly defends the kind of
teleological arrangement that Sedley is defending, it does not seem conceivable that
Aristotle held an anthropocentric teleology, especially in light of how it is that Aristotle
understood the second type of final causality I have outlined as well as how we are to
understand natural entities as it is exhibited by him in the biological works.
Yet, the precise nature of Aristotle’s account of natural teleology is still not clear
at this point. And it is worthwhile to note here that all that has been accomplished thus
far concerning the debate that I am considering is that an anthropocentric teleology in
Aristotle is not explicitly defended by him anywhere in the corpus. What I have not
shown as of yet is that Aristotle did not have a conception of a broader teleology in
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nature. And specifically, the precise claims of Physics II 8 have not been adequately
addressed. And of course at this point Sedley could respond that his interpretation of
Politics I 8 is informed by how he understands Aristotle’s claims in Physics II 8, and I
certainly admit that Sedley has a point here. However, I have shown that there is nothing
in Aristotle’s texts whatsoever that even suggest in an explicit fashion an anthropocentric
view of Aristotle’s account of natural teleology. I do believe though that Sedley, as well
as the other scholars who have defended a broader teleology in Aristotle, is right to
suggest that there are suggestions in Aristotle’s writings that imply that Aristotle did
defend a broader teleology; just not an anthropocentric one. In order to defend this
position however, it is first necessary to examine the arguments of those who have
interpreted Aristotle as defending a strictly internal teleology.
b) The Internalist Interpretation

At this point I have shown that it seems likely that Aristotle meant for us to take
Politics I 8 as expressing the fact that οὗ ἕνεκα- ᾧ causality operates in the human arts as
though animals existed for the sake of man, and thus that the benefits provided by
animals and plants to human beings are not an expression of the nature of the animals or
plants. Doing this has allowed us thus far to see that Aristotle has nowhere in the text
explicitly defended an anthropocentric teleology. But it remains true that Physics II 8
implies on the surface that regular winter rain is a teleological event, and that summer
rain is not a teleological event due to its rarity. And if Aristotle is expressing such in this
text, one would have to admit that there is a broader teleology at work here. For the fact
that winter rain, and not summer rain, is teleological would imply that there is an end to
winter rain as such that it is attempting to achieve which summer rain is not attempting to
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achieve. And this end of winter rain would have to be more than just the end that water is
attempting to achieve, since summer rain is just as much water as winter rain. Whatever
end winter rain is aiming at then would correspondingly imply a broader teleology.
Recognizing this difficulty, there have been many scholars who have in their own
way attempted to provide an alternate reading of this passage in order to escape the
implication that there is a broader teleology at work here. According to Johnson,
Aristotle’s account of rain elsewhere clearly shows that he did not conceive it as naturally
aiming at the benefit of other natural entities.72 In the Meteorology Aristotle states that
“The earth is at rest, and the water around it is carried up by the sun’s rays and the other
heat from above. But when the heat which made it rise departs, some being scattered in
the upper region, some extinguished by rising so far into the air above the earth, the vapor
is cooled and condensed again by the departure of the heat and the height, and water
comes to be out of air. Having become water, it is carried back to earth.”73 Johnson thus
argues that “The point of the rainfall example is to show how there can be a coincidental
result that is beneficial… The reason why rain regularly helps farmers grow crops, then,
is neither luck, nor nature, but art, to wit, the art of agriculture.”74 The claim then that
winter rain provides a benefit is for Johnson merely incidental to the regularity of winter
rain itself. Rather, winter rain provides the benefit that it does, not on account of its own
nature, but rather on account of the art of agriculture which uses the regularity of winter
rain in order to obtain the benefits that ultimately lead to benefitting human beings. And
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we have already seen that Aristotle does not hold that such benefits must be seen through
the fulfillment of the nature of that entity which is providing the benefit, but rather it
must be understood through the goal of the practical and productive sciences as such,
namely the human good.
Johnson further expands his account of Physics II 8 by denying altogether that
rain is the kind of entity that could possess a nature and thus a teleological aim. Johnson
states that “…rainfall is not a substance. Water is a substance, and so it can be
teleologically explained. But it would be bad science to explain the existence of water or
the phenomenon of rainfall with reference to how it relates to animals or other
beings…There is no ‘being in a state of completion (ἐντελέχεια) for rainfall as
rainfall…”75 As we have seen, a natural entity is one which possesses an internal
principle of motion. This internal principle is identified by Aristotle with the nature and
form of a thing. It is this nature and form of a thing that the natural scientist studies when
he attempts to provide an explanation of a natural thing through the four causes. The
final cause moreover represents the natural form of a thing in action so to speak as it
allows us to understand the characteristic motions of that thing. But rainfall as such is
not such an entity. Rather it is merely an event or product of the teleological motions of
the celestial bodies and the elements including water, both of which are natural entities
and thus have a form and move according to an end.
Robert Wardy has also produced an interpretation of this passage which further
helps us understand it in the sense defended by Johnson. According to Wardy, the
primary problem with Physics II 8 is the distinction between the regularity of winter rain
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and the irregularity of summer rain. Wardy has argued that we should take Aristotle to
be asserting that it is the circumstances surrounding the event of summer rain which are
accidental. But, and this is the crucial point, this is not to say that summer rain itself fails
to have a teleological aspect to it. In fact, it has the same teleological characteristics as
winter rain. The key to interpreting Aristotle in this sense is to understand Aristotle as
arguing that regularity is a sufficient condition for an event being purposeful, but that it is
not the irregularity of summer rain which makes it non-purposeful. Rather summer rain
is an event which regularly occurs given the sufficient conditions necessary for producing
rain. It is these conditions, namely the position of the sun and the amount of potential
water in the air, that are irregular during the summer months. In other words, the
conditions which are necessary for producing summer rain are accidental, because they
are not regular, but once those conditions are in fact present then rain will in fact be
produced regularly. Thus there is in a sense regularity to summer rain, but it is not the
fact that summer rain actually occurs often or regularly. Rather, it is simply the fact that
when those conditions necessary for rain to be produced are satisfied, then it will
regularly follow that it will in fact rain. And rain, whether it occurs in the summer or
winter, is a teleological event because it occurs regularly given the conditions necessary
to produce it. As Wardy states, the fact that “the rain fell in August is chance; but that the
rain fell in August, given these, admittedly freak, circumstances, is not.”76 And when one
understand Physics II 8 to be expressing this point, then it is not controversial to claim
that summer rain does not occur regularly. Once again, this is not because there is some
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teleological aspect to winter rain in itself that summer rain does not have, but rather the
conditions required to produce rain are not regular occurrences during the summer.
At this point, one may argue that this solution to the distinction between the
regularity of winter rain and the irregularity of summer rain only pushes the problem we
are attempting to solve one step back. An opponent may claim that it is fine and good to
argue that the irregularity that Aristotle seems to be distinguishing in relation to summer
rain is actually referring to the conditions that produce summer rain, and not summer rain
itself, but that this still seems to imply that there is some teleological aspect concerning
those conditions which produce winter rain regularly and which do not produce summer
rain regularly. And that moreover, this teleological aspect still seems to imply that there
is some purpose ultimately directed at the benefit of man involved in the conditions
which regularly produce winter rain.
However, Wardy may argue that this is not the case at all. Wardy might respond
by stating that the difference for Aristotle between claiming that summer rain is nonteleological and claiming that the conditions producing summer rain are irregular is quite
important. For claiming that summer rain itself is non-teleological is to claim that a
specific event is non-teleological, which, when considering that winter rain is
teleological, thus leads some interpreters into the anthropocentric interpretation.
However, to claim that the conditions necessary for the production of rain are irregular
indicates nothing about the specific events involved in the production of rain. What
Wardy might mean by this is that there is nothing inconsistent in claiming that water has
a teleology internal to it and that the movement of the celestial bodies which leads to the
production of rain also has an internal teleological explanation associated with it but that

58

at the same time these conditions are irregular during the summer months. For these
conditions are not an event, which would correspondingly require a teleological
explanation to account for such an event. Rather, the conditions are a group of events
each of which does have a teleological explanation to it. It is in fact due to the
teleological nature of water and the celestial bodies that the conditions necessary for the
production of rain are accidental and irregular during the summer months. Therefore,
Wardy might argue that far from pushing the problem back one step, Wardy’s solution
allows us to preserve the teleological aspects associated with water and the heavenly
bodies according to what Aristotle states about these things within his corpus, but which
also allows us to see why in fact summer rain is irregular without thereby claiming that
summer rain is non-teleological.
However, such an interpretation still does not seem to correctly correspond with
what it is that Aristotle explicitly states in Physics II 8. Aristotle does not just mention
winter and summer rain as teleological events on equal level, but rather seems to
explicitly state that winter rain is an example of a regularity that occurs ‘for the sake of
something,’ and that summer rain is not. And although we can offer a positive reading of
Physics II 8 which understands Aristotle as saying that that which produces rain is
teleological, and that this leads to the regularity of winter rain and the irregularity of
summer rain, we don’t seem to be actually taking Aristotle’s claims as he has literally put
them. For Aristotle states that “If then, it is agreed that things are either the result of
coincidence or for the sake of something, and these cannot be the result of coincidence or
spontaneity [including winter rain], it follows that they must be for the sake of
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something…”77 The question for correctly interpreting this passage then seems to truly
revolve around how we are going to take the ταῦτα (these) here. According to the Oxford
translation of the text, the ταῦτα refers to teeth, whereas Judson argues that the ταῦτα
“…refers precisely to the restricted range of things (natural substances, their parts,
generation, etc.) and not to everything that happens by nature.”78 And it certainly seems
natural to translate ταῦτα in this way given the generally accepted view of Aristotle’s
teleology which I have already given in the first part of the chapter. However, Aristotle
proceeds to use as his example of natural regularity winter rain as opposed to summer
rain. This then seems to force us to take 199a 3-5 as including winter rain. And if it is
natural to take Aristotle to be including winter rain among those things which are by
nature and thus are to be explained teleologically, then there is no doubt whatsoever that
the context of Physics II 8 is explicitly making a contrast between winter rain and
summer rain in such a way as to imply that the former is a teleological event and the
latter is not. So although Wardy’s argument is perfectly consistent with what Aristotle
has to say regarding rain elsewhere, and regarding natural entities and explanation as I
have explained earlier, it does not seem to take the text in the sense that seems most
natural, literal and explicit.
All of this leads to the problems inherent with the internalist position. The
various scholars who wish to take Aristotle as simply defending the kind of teleology that
is for the most part exhibited in the biological works do not seem to know what to do
with Physics II 8. Although Johnson and Wardy present interpretations that are perfectly
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compatible with those things that Aristotle states about rain in his other texts, the fact of
the matter is that they ignore what the text seems to be saying regarding natural teleology
and winter rain. It is clear that Physics II 8 cannot be easily interpreted through simply
holding that Aristotle is referring to the teleological nature of water and the celestial
bodies, and that summer rain and winter rain are on the same level regarding their
teleology. There is no doubt that Aristotle certainly held the view that the water involved
in both summer rain as well as winter rain should be understood in teleological terms, but
Physics II 8 also seems to be explicitly saying that winter rain is also a teleological event,
and that summer rain is not. This claim simply cannot be reduced to the motions of
water. One could argue that this text simply represents a slip on the part of Aristotle.
And I admit that this is a move that one could make, and that given this fact along with
the other claims that Aristotle makes concerning the nature of water and the celestial
bodies, one could say that Physics II 8 is simply a defense of the restricted and internal
teleology that Wardy’s reading seems to imply. However, the fact that this text is so
commonly interpreted in such a way is I contend precisely in order to avoid the claim that
there is a broader teleology at work in Aristotle.79 But it simply fails to account for the
textual difficulties of Physics II 8. How we are to understand Physics II 8 then seems to
me to involve the arrangement of things that seems to be behind the expression that

79

But this is not to say, as I intend to show in the next chapter, that the text necessarily implies an
anthropocentric teleology. Rather, Physics II 8 needs to be understood in light of Metaphysics Λ 10, which
in turn needs itself to be understood in light of Politics I 2. Doing this will show that Physics II 8 is merely
another expression of a broader teleology. I also admit that Sedley makes the same move, and I agree with
him on this point. However, Sedley’s interpretation of Metaphysics Λ 10 already assumes an
anthropocentric teleology in Aristotle, an interpretation which in turn is possible only through a rather
eccentric interpretation of Politics I 8. As I will be discussing, there is nothing in the claims of
Metaphysics Λ 10 which necessitates an anthropocentric interpretation. Given this point, it is incumbent
upon us therefore to attempt to understand precisely what Aristotle is attempting to say in Physics II 8
without assuming an anthropocentrism. Accomplishing this will in part be the goal of this project and will
finally see a resolution in the final chapter of the dissertation.

61

winter rain is a teleological event and summer rain is not. For if winter rain is
teleological, it must be for an end and this end must seemingly involve more than just the
end that water is attempting to attain. But we have also seen that the anthropocentric
interpretation has very little textual support as such. So, contrary to Sedley, it seems
pertinent to assume that Aristotle did not intend to convey an anthropocentric teleology
when he states that winter rain is a teleological phenomenon. The key then to the correct
interpretation of this passage seems to be found in the only text that we have in which
Aristotle speaks of a natural arrangement, namely Metaphysics Λ 10.
The problem of failing to take into account Aristotle’s explicit assertions of a
broader teleology is also I contend exhibited by the internalist camp in their
interpretations of Metaphysics Λ 10. Λ 10 seems to explicitly state that there is an
arrangement of the whole and that the good is found both as a separate entity as well as in
this arrangement. The nature of this arrangement is not explicitly stated by Aristotle
here, but it seems correct to assume that whatever it may be it is closely connected to that
which Aristotle is stating in Physics II 8. However, an analysis of the claims of
Metaphysics Λ 10 is a daunting task, one which I intend to take up in the next chapter.
4. Conclusion
Before moving on to the claims of Metaphysics Λ 10, it is pertinent to raise a few
issues that in my mind has kept those who have defended the internalist interpretation
from accepting a broader view. I have discussed in the first part of this chapter
Aristotle’s account of nature and of natural explanation. We have seen that Aristotle
believes that a natural entity possesses a form which is what we come to know when
provided with an explanation of that thing through the four causes. I also pointed out that

62

the matter of a natural entity is to be understood as relative to the form. This is not to say
that the form of a natural thing can simply realize itself in any matter whatsoever, but
rather that the various parts of a natural thing are only understood and thus knowable as a
part of the whole natural thing as it is actualized by its form. This account of a natural
thing then is taken as basic by those who have defended the internalist interpretation of
Aristotle’s natural teleology. Accordingly, the claim that there is an arrangement of the
whole would indicate, following from Aristotle’s account of nature, that the whole must
have its own form and its own good. This would seemingly make the whole a substance.
It follows from this then that in order for there to be a cosmic teleology, there must be a
cosmic substance whose teleological end is being realized. But, if this were actually the
case, then it would also imply that each individual thing that must be taken as part of the
cosmos cannot in itself be a substance, just as the parts of an individual entity are not
substances for Aristotle. This would mean that human beings, as well as every other
sublunary life form, would be merely parts of a substance and not substances themselves.
This position however flies in the face of much of what Aristotle holds true throughout
his corpus, and Wardy states that “…anyone would balk at the idea that people too are
not substances…”80 The argument then is that taking Λ 10 in the cosmic teleological
sense would force us to understand Aristotle as defending a position that is explicitly at
odds with a prominent feature of his general ontology; namely that individual people,
plants and animals are substances that possess a nature in their own right and not merely
in relation to a cosmic substance.
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A related issue to this would be what it would entail regarding the doctrine of the
autonomy of the sciences. For if Aristotle is indeed arguing that there is a cosmic
substance, this would also imply that the natural scientist would have to know the good of
the whole in order to truly attain knowledge of any natural entity whatsoever. For if there
is truly a good of the whole, then each individual entity would necessarily be understood
in light of its supposed contribution to the whole. Much as the individual parts of a living
body are understood through the whole, each entity would be seen as contributing to the
whole and therefore must be known through the whole. But this is just not what Aristotle
seems to do or state regarding natural science.
These problems concerning the interpretation of Metaphysics Λ 10 have been the
true reason behind the internalists’ desire to interpret these texts so as to avoid any claim
regarding a broader teleology. And it is these issues then, as well as the interpretation of
Physics II 8, that will limit and provide the focus of my interpretation of Metaphysics Λ
10. The goal then will be to attempt to show how we can see that there is an arrangement
of the whole without on the one hand violating the basic dictums of Aristotelian science
and theory of substances, and without on the other hand forcing us to simply ignore what
is explicitly stated in those few texts in which a broader teleology is defended; texts
which crucially include Metaphysics Λ 10.
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CHAPTER III
THE ANALOGIES OF Λ 1081
81

My interpretive arguments in this dissertation exclusively come from and arise out of a consideration of
modern scholarship regarding Aristotle. However, I have been made aware in the course of the defense that
the view concerning the UMM defended in this chapter is remarkably similar to what is found in Averroes’
(Ibn Rushd) commentaries on Aristotle. Averroes argues that the UMM is the final cause of every entity
within the cosmos and through being the final cause accounts for the order of the cosmos. Richard Taylor
in “Providence in Averroes” states that Averroes’ view “…is one of final causality alone on the part of the
Creator, a final causality that draws things into a unity and organization of the entire universe by causing all
the kinds of things to imitate to the fulness of their ability the complete perfection of finality and being
found in the Creator” (Taylor, “Providence in Averroes,” 460). Specifically, in the Incoherence of the
Incoherence and the Long Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, Averroes makes a series of
arguments concerning Aristotle’s conception of God and his relationship with the rest of the cosmos with
which my account in this chapter as well as in part of the last chapter, an account which is itself in response
to modern scholarship on Aristotle, happens to be in agreement. In summary Averroes argues that creation
must be understood as the UMM or God drawing things into actuality in so far as everything depends for its
realization on the first cause which is God. The movement of the heavenly bodies is on account of and
caused by the UMM, and the realization of all sublunary entities is ultimately explained by their desire for
God. Averroes uses the army analogy found in Λ 10 to explain his view of how Aristotle believed that the
good and order are found most especially in the leader as prior and greater, and the leader, through being
the good and final cause of all things in the cosmos, causes the order in the rest of the cosmos. Taylor
states regarding Averroes’ view of a cosmic order in Aristotle that “…in the course of an upward looking
imitation at the various levels of the entities of the universe for lower entities, being, order and unity are
brought about in corresponding levels. This ordering of the entirety of the universe through a relation to
the divine is the presence of divine creative power throughout the universe” (Ibid, 468). So the desire for
God, according to Averroes, manifests itself in the desire for perfection within the limits of the respective
natures of each kind of entity within the cosmos. This desire will then explain the actualization of the
various individuals within the cosmos. This also explains the human desire for actuality and cashes out in
the life of happiness and theoretical knowledge for human beings, the latter of which constitutes the most
noble kind of worship that human beings can offer to God. In this chapter, as well as in part of the last
chapter of this dissertation, I will be arguing explicitly in consideration of and in response to present day
scholarship what happens to be a similar interpretation of Metaphysics Λ as that which Averroes defends. I
will be defending the view that the UMM must be considered a separate good, and that as a separate good it
explains the actualization of all entities within the cosmos, including the celestial bodies, humans, animals,
and the elements. This actualization occurs due the desire for the entities to possess, in so far as their
natures allow, the actuality of the UMM and cashes out in the realization of the respective natures of the
various entities within the cosmos. I will also argue in this chapter that Aristotle believes that there is a
nature of the whole, and a good in the arrangement of things within the cosmos which I believe is also due
to the desire for the UMM. All of this has been argued by Averroes in his commentaries on Aristotle. Just
to be clear, the scholarship which I have considered in this dissertation did not involve the work of
Averroes, and thus my interpretation, although similar to Averroes’, arose out of an examination of the
modern readings of Λ 10. I was subsequently made aware of Averroes’ position in the process of
defending the dissertation. Fundamentally then, I agree with Averroes’ conception of the UMM as final
cause of the cosmos, and as the cause of the ordering of the entities within the cosmos. Having said this, I
believe that my account here is relevant in response to contemporary scholarship, and have confidence that
my emphasis on the necessity of providing an explanation of the nature of this order contributes something
new to the field of modern scholarship regarding Aristotle’s metaphysics and ontology. For a good
summary of Averroes’ account of the role of the UMM in providing order, existence, and unity to the rest
of the cosmos see Richard Taylor, “Providence in Averroes,” in Fate, Providence and Moral Responsibility
in Ancient, Medieval and Early Modern Thought, eds. Peiter d’Hoine and Gerd Van Riel (Leuven: Leuven
University Press, 2014), 455-473. For Averroes’ account of this argument see C. Genequand, Ibn Rushd’s
Metaphysics. A Translation with Introduction of Ibn Rushd’s Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics,
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1. Introduction

In the last chapter, I have shown that the current debate concerning the
interpretation of Aristotelian teleology, especially regarding the controversy in
interpreting Physics II 8, is not resolvable without analyzing in some detail the claims
that Aristotle makes in Λ 10. We have seen that a major strand in the recent
interpretations of Aristotelian teleology defends a hierarchical and even an
anthropocentric teleology. But we have also seen that the passages which support such a
position are at best unclear, and do not themselves explicitly defend anthropocentrism.
Now the passage that we have yet to discuss in any significant detail is Λ 10, and as I
concluded in the last chapter, it is vital to provide such an interpretation for
understanding Physics II 8 and for constructing a fuller interpretation of Aristotelian
teleology. What is clear even in a brief examination of Λ 10 is that Aristotle is here
providing us with a view of his teleology as it relates to a world order, or a ‘nature of the
whole,’ as such, and not just how teleology relates to the individual natural motions of
the various entities which serve as the subject matter for biology, which I briefly
discussed in the first part of the last chapter. The purpose of this chapter will be therefore
to examine what Aristotle precisely means by a ‘nature of the whole,’ and how this
relates both to the claims that Aristotle makes in the rest of the passage as well as how
this relates to understanding Aristotle’s teleology as it is expressed elsewhere. I will
argue then that, contrary to the view of some recent commentators, Aristotle is indeed

Book Lam (Leiden: Brill, 1986); S. Van Den Bergh trans., Averroes’ Tahafut al-Tahafut (The Incoherence
of the Incoherence) (London: Luzac and Co., 1954).
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indicating in Λ 10 that there is a ‘nature of the whole’ being defended in Λ 10. Once I
have established this to be true, I will then discuss firstly how this indicates for us that
Aristotle is indeed defending a cosmic teleology, in which things are arranged in a
teleological fashion which thereby allows us to explain the good ordering of each entity
with the other entities in the cosmos. Finally, I will also show that the ‘nature’ which
Aristotle is pointing out here fails to correspond with the account of nature that has been
understood as basically Aristotelian and which I have discussed in the second chapter.
Demonstrating this point will then encourage us to look elsewhere for an account of
nature that can satisfactorily explain the use of ‘nature’ in Λ 10, which I will argue points
us to Aristotle’s use of ‘nature’ in Politics I 2.
2. Λ 10 and the Minimalist Interpretation

Divided in parts relevant to the claims that Aristotle is making in the passage
then, Λ 10 states that:
(a)We must consider also in which way the nature of the whole possesses the
good and the best – whether as something separated and by itself, or as its
arrangement. (b) Or is it in both ways, like an army? For an army’s goodness is in
its ordering, and is also the general. And more the general, since he is not due to
the arrangement, but the arrangement is due to him. (c) All things are in some
joint-arrangement, but not in the same way – even creatures which swim,
creatures which fly, and plants. (d) And the arrangement is not such that one thing
has no relation to another. They do have a relation: for all things are jointly
arranged in relation to one thing. (e) But it is as in a household, where the free
have least license to act as they chance to, but all or most of what they do is
arranged, while the slaves and beasts can do a little towards what is communal,
but act mostly as they chance to. (f) For that is the kind of principle that nature is
of each of them. (g) I mean, for example, that at least each of them must
necessarily come to be dissolved; and there are likewise other things in which all
share towards the whole.82
Ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ καὶ ποτέρως ἔχει ἡ τοῦ ὅλου φύσις τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον, πότερον κεχωρισμένον τι
καὶ αὐτὸ καθ´ αὑτό, ἢ τὴν τάξιν. ἢ ἀμφοτέρως ὥσπερ στράτευμα; καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ τάξει τὸ εὖ καὶ ὁ
στρατηγός, καὶ μᾶλλον οὗτος· οὐ γὰρ οὗτος διὰ τὴν τάξιν ἀλλ´ ἐκείνη διὰ τοῦτόν ἐστιν. πάντα δὲ
συντέτακταί πως, ἀλλ´ οὐχ ὁμοίως, καὶ πλωτὰ καὶ πτηνὰ καὶ φυτά· καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει ὥστε μὴ εἶναι
82
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Λ 10 seems on the surface to be expressing a positive claim. In [a], Aristotle mentions a
‘nature of the whole’ as the subject for the subsequent claims. This at the very least
seems to imply that there is an overall nature above every individual nature that may exist
and might have to be accounted for. Aristotle proceeds to ask whether the good that is
possessed by this ‘nature of the whole’ is something separate or rather is found in the
arrangement of things within the cosmos. In [b] he seems to answer this question by
stating that the good is found in both the arrangement of the things within the whole as
well as something separate. In [b] through [f] he then uses an army and its general as
well as a household and its head as analogies for the good as it relates to the cosmos as a
whole. Now it would seem easy at this point to take Aristotle seriously in his claims here
and attempt to understand what he might mean by stating firstly that there is a ‘nature of
the whole’ to begin with, and secondly that the good that this nature possesses is found
both as a separate thing as well as in the arrangement of things within the cosmos.
However, there have been some scholars who have dismissed this reading of this passage
and have rather taken a minimalist approach to interpreting this passage and thereby find
in it nothing other than what Aristotle has already stated in the Physics and in the
philosophical lexicon of the Metaphysics.83

θατέρῳ πρὸς θάτερον μηδέν, ἀλλ´ ἔστι τι. πρὸς μὲν γὰρ ἓν ἅπαντα συντέτακται, ἀλλ´ ὥσπερ ἐν οἰκίᾳ τοῖς
ἐλευθέροις ἥκιστα ἔξεστιν ὅ τι ἔτυχε ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἢ τὰ πλεῖστα τέτακται, τοῖς δὲ ἀνδραπόδοις καὶ
τοῖς θηρίοις μικρὸν τὸ εἰς τὸ κοινόν, τὸ δὲ πολὺ ὅ τι ἔτυχεν· τοιαύτη γὰρ ἑκάστου ἀρχὴ αὐτῶν ἡ φύσις
ἐστίν. λέγω δ´ οἷον εἴς γε τὸ διακριθῆναι ἀνάγκη ἅπασιν ἐλθεῖν, καὶ ἄλλα οὕτως ἔστιν ὧν κοινωνεῖ ἅπαντα
εἰς τὸ ὅλον. Metaphysics Λ 10 1075a11-25 (Sedley’s Translation).
83
Namely that nature is nothing other than an internal principle of motion and stationariness which applies
only to individual entities who possess a nature and whose motions are accounted for through the nature
that it possesses. Of course an implication of this view is that there is no separate nature of the whole at all,
and that Aristotle is simply speaking loosely in this passage. This position of Aristotle’s has been
discussed in some detail in the second chapter, and for the most part those who defend the internalist
interpretation of Aristotelian teleology also approach Λ 10 from a minimalistic perspective. Given this
fact, there is some significant overlap between these two interpretive camps. Keeping this in mind then see
Wardy, Kullmann, Johnson, and Judson, all of whom were discussed in the second chapter.
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As an example of this interpretive position, Monte Johnson argues that Aristotle is
in this passage not arguing for either a separate principle of the good, or a good in the
arrangement of things. Rather, Johnson believes that Λ 10 “turns out to be more useful in
indicating ways that Aristotle does not want us to think about nature possessing the good,
than it does in expressing a positive doctrine.”84 Johnson argues that Aristotle is at best
simply repeating the claim found in his other works on nature that all things are arranged
only in so far as they can attain the good that is defined through their respective forms or
natures.
The minimalist position represented by commentators such as Johnson, is best
understood through a desire to make the apparent claims in Λ 10 consistent with the rest
of the Aristotelian corpus.85 Firstly, concerning a separate principle of the good, one
could argue that such a principle would be inconsistent with what Aristotle has to say in
passages such as Eudemian Ethics I 8 in which Aristotle expresses his distaste for the
Platonic notion of a Form or Idea of the Good which seemingly unifies and makes real
the various goods found in the world.86 What would follow, according to Aristotle, from
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Johnson, Aristotle on Teleology, 272.
The following arguments are my summary of those arguments generally brought forward by the
minimalist interpretive position.
86
Aristotle’s criticism of the Form of the Good is an extension of his criticism of the Platonic Forms in
general. Regarding the Forms, Aristotle presents many arguments against both their usefulness and their
rationality. One of the main themes that Aristotle seems to emphasize when criticizing the forms is that
they are utterly useless even if they did exist. So for example, in Metaphysics A 9 Aristotle states that
“Above all one might discuss the question what on earth the Forms contribute to sensible things, either to
those that are eternal or to those that come into being and cease to be. For they cause neither movement
nor any change in them. But again they help in no way toward the knowledge of the other things…nor
towards their being, if they are not in the particulars which share in them…” (991a9-14; πάντων δὲ μάλιστα
διαπορήσειεν ἄν τις τί ποτε συμβάλλεται τὰ εἴδη τοῖς ἀïδίοις τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἢ τοῖς γιγνομένοις καὶ
φθειρομένοις· οὔτε γὰρ κινήσεως οὔτε μεταβολῆς οὐδεμιᾶς ἐστὶν αἴτια αὐτοῖς. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὔτε πρὸς τὴν
ἐπιστήμην οὐθὲν βοηθεῖ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων… οὔτε εἰς τὸ εἶναι). The problem that Aristotle has with the
Forms primarily revolves around the fact that the Forms cannot serve as motive causes for the entities that
they apparently explain, and they do not explain the being or existence of those entities as such for they are
separate from those entities and thus do not account for their existence. Aristotle’s criticism of the Form of
the Good is essentially an extension of this point, in that Aristotle does not see how one can understand the
good of something through an entity which is entirely separate from that good.
85
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a Form of the Good would be a view which at its foundation would necessarily hold that
the meaning of the good is the same in every instance, since it would be the Form of the
Good which makes real and thus meaningful all of the other instances of the good in
reality. Aristotle does not agree with this position, and rather argues that the good has
different meanings or senses. He clearly expresses this point in the Eudemian Ethics by
stating that “As then being is not one in all that we have just mentioned, so neither is
good; nor is there one science either of being or of the good; not even things named good
in the same category are the objects of a single science…” 87 Aristotle rather insists that
the meaning of good varies among different kinds of things, and that it is simply not
helpful in any way to posit a separate good such as the Platonic Form of the Good and
then use the separate good to attempt to understand the various ways in which the good is
actually applied.88 Aristotle repeatedly asserts that a good of something must be inherent
to a thing, connected with its nature. An overall good, much like the Platonic Forms in
general, would be useless and unable to explain the cause of and the existence of the
various goods sought by natural entities. So it would seem to follow from all of this that

ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδὲ τὸ ὂν ἕν τί ἐστι περὶ τὰ εἰρημένα, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸ ἀγαθόν, οὐδὲ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶ μία οὔτε
τοῦ ὄντος οὔτε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ἀλλ´οὐδὲ τὰ ὁμοιοσχημόνως… Eudemian Ethics I 8 1217b33-37.
88
Stephen Menn has provided an interesting discussion of this topic. According to Menn, Aristotle does
believe that there is a separate good. The problem that Aristotle is insisting upon regarding the Form of the
Good is not that it is a separate good, but rather that, just like the other Forms, the Form of the Good would
not contribute to the being or the knowing of the particular goods of natural entities. Thus Menn states that
“[Aristotle] rejects the claim that the X-itself is the Form of X, because the Form of X would be no more X
than corruptible X’s are, and because it would not contribute causally to the X-ness of other things” (Menn,
“Aristotle and Plato on God as Nous and as the Good,” 570). Rather Menn seems to argue that there is a
separate good according to Aristotle in so far as there is a separate nous which serves as an object of desire
and therefore causes motion in the cosmos. As an object of desire, nous is identified by Menn as a separate
good. I will be defending an interpretation of the UMM as a separate good which will be similar to this
approach provided by Menn. The issue that I will have with Menn’s approach however is that he fails to
see that all activity in so far as it is driven toward actuality is ultimately caused by the UMM. So the UMM
serves as a separate good for everything within the cosmos, and not just for those things which seek to
attain the practicable and attainable good of nous which is itself only attainable by a few entities in
Aristotle’s world. For Menn’s discussion of this topic see Stephen Menn, “Aristotle and Plato on God as
Nous and as the Good,” Review of Metaphysics 45, no. 3 (1992): 543-573.
87
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Λ 10 must be dismissing the separate good, since such an entity would seemingly
represent something like a Form of the Good.
A similar interpretive strategy holds when considering the good that is found in
the arrangement of things; namely that such a claim seems inconsistent with other claims
concerning the good in the Aristotelian corpus. As we have already seen, Physics II 1
states that natures are internal to a thing and that therefore the good of something is
understood through the nature that that thing possesses. Aristotle’s claim therefore that
the good is found in the arrangement of things must, according to some, be understood in
light of this understanding of the good as it is connected to the nature of a thing from
Physics II 1.89 Since it seems that the good for Aristotle is inextricably linked to the
nature that a thing possesses, it would follow that if there is a good found in the
arrangement of things, there would necessarily be a nature corresponding with this good.
But such a nature could be nothing other than a cosmic nature. However, Aristotle does
not explicitly defend a cosmic nature of any kind in any other passage, and in particular
he fails to mention a concept of the good which is somehow associated with the cosmos
as a whole.90 Moreover, it would seem that this understanding of the concept of nature or
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I have discussed the connection that Aristotle makes between the good of something and the nature that it
possesses in the second chapter.
90
Mohan Matthen, in his article “The holistic presuppositions of Aristotle’s cosmology,” does argue that
there is a universal nature defended by Aristotle in the De Caelo. In DC I 2, Matthen argues that Aristotle
mentions a form of the cosmos, and that this is also associated with the nature of the whole which is also
mentioned in this passage. From this passage, Matthen goes on to argue that the cosmos is a single
substance and that this substance is a composite whole which is also to be regarded as a self-mover.
Suffice it to say that I believe that Matthen is right in emphasizing this passage as yet another instance of
Aristotle defending a kind of cosmic nature. In so far as Matthen takes the De Caelo to be stating this
about the cosmos, I think that he is right. The issue with Matthen in my view is that he believes that the
cosmos is a substance but does not proceed in any real sense in showing what this means precisely,
especially given Aristotle’s claims regarding substance in the rest of the corpus. Finally, Matthen’s
arguments rest upon a certain understanding and translation of the words used by Aristotle, especially
concerning the opening lines of De Caelo I 2, which is not the only translation available to the interpreter.
To actually show that there is good evidence that Aristotle held that there is a cosmic order, one must look
outside of the passages that Matthen considers. We will return to the issue of a cosmic substance in the
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of the good is inconsistent with the claims that Aristotle actually does make concerning
nature and the good. In other words, to speak of the order of things as possessing a good
in Aristotelian terms seems on the face of it to violate the Aristotelian doctrine of natural
explanation as discussed in the second chapter, unless one admits that Aristotle is stating
that the cosmos possesses a nature and thus a good associated with this nature. Once
again, Aristotle does not seem defend such a position anywhere else in the corpus. A
final problem with acknowledging that the cosmos possesses a nature is that it comes
awfully close, and perhaps even necessitates the claim that the cosmos is a substance.
Such a claim would however undermine the basic Aristotelian position that individual
entities are substances and thus possess existential autonomy.91
What these arguments seem to imply then, according to the minimalist
interpretation, is that Λ 10 is primarily a negative passage, in that Aristotle is not
attempting to say something new regarding his view of the cosmos, but is rather
reiterating his views that have already been expressed in other passages. This minimalist
position in general is justified through either the lack of any positive claims concerning
the status of a separate good or a good in the arrangement of things, or even an apparently
explicit refutation of such claims. The trick for this interpretive approach then would be
to attempt to understand the claims of Λ 10 without accepting that Aristotle is making a
positive claim concerning the good of the cosmos and its arrangement.

final chapter when I consider what the cosmic nature that I believe Aristotle is defending in Λ 10 is, and
how it is helpful in understanding Aristotle’s conception of the cosmos. For Matthen’s discussion of the De
Caelo see Mohan Matthen, “The Holistic Presuppositions of Aristotle’s Cosmology,” In Oxford Studies in
Ancient Philosophy vol. XX, edited by David Sedley (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 171-201.
91
Wardy, “Aristotelian Rainfall or the Lore of Averages,” 25.

72

Johnson then, who defends a minimalist interpretation of Λ 10, argues that in
general Λ 10 is truly a negative passage, in that it is an expression primarily of how not to
understand Aristotle’s cosmology and teleology. Concerning Aristotle’s claim that the
good is in the arrangement of things, Johnson argues that Aristotle is simply attempting
to emphasize that all things are arranged according to one good in so far as they all seek
to attain the good that is defined through their respective forms or natures. This of course
extends throughout the biological realm. What this entails then is that the good is to be
found fundamentally in the actualization of the potencies defined through the nature of
the individual entities. However, Aristotle’s claim that there is a good of the arrangement
should not, according to Johnson, be confused with a defense of something like an
overarching good somehow found in the cosmos and which is over and above the goods
of the various species in the sense described. Rather, the good in the arrangement is
understood by Johnson merely to imply that the good of each entity is not exclusive with
the good sought by natural entities of a different kind. Johnson states that “…all things
are jointly arranged with respect to one thing, the good. Chiefly, this means their own
goods…But the arrangement of nature is such that all the different kinds can coexist:
their needs are not generally mutually exclusive…This is the good in the arrangement.”92
Johnson therefore argues that Aristotle, far from making any defense of an overall nature
which possesses a good and is defined through the specific arrangement of the entities
within the cosmos, is here simply asserting that there is a good in the arrangement in so
far as each entity is able to seek its own good in a non-exclusive sense. 93
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Johnson, Aristotle on Teleology, 283.
Johnson does recognize that predatory behavior seems to be an example of the good of an entity being
mutually exclusive with the good of another entity. However, he simply seems to dismiss this as merely
being a particular instance of mutual exclusivity rather than anything which challenges his interpretation of
93
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Johnson argues that the analogies that Aristotle uses supplement his interpretation
as well. On the one hand, the Army analogy is dismissed by Johnson as not altogether
helpful in defending what Johnson views as Aristotle’s overall argument in the passage.
The problem here is that fundamentally Aristotle’s conception of the Unmoved Mover is
not one of an ordering god. Rather, God is understood by Aristotle as merely the object
of desire and not as a divine craftsman. So, unlike a general, the Unmoved Mover does
not order the cosmos, nor does it command the cosmos and interfere with the actions of
the individual entities within the cosmos. What the army analogy does show for Johnson
is rather that “Aristotle wants to stress that the good is not separate from the individual
things that are good, but is rather an immanent principle that accounts for the
organization of the many things that are good…”94 So, just as a general serves as a
principle of organization in an army, and therefore is the cause of the good of an army,
the good that Aristotle is speaking of in relation to the cosmos and the arrangement of
entities within a cosmos is how each thing interacts with every other thing in an
organized sense, and that these things are not ‘exclusive’ in regard to each other.
The household analogy, on the other hand, indicates for Johnson the fact that each
of the entities within the cosmos pursues its own good, a good which is dictated by their
natures, and incidentally while in the pursuit of their own good they can contribute to the
good of other things. Johnson believes that it is a precarious move to take this analogy
any further than this, as taking the passage further might involve a kind of justification in

Aristotle’s claim that there is a good in the arrangement of things. This position is also a part of Johnson’s
overall argument against Sedley’s anthropocentric interpretation, which was discussed and criticized in the
second chapter of the dissertation.
94
Johnson, Aristotle on Teleology, 275.

74

the cosmic sense of the questionable practice of slavery.95 It is clear that for Aristotle
slaves are a part of the household. And Johnson believes that taking the household
analogy as a more literal description of the arrangement of the cosmos would involve
making certain entities within the cosmos slaves to other entities. Avoiding this
implication then, Johnson believes that all that Aristotle is stating here is that the motions
of the various entities within the cosmos are due to the pursuit of an entity’s own good,
and that the benefits that they may provide to other entities are in fact incidental to this
pursuit. How this is precisely shown in the household analogy then is, Johnson argues,
that just as the actions of a slave happen to coincide with the good of the household, for
the most part these same actions are incidentally related to the good of the slave himself.
So Johnson states that “The slave who cooks [eggs] is carrying out orders, and has an
interest in obeying. But the good for the slave in this case is in avoiding punishment and
satisfying the master, not in enjoying the benefits of a well-cooked omelet.”96 What this
implies is that the household model is meant to show us that some actions which entities
undertake may have benefits for other things which would be incidental to the good that
an entity is pursuing and which ultimately explains the various actions that an entity
pursues in the first place.97 And the primary claim here is that each of these entities seek
their own good in the natural movements that they undergo.
So in general, Johnson’s view of Λ 10 is primarily influenced by his desire to
make the passage consistent with those other passages within the corpus which Johnson
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Ibid, 277.
Ibid, 277.
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Johnson also provides a passage from the De Cealo II 12 in which Aristotle argues that every entity
within the cosmos seeks its own good in the movements it undergoes, and which contains “no
argument…that these various motions happen for the sake of an overall good, or for the sake of natural
substances other than the ones that are in motion” (Ibid, 277-278).
96

75

takes to be the fundamental and exhaustive accounts of those crucial terms which are in
question in Λ 10 itself. Firstly, the notion of a good which is separate must be
understood in light of Aristotle’s account of the good of something being connected and
expressed through the nature of that thing. So that that which possesses a good must, in
the most basic case, possess a nature which allows one to make sense of the good of that
thing. And thus the good of anything is a matter of understanding the nature of that
thing. What is implied here then is that if there were to be a good which is entirely and
wholly separate, then we would be in danger of bringing back into the Aristotelian
ontology something like the Platonic Form of the Good, which of course is explicitly
denied by Aristotle as anything which could be useful or sensible.
On the other hand, the arrangement of the whole as somehow possessing a good
would, given Aristotle’s statements regarding the connection between the good of
something and its nature, imply that there must be a nature corresponding with this good
expressed by the arrangement of the whole. The question here, one which ultimately
influences scholars such as Johnson, is whether then there must be a nature of the whole
corresponding with the good found in the arrangement. This of course would seemingly
follow from admitting that the arrangement possessed a good, which would then
seemingly force one to admit that Aristotle is indeed arguing for a nature of everything; a
kind of cosmic nature. But this cosmic nature would then imply something like a cosmic
substance, the existence of which seems doubtful to many due to Aristotle’s lack of an
explicit discussion of a cosmic nature within the corpus as well as due to the
inconsistency this would seemingly imply between the existential autonomy of individual
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substances such as human beings, rabbits, tigers, etc… and the existence of a cosmic
substance.
Keeping these considerations in mind then, I believe that we nevertheless must
acknowledge that Aristotle is indeed discussing something far more positive in this
passage. The interpretive position that we have just discussed denies a few crucial claims
that in my view cannot coherently be denied when working through Λ 10. As we have
seen, the first claim is that there is in no sense a separate principle of the good. The
second claim is that there is no good found in the arrangement of things as such, other
than a vague notion of a good found in the fact that entities sometimes benefit other
entities and can survive and flourish in a non-exclusive sense. Furthermore, this second
claim also implicitly denies that Aristotle is admitting and discussing a cosmic nature of
any kind and/or that there is a defense of an external teleology which goes beyond the
teleological claims found in the Physics and discussed in the second chapter. Each of
these claims are related, and I believe that in order to establish my argument that there is
indeed a defense of a cosmic nature and thus a cosmic teleology in Λ 10, I will first have
to answer each of these claims separately.
The first claim is that there is no separate good being defended in Λ 10.
However, I believe that this position is altogether unreasonable.98 What seems to me
clear from Aristotle’s assertions regarding the relationship between the various entities
within the cosmos and the UMM is that first of all the UMM provides a kind of final
cause which provides an explanation of existence of motion as such in the cosmos. And

The following argument follows Kahn’s argument. For the argument that Kahn provides see Charles
Kahn, “The Place of the Prime Mover in Aristotle’s Teleology,” in Aristotle on Nature and Living Things,
edited by Allan Gotthelf (Bristol: Bristol Classical Press, 1985), 183-207.
98
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when one considers Aristotle’s discussion of the good in the Nicomachean Ethics and the
De Anima, one finds that Aristotle understands the good of something as being both
defined by and understood through the context of final causality. 99 So, my claim here is
that the UMM both provides a final cause to everything within the cosmos and also that
the UMM is considered by Aristotle as a kind of overarching good, and even a separate
one, albeit separate in a different sense then how Aristotle understands the separate good
of Plato.
As seems obvious, each of these claims are related and require some textual
support. Let us deal with the concept of the UMM as the cause of everything first, and
then deal with the concept of the UMM as being a separate good. I believe that first of all
the UMM is a cause of everything in so far as it is a final cause of all the natural motions
in the cosmos.100 So in regard to the heavenly bodies being moved on account of the
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Nicomachean Ethics I, Nicomachean Ethics X, and De Anima II 1-5.
There is some controversy here regarding the precise nature of the causality that the UMM provides to
the rest of the cosmos. There is of course a minimalist interpretation of the UMM’s causality in which the
UMM is simply a final cause for the outer celestial sphere. The rest of the motions within the cosmos then
are either a matter of mechanical efficiency or the final causality of the natures of individual entities.
However, the passages that I will be discussing in the following paragraphs I believe sufficiently
demonstrate the poverty of such a view and the explicit inconsistencies in interpretation which arises as a
result of the following passages. There is also a significant controversy regarding the way that the causality
of the UMM actually works. It is unclear from Aristotle’s work whether the UMM operates as a Final
Cause, an Efficient Cause, or as both. Now it seems clear from outset that Aristotle believes that the UMM
is a Final Cause. It is described as such in Λ and is even described as an ‘object of love’ by Aristotle.
However, even the early commentators acknowledge some controversy regarding the nature of the UMM’s
causation, as Simplicius, in his commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, states that the ancient commentators
disagree on whether Aristotle’s Prime Mover was the efficient cause as well as the Final Cause of the
Heavens (1360,24-1363,24). The way in which the UMM is understood to be the efficient cause as well as
the final cause of the heavens is sometimes stated that it is through being the final cause that the UMM is
the efficient cause. For this view, see W. D. Ross, Aristotle fifth ed. (London: Methuen, 1964), 181.
Charles Kahn, on the other hand, seems to believe that the UMM is a final cause only, and at best an
efficient cause in an incidental sense (Kahn, “The Place of the Prime Mover in Aristotle’s Teleology,” 183207). There are those who argue that the UMM must be considered to be an efficient cause primarily, and
that it moves the heavens, at the very least, through a kind of psychic force much like the soul moves the
body. For this view, see Sarah Broadie, “Que fait le premier moteur d’Aristote? (Sur la théologie du livre
Λ de la ‘Métaphysique’),” Revue philosophique de la France et de l’Étranger 183, no. 2 (1993): 375-411.
Finally, there are those who argue that the UMM is a soul, and that it operates as both final and efficient
cause in so far as it is the soul of the cosmos (Mohan Matthen, “The Holistic Presuppositions of Aristotle’s
Cosmology,” 171-201). There is also to be considered in this debate, in my view, one’s conception of
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UMM, Aristotle states that “There is something, then, that is always being moved in a
ceaseless motion, and this motion is circular…Hence there is also something that initiates
motion. And since whatever both is moved and initiates motion is an intermediary, there
is something that initiates motion without being moved, something that is everlasting and
a substance and actuality.”101 This everlasting and purely actual substance is of course
the UMM.102 The way in which this cause is understood by Aristotle is then described by

efficient and final causality, for it will be partly due to one’s understanding of these two kinds of causes
that will influence one’s position regarding the kind of causality exercised by the UMM. For my view, I
believe that it is best to see the UMM as both a final and efficient cause, and that this is due to the fact that
I do not believe that Aristotle can successfully make sense of efficient causality without incorporating final
causality. So I would argue that the UMM is primarily a final cause, but that in the end the final causality
of the UMM ultimately implies that it is also an efficient cause of the cosmos due to the fact that efficient
causality is dependent upon final causality. For the connection between efficient and final causality see
Margarat Scharle, “Material and Efficient Causes in Aristotle’s Natural Teleology,” Apeiron 41, no. 3
(2008): 27-46. I do not have the room to consider the arguments in detail for this dissertation. The specific
kind of causality that the UMM exhibits is not necessary to explain in order for me to demonstrate the point
that there is a cosmic nature being defended in Λ 10 and that the best way for us to understand what this
nature is for us to examine the claim that the polis is a natural entity in Politics I 2. The point that I am
attempting to make here then does not concern the specific kind of cause that the UMM exhibits, but rather
that it is at the very least a final cause which affects and operates as a cause for all natural entities within
the cosmos. Whether this final causality is a matter of also being a kind of efficient cause, or even if the
UMM ultimately should be considered an efficient cause primarily, is not relevant to the argument. What
is clear at the very least is that Aristotle viewed the UMM as a kind of final cause, and my argument here is
that as final cause it acts as a good and cause for all natural entities. The result is that all entities actualize
and self-realize in their own way as defined by their natures due to the efficacy of the UMM as final cause.
101
καὶ ἔστι τι ἀεὶ κινούμενον κίνησιν ἄπαυστον, αὕτη δ´ ἡ κύκλῳ…ἔστι τοίνυν τι καὶ ὃ κινεῖ. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ
κινούμενον καὶ κινοῦν [καὶ] μέσον, †τοίνυν† ἔστι τι ὃ οὐ κινούμενον κινεῖ, ἀΐδιον καὶ οὐσία καὶ ἐνέργεια
οὖσα. Metaphysics Λ 7 1072a21-26 (Translated by Terence Irwin and Gail Fine).
102
Aristotle also seems to argue that there is a plurality of movers which account for the various motions of
the celestial bodies in Λ 8. Aristotle had thought it necessary to suppose a plurality of prime movers
primarily in order to explain the motions of each of the spheres that he calculated were necessary to fully
explain the motions of the heavens. So Aristotle argues that “But it is necessary, if all the spheres
combined are to explain the phenomena, that for each of the planets there should be other spheres (one
fewer than those hitherto assigned) which counteract those already mentioned and bring back to the same
position the first sphere of the star which in each case is situated below the star in question; for only thus
can all the forces at work produce the motion of the planets. Since, then, the sphere by which the planets
themselves are moved are eight and twenty-five, and of these only those by which the lowest-situated
planet is moved need not be counteracted, the spheres which counteract those of the first two planets will
be six in number, and the spheres which counteract those of the next four planets will be sixteen, and the
number of all the spheres – those which move the planets and those which counteract these - will be fiftyfive. And if one were not to add to the moon and to the sun the movements we mentioned, all the spheres
will be forty-nine in number. Let this then be taken as the number of the spheres, so that the unmovable
substances and principles may reasonably be taken as just so many; the assertion of necessity must be left
to more powerful thinkers” (Metaphysics Λ 8 1074a1-17; ἀναγκαῖον δέ, εἰ μέλλουσι συντεθεῖσαι πᾶσαι τὰ
φαινόμενα ἀποδώσειν, καθ´ ἕκαστον τῶν πλανωμένων ἑτέρας σφαίρας μιᾷ ἐλάττονας εἶναι τὰς
ἀνελιττούσας καὶ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἀποκαθιστάσας τῇ θέσει τὴν πρώτην σφαῖραν ἀεὶ τοῦ ὑποκάτω τεταγμένου
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him a few sentences later when he states that “…local motion is the primary type of
motion, and the primary type of local motion is circular motion [i.e. the motion of the
celestial bodies] and this is the sort of motion that the primary mover initiates. Hence the
primary mover exists necessarily; and insofar as it exists necessarily, its being is fine, and
insofar as its being is fine, it is a principle.”103 Aristotle then understands the circular
motions of the celestial bodies as being primarily motivated through the desire for the

ἄστρου· οὕτω γὰρ μόνως ἐνδέχεται τὴν τῶν πλανήτων φορὰν ἅπαντα ποιεῖσθαι. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐν αἷς μὲν αὐτὰ
φέρεται σφαίραις αἱ μὲν ὀκτὼ αἱ δὲ πέντε καὶ εἴκοσίν εἰσιν, τούτων δὲ μόνας οὐ δεῖ ἀνελιχθῆναι ἐν αἷς τὸ
κατωτάτω τεταγμένον φέρεται, αἱ μὲν τὰς τῶν πρώτων δύο ἀνελίττουσαι ἓξ ἔσονται, αἱ δὲ τὰς τῶν ὕστερον
τεττάρων ἑκκαίδεκα· ὁ δὴ ἁπασῶν ἀριθμὸς τῶν τε φερουσῶν καὶ τῶν ἀνελιττουσῶν ταύτας πεντήκοντά τε
καὶ πέντε. εἰ δὲ τῇ σελήνῃ τε καὶ τῷ ἡλίῳ μὴ προστιθείη τις ἃς εἴπομεν κινήσεις, αἱ πᾶσαι σφαῖραι ἔσονται
ἑπτά τε καὶ τεσσαράκοντα. — τὸ μὲν οὖν πλῆθος τῶν σφαιρῶν ἔστω τοσοῦτον, ὥστε καὶ τὰς οὐσίας καὶ
τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς ἀκινήτους [καὶ τὰς αἰσθητὰς] τοσαύτας εὔλογον ὑπολαβεῖν ((τὸ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον ἀφείσθω τοῖς
ἰσχυροτέροις λέγειν))·). This argument has caused some controversy among scholars, as it seems to come
out of nowhere and even to contradict the other books of Λ. However it is that one should understand
Aristotle here, I do not believe that it poses a problem for the argument that I am making in this chapter.
What is certain from several passages in the corpus is that Aristotle believed that there was one UMM that
could explain the motions and order of everything in the cosmos, or in other words that there is only one
arche for the order and regularity of nature. In Generation and Corruption Aristotle makes it explicit that
multiple motions still must have one arche when he states that “…if there is to be movement (as we have
explained elsewhere, in an earlier work) there must be something which initiates it; if there is to be
movement always, there must always be something which initiates it; if the movement is to be continuous,
what initiates it must be single, unmoved, ungenerated, and incapable of alteration; and if the circular
movements are more than one, they must all of them, in spite of their plurality, be in some way
subordinated to a single principle” (Generation and Corruption II 10 337a17-22; ἐπεὶ δ´ ἀνάγκη εἶναί τι τὸ
κινοῦν εἰ κίνησις ἔσται, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον ἐν ἑτέροις, καὶ εἰ ἀεί, ὅτι ἀεί δεῖ τι εἶναι, καὶ εἰ συνεχής,
ἓν τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἀκίνητον καὶ ἀγένητον καὶ ἀναλλοίωτον, καὶ εἰ πλείους αἱ ἐν κύκλῳ κινήσεις, πλείους μέν,
πάσας δέ πως εἶναι ταύτας ἀνάγκη ὑπὸ μίαν ἀρχήν·). The single principle would be the first of the prime
movers, which would be the UMM of which I am speaking throughout this chapter. As I will argue in
subsequent chapters, Aristotle believed that the universe or cosmos was indeed hierarchical and that the
best way to conceive of it was as a monarchy. This point is of course illustrated by Aristotle at the end of
Λ 10 when he states, quoting Homer, that “’The rule of many is not good; let there be one ruler’” (Met. Λ
10 1076a4). Aristotle makes this assertion in response to those philosophers who he claims give different
principles for different substances making the universe a series of episodes. This lack of unity in the
cosmos is something that Aristotle clearly despises, and he firmly believes that ultimately there must be
only one principle of explaining the order and regularity of the cosmos. The controversy regarding the
other prime movers moreover especially relates to the problem of individuating the prime movers, which is
especially relevant when it is recognized that they do not have a material component to their natures
(Guthrie, Aristotle: An Encounter, 270-271). However, this specific issue with the prime movers is not
especially relevant to the argument that I am presenting, since regardless of how they are individuated there
would still need to be a highest UMM which represents the final cause of the entirety of the cosmos.
103
φορὰ γὰρ ἡ πρώτη τῶν μεταβολῶν, ταύτης δὲ ἡ κύκλῳ· ταύτην δὲ τοῦτο κινεῖ. ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄρα ἐστὶν ὄν·
καὶ ᾗ ἀνάγκῃ, καλῶς, καὶ οὕτως ἀρχή. Metaphysics Λ 7 1072b8-11.
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fine, which is ultimately manifested in the pure actuality of the UMM and which results
in the eternal circular motions of the heavenly bodies.
This cause of motion on the part of the UMM is not simply restricted to the
movement of the heavenly bodies however. It seems clear from various texts within the
Aristotelian corpus that the UMM is also responsible for the universal tendency for
actualization among all the entities within the cosmos, and thus it serves as a cause of
motion for all things within the cosmos. So Aristotle states in De Caelo concerning the
various kinds of motions exhibited within the cosmos that “To attain the end would
certainly be the best for all things. But if that is impossible, the nearer a thing is to what
is best the better it is. And that is why the earth does not move at all, and the bodies close
to it have few motions. For they do not reach the extreme goal, but they advance as far as
they are able to attain the most divine principle. The first heaven attains it directly by a
single motion. The bodies in between the first and the last one do reach the goal, but they
reach it through a number of motions.”104 This text is a clear indication of Aristotle’s
insistence on the fact that all things do whatever it is that they do as it is dictated to them
through their internal principles of motion on account of their desire for the best. The
result of this is that the disparate natures of these entities result in the different kinds of
motions exhibited by them as they seek to imitate the divine principle. This clearly
implies that there is a kind of hierarchy which is defined by both the pursuit of and the
proximity to the principle which represents the best. This principle of course is the

Μάλιστα μὲν γὰρ ἐκείνου τυχεῖν ἄριστον πᾶσι τοῦ τέλους· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀεὶ ἄμεινόν ἐστιν ὅσῳ ἂν ἐγγύτερον
ᾖ τοῦ ἀρίστου. Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡ μὲν γῆ ὅλως οὐ κινεῖται, τὰ δ´ ἐγγὺς ὀλίγας κινήσεις· οὐ γὰρ ἀφικνεῖται
πρὸς τὸ ἔσχατον, ἀλλὰ μέχρι ὅτου δύναται τυχεῖν τῆς θειοτάτης ἀρχῆς. Ὁ δὲ πρῶτος οὐρανὸς εὐθὺς
τυγχάνει διὰ μιᾶς κινήσεως. Τὰ δ´ ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ πρώτου καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων ἀφικνεῖται μέν, διὰ πλειόνων
δ´ἀφικνεῖται κινήσεων. De Caelo II 12 292b17-25 (Translated by W. K. C. Guthrie).
104
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UMM, which thus clearly serves as an overarching final cause extending throughout the
cosmos and which causes the motion of the entities within the cosmos in their striving
for, in the sense of aiming for, the UMM. The hierarchy then comes about through the
proximity to pure actuality, which for Aristotle is also eternal, unmoved and best. The
closer that an entity can get to this actuality, the higher it seems to be in the cosmic
hierarchy.
I am not arguing however, nor do I think that Aristotle is stating, that the UMM is
the reason for the specific motions exhibited. The fact that a kitten for example grows
into a cat is not the result of the causality of the UMM as such, but rather it would be the
result of the nature that that kitten possesses. But it is the fact that any actualization as
such is a result of the universal tendency for the UMM which cashes out as a universal
imitation of the UMM, and the ways in which these motions are exhibited are partly
understood through the specific natures that each of the entities within the cosmos
possesses, but also for Aristotle through their proximity to the UMM. It is the proximity
to the UMM, understood as pure actuality, which in turn leads to a kind of cosmic
hierarchy in which some entities are able to more closely resemble the eternal activity of
the UMM.
I am also not arguing that entities seek to eliminate themselves and become the
UMM simpliciter, which would involve the contradictory claim that entities seek to
undergo a substantial change in which they cease to be the kind of entity that they are.
What I am arguing however, is that Aristotle clearly believes that all entities seek what is
eternal, purely actual, unmoved, and thus best. By seeking such a thing, they do not seek
their own destruction, but rather seek actuality and do so by imitating the eternal actuality
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of the UMM in so far as they are able, and the limits of which are dictated by the specific
natures that the various entities possess. 105 Thus the specific natures possessed by the
various entities within the cosmos implies that entities simply seek to actualize those
natures that they possess, and the causality of the UMM is not to be understood as
overriding the internal causality provided to an entity through its nature but rather as
completing the internal causality through explaining why the entity attempts to actualize
itself in the first place. And entities actualize their immanent potencies due to their
imitative desire for the UMM, which in other words is an imitative desire for pure
actuality. Thus, there is a striving for pure actuality which for Aristotle is strictly
unattainable for any entity within the cosmos since such a goal goes beyond what the
specific natures can allow for the entities which possess them, but nevertheless the pure
act explains why the entities actualize in the first place. This is not to be understood then
as entities seeking to be something other than what they are, but rather as a causal
explanation for Aristotle for why it is that entities do what they do in the first place.
This aspect of Aristotelian teleology is supported by a few other texts as well. In
regard to the elements for instance, Aristotle states that “That, too, is why all the other
things – the things, I mean, which are reciprocally transformed in virtue of their qualities
and their powers, e.g. the simple bodies – imitate circular motion. For when Water is
transformed in Air, Air into Fire, and the Fire back into Water, we say the coming-to-be
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It must be admitted that this interpretation is not explicitly defended by Aristotle anywhere in the
corpus. There are of course indications that Aristotle believed what I am defending here, and I intend to
show these indications and what they mean for my reading, but ultimately my reading must be taken as
merely an interpretation of the arguments that Aristotle does provide. I do not however understand how it
is that Aristotle can say that entities imitate the activity of the UMM and not state that in some way they are
striving to be the UMM, and that this striving does not mean that entities seek to eliminate themselves but
rather actualize their inherent natures which happens precisely because of their desire to imitate the pure
actuality of the UMM.
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has completed the circle, because it reverts again to the beginning. Hence it is by
imitating circular motion that rectilinear motion too is continuous.”106 The elements then
move in the way that they do on account of their internal principle of motion, but this
kind of motion is ultimately explained by their desire for the best, which is a desire for
actuality itself. And the unidirectional motion of the elements transforming into one
another is a result of their imitation of the motion of the heavenly sphere. But, I contend,
the reason that they are imitating the circular motion of the heavens is due to the ultimate
desire for actuality which can be understood in Aristotelian terms as an imitation of the
UMM.
This also applies to plants and animals as well. In the De Anima Aristotle states
that for living things “…the most natural act is the production of another like itself, an
animal producing an animal, a plant a plant, in order that, as far as its nature allows, it
may partake in the eternal and divine. That is the goal toward which all things strive,
that for the sake of which they do whatsoever their nature renders possible.”107 Here
Aristotle states clearly that there is a kind of aiming for something better, which is pure
act, that occurs throughout living things, and this is to be understood in terms of the
eternal and divine, which of course ultimately is to be understood as the UMM. So
Aristotle seems to be here recognizing that all things desire what is best, and it is on
account of what is best that living things do what they do. This is explicitly the account
that Aristotle makes of reproduction, which occurs because of the inability for created
διὸ καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα μεταβάλλει εἰς ἄλληλα κατὰ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις, οἷον τὰ ἁπλᾶ σώματα,
μιμεῖται τὴν κύκλῳ φοράν· ὅταν γὰρ ἐξ ὕδατος ἀὴρ γένηται καὶ ἐξ ἀέρος πῦρ καὶ πάλιν ἐκ πυρὸς ὕδωρ,
κύκλῳ φαμὲν περιεληλυθέναι τὴν γένεσιν διὰ τὸ πάλιν ἀνακάμπτειν· On Generation and Corruption II 10
337a1-6.
107
φυσικώτατον…τὸ ποιῆσαι ἕτερον οἷον αὐτό, ζῷον μὲν ζῷον, φυτὸν δὲ φυτόν, ἵνα τοῦ ἀεὶ καὶ τοῦ θείου
μετέχωσιν ᾗ δύναν|ται· πάντα γὰρ ἐκείνου ὀρέγεται, καὶ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα πράττει ὅσα πράττει κατὰ φύσιν. De
Anima II 4 415a26-415b2 (My italics).
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things to be eternal. Since these things cannot be eternal, they are compelled to reach
whatever it is that they can which approximates eternality as close as it is possible for
them to reach. For living things then, this would be reproduction. Reproduction allows
the species to be eternal, even when the individual cannot be. And crucially the
explanation that Aristotle provides for reproduction is that it is due to a desire for the
good or best, which of course is to be understood in Aristotle’s account as a final cause.
Now it is also important to recognize that Aristotle does not simply argue that living
things do what they do, or that all of the various entities within the cosmos move as they
move, on account of final causality. There is also a mechanical explanation for these
occurrences, understood by Aristotle as an explanation through efficient causation. But
this is not for Aristotle in competition with the teleological account, but rather final
causality goes hand in hand with efficient causality.108
Finally, when it comes to human beings, Aristotle claims that humans are in a
unique position within the cosmos. As we have so far seen, the UMM is a final cause in
the sense of an aim for all natural motions within the cosmos. But the various things
within the cosmos can reach this aim only in an attenuated sense, and perhaps even in
some cases, such as the elements, not even that. But human beings can actually achieve
the activity of the divine, through contemplation which represents the end of all human
activity. Regarding this end of human activity, Aristotle states that “If intellect is divine,
then, in comparison with man, the life according to it is divine in comparison with human
life…[we] must, so far as we can, make ourselves immortal, and strain every nerve to live
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Once again, for an interesting discussion and interpretation of the relationship between Aristotelian final
and efficient causality see Margaret Scharle, “The Role of Material and Efficient Causes in Aristotelian
Natural Teleology,” 27–46.
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in accordance with the best thing in us; for even if it be small in bulk, much more does it
in power and worth surpass everything.”109 Here Aristotle is explicitly defending the life
of contemplation as one which not only is best, but which ultimately is understood by
him to be the truly happy life. So Aristotle then states “…that which is proper to each
thing is by nature best and most pleasant for each thing; for man, therefore, the life
according to intellect is best and pleasantest, since intellect more than anything else is
man.”110 The way in which contemplation is understood by Aristotle to be the happy life
is through his belief that the activity of God is ultimately a contemplative activity, and
since that activity must be considered to be the best, anything which can partake in that
activity would be essentially acting as God acts. This is clearly the best kind of activity
and therefore a life of contemplation is the best life. Human beings are able then to
achieve this life, albeit in an attenuated and temporary sense, and therefore this kind of
life is the end of all human activities. Aristotle therefore essentially identifies the happy
life of human beings with the life of contemplation.111 Aristotle asserts this point by
stating that “…the whole life of the gods is blessed, and that of men too in so far as some

εἰ δὴ θεῖον ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοῦτον βίος θεῖος πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον…ἀλλ᾽
ἐφ᾽ ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὑτῷ: εἰ γὰρ καὶ τῷ
ὄγκῳ μικρόν ἐστι, δυνάμει καὶ τιμιότητι πολὺ μᾶλλον πάντων ὑπερέχει. Nicomachean Ethics X 7
1177b30-1178a1.
110
τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἑκάστῳ τῇ φύσει κράτιστον καὶ ἥδιστόν ἐστιν ἑκάστῳ: καὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δὴ ὁ κατὰ τὸν
νοῦν βίος, εἴπερ τοῦτο μάλιστα ἄνθρωπος. οὗτος ἄρα καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατος. δευτέρως δ᾽ ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην
ἀρετήν: αἱ γὰρ κατὰ ταύτην ἐνέργειαι ἀνθρωπικαί. Nicomachean Ethics X 7 1178a5-10.
111
Admittedly, this involves a bit of controversy regarding Aristotle’s understanding of the happy human
life. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle seemingly identifies two inconsistent accounts of happiness. In
the first book, he seems to argue that happiness represents the actualization of the various faculties of
human nature, and that as a result the virtuous and happy life would be the social and political life
represented by what many would consider to be the life of nobility and leisure. However, in the last book
of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle states that the best life is one of contemplation, which is the life of
perfect happiness. However one understands the consistency of these two claims, I take as basic that
Aristotle found the good of human life to be found and defined by that which he considered to be the best
in human activity, namely that which humans share with the divine. This of course is contemplation. For a
discussion of this controversy see Guthrie, Aristotle: An Encounter, 390-396; Lear, Aristotle: The Desire to
Understand, 293-320.
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likeness of such activity belongs to them…Happiness extends, then, just so far as
contemplation does, and those to whom contemplation more fully belongs are more truly
happy, not accidentally, but in virtue of the contemplation; for this is in itself precious.
Happiness, therefore, must be some form of contemplation.”112 This statement then
shows us firstly that the life of contemplation is the happy life for human beings. This is
so because it is this activity which is the best activity as it is a divine activity. But
happiness is what we are aiming at, and therefore it seems natural for us to understand
this desire for contemplation as ultimately caused by the desire to imitate the UMM. This
is what makes humans rather unique among sublunary life forms, since humans can
achieve this in a way that other sublunary living things cannot. The aim for the UMM
then among most living things ultimately explains the desire for reproduction, but for
humans it also explains our desire to contemplate. This is just another instance of the
UMM being a final cause, in the sense of an aim which leads to an imitative activity, for
all natural motion.
What we have established thus far then is that all things are motivated by the
UMM, in so far as all natural motions are ultimately understood through their aiming at,
or desiring the UMM. Now it follows from this position that the UMM works as a kind
of final cause for all natural motions within the cosmos. We have already seen in the
second chapter that Aristotle himself distinguishes two senses of final causality, namely
something being for the benefit of something and something aiming at something.
Clearly the final cause that is operative in this sense then is that of aiming at the UMM. I

τοῖς μὲν γὰρ θεοῖς ἅπας ὁ βίος μακάριος, τοῖς δ᾽ ἀνθρώποις, ἐφ᾽ ὅσον ὁμοίωμά τι τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας
ὑπάρχει…ἐφ᾽ ὅσον δὴ διατείνει ἡ θεωρία, καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία, καὶ οἷς μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει τὸ θεωρεῖν, καὶ
εὐδαιμονεῖν, οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν θεωρίαν: αὕτη γὰρ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν τιμία. ὥστ᾽ εἴη ἂν ἡ
εὐδαιμονία θεωρία τις. Nicomachean Ethics X 8 1178b25-32.
112
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believe that this is the essential point to make in order to understand how Aristotle can
say that the UMM represents a separate good without thereby committing his theory to
defending a kind of Platonic Form of the Good. So in (a) and (b), when Aristotle is
arguing that the good is separate and in the arrangement of things, I contend based partly
upon the passages just discussed that the UMM serves as a separate good precisely
because the UMM is the final cause, in the sense of an aim, for all natural motions.
Everything seeks the divine and attempts to attain it in any way it possibly can, and this
aiming ultimately pans out as an imitative activity which is defined and given order
through the natures that the respective entities possess. And given these restrictions, the
motions of the entities in their imitative activity are ultimately those motions defined by
their form and nature. If this is correct, then the UMM as an aim would also be
understood by Aristotle as a good which is aimed at by the various things within the
cosmos. The end of a teleological motion for Aristotle is the good, which is clear when
Aristotle states, while determining the human good, that “For just as for a flute-player, a
sculptor, or any artist, and, in general, for all things that have a function or activity, the
good and the ‘well’ is thought to reside in the function, so would it seem to be for man, if
he has a function.”113 The good of something is found in the function of that thing and
the function of that thing is determined by the nature that it possesses. And the nature
determines the final cause of the actions of that thing. What it is aiming at then is the
good for it.

ὥσπερ γὰρ αὐλητῇ καὶ ἀγαλματοποιῷ καὶ παντὶ τεχνίτῃ, καὶ ὅλως ὧν ἔστιν ἔργον τι καὶ πρᾶξις, ἐν τῷ
ἔργῳ δοκεῖ τἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὖ, οὕτω δόξειεν ἂν καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, εἴπερ ἔστι τι ἔργον αὐτοῦ.
Nicomachean Ethics I 7 1097b25-29.
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Now the UMM is considered by Aristotle to be the final cause of motion. By
being the actuality behind all realization in so far as every realization aims at an end
which is an actuality and which is ultimately identified as the UMM in so far as the
UMM is pure act, the UMM performs the role of being the good as final cause for all
entities as such. As Lear puts it “God is the final cause: the order depends on him. The
order of this well-ordered world must bear some relation to God if he is to be responsible
for it.”114 It is my contention then that the UMM represents an overall good for every
entity within the cosmos. For Aristotle, the good of something is represented as the final
cause of that entity, and the UMM as ultimate final cause is at the same time a good at
which all entities aim in their attempts to realize themselves according to their natures.
So there is for Aristotle a kind of proximate good for entities, which of course is
determined by the natures of the individual entities. But the UMM, being the final cause
in a non-proximate sense, represents a good for every natural motion that occurs. Of
course, this good is a separate principle of good, since Aristotle’s own definition of what
is natural is that which possesses a principle of motion and stationariness in itself which
of course is not something that the UMM possesses. So the UMM is a separate thing
from the natural world of moving entities, and it is a good separate from the motions of
this moving world of nature. This implies a deep relationship between the entities of this
world and the UMM, so deep in fact that it could be reasonably claimed that for Aristotle
“…the order of the world as a whole is an attempted physical realization of God’s
thought.”115
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At this point then I have shown that there is a good reason to believe that Aristotle
does indeed mean to say that there is a separate principle of the good in Λ 10. But he
also clearly states that the principle of the good also exists in the arrangement of things
within the cosmos. As we have seen, the predominant interpretation of the passage
attempts to play down the claim that there is a good of the arrangement, instead saying
that all that Aristotle ultimately intends to say here is that species are able to attain their
own good without thereby undermining the attempt of other species to do the same.
However, this is not what Aristotle is stating here in my view. Rather, Aristotle is clearly
telling us that there is a good found in the order of the cosmos, and that moreover there is
a nature associated with this good.
I believe that there is a philological justification for my view. For in (a) Aristotle
states that “We must consider also in which of two ways the nature of the whole
possesses the good…” What this seems to imply right off the bat then is that the
following assertions are about a nature of the whole, in the sense that it is about a cosmic
nature over and above the natures of the various entities within the cosmos. However, we
have seen Johnson for instance argue that there is no nature of the whole being defended
in this passage. Those scholars who have taken this position then argue that Aristotle’s
expression of a ‘nature of the whole’ is a mere periphrasis for ‘the whole.’116 But I
believe that the text as we have it does not lend itself to such an interpretation without
some manipulation of the word order. For in the opening passage, Aristotle states in the
Greek ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ καὶ ποτέρως ἔχει ἡ τοῦ ὅλου φύσις τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον,
πότερον κεχωρισμένον τι καὶ αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτό, ἢ τὴν τάξιν. This can be reasonably

Johnson, Aristotle on Teleology, 272-274; Kullmann, “Different Concepts of the Final Cause in
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translated as “We must consider also in which of two ways the nature of the whole
possesses the good and the best, whether as something separate and by itself, or as the
order.” Now one can possibly understand Aristotle here to be asserting something like
‘the whole’ rather than explicitly pointing out a nature of the whole which would be over
and above the several natures of the individual substances found within that whole.
However, at 1075a22 Aristotle again, according to some manuscripts, seems to refer to
that nature of the whole which he has already mentioned in the opening passage of Λ 10.
According to Jaeger, this passage states in the Greek that τοιαύτη γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἑκάστου
αὐτῶν ἡ φύσις ἐστίν. When translated, this passage states that “For the nature of each of
them is such a principle.” However, this specific word order is not universally agreed
upon. Ross’ text gives the Greek as τοιαύτη γὰρ ἑκάστου ἀρχὴ αὐτῶν ἡ φύσις ἐστίν.117
According to this word order the translation would be “For that is the kind of principle
that nature is of each of them.” This second translation of this part of Λ 10 then seem to
be another indication that Aristotle is speaking here of a nature of the whole, and that this
specific passage is a second reference to this nature of the whole. Now one could state
that this second passage might be translated along the lines of the first reading, and that
the word order provided by Ross does not change the essential meaning of the passage.118
I think that this is possible, but it does seem to me that the meaning of this passage is
better taken to be speaking of a nature of the whole given the context of the passage
overall and the possibility of translating the above phrase according to the Ross word
order of the Greek which would make the passage contain a second reference to an
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overall nature. If this is the case then, we can see that the entire passage is indeed a
discussion of a nature of the whole, or a cosmic nature.
Of course, this philological argument has come under question as well. Bodnár
for instance argues that if we are to accept Ross’ word order, there would result a kind of
circular argument being expressed by Aristotle in Λ 10. Bodnár believes that the nondistributive sense of nature in (f) would necessarily lead to a strange circularity in which
Aristotle would be arguing that it is not the interaction of the individual components of
the universe and of the single excellent entity which gives rise to ordering, but rather a
hierarchy that must direct the individuals towards the single excellent entity which then
proceeds to produce the joint-arrangement among the entities within the cosmos.119 But
this is clearly a circular argument if Aristotle is stating this, for presumably the passage is
about how there is a nature of the whole and how it is good or possesses the good. But
Bodnár’s argument here is that the non-distributive reading of ‘nature’ in (f) would imply
that the explanation for the joint-arrangment of things is a pre-existing hierarchy
expressed by the regulation of the behavior of the individual entities in the hierarchy. But
clearly such a joint-arrangement should be a characteristic of the hierarchy in the first
place, not something which is explained by a pre-existent hierarchy. So Bodnár states
that the non-distributive reading would force us to understand Aristotle’s argument as
essentially implying that “…the hierarchy needs to direct the individual entities towards
the single excellent entity, and only after this will the individual entities produce the
joint-arrangement among themselves.”120 For Bodnár, due to the vacuous nature of the
argument when we take the non-distributive understanding of ‘nature’ in (f) seriously, it
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would be better to simply understand Aristotle as referring to the various natures of the
natural kinds, and not a single ‘nature of the whole.’
However, Bodnár’s argument here is not convincing. What Bodnár believes is
that there is a circularity that can be avoided in this passage which results from the nondistributive understanding of ‘nature.’ However, I believe that the non-distributive
reading does not imply that Aristotle is necessarily providing a circular argument.
Aristotle is not stating that there is a pre-existing hierarchy which explains the jointarrangement, but rather that the fact that all things are jointly arranged in relation to one
thing implies that there is a sort of nature beyond the individual natures of the entities
within the cosmos, a nature which certainly does not account for the specific movements
of the individual entities, but is necessary to account for the joint-arrangment of things
within the cosmos.121 In other words, Λ 10 is stating that all things aim at one thing, and
that implies that there is a sort of arrangement among the entities in the world. So far
from implying that there is a hierarchy which then explains the arrangement among
entities within the world, as Bodnár contends, it is rather that all things aim at the same
one thing, and that this aiming also leads to a joint-arrangment of all things within the
cosmos for Aristotle which is itself a necessary condition for the entities to achieve their
aim in the first place. Rather, it is from the fact that all things according to Aristotle aim
at one thing that there is in fact an arrangement which is the nature to which he is
referring, and the arrangment itself is a necessary condition for the various entities within
the cosmos to realize their own natures and aim at one thing, namely the UMM.
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The upshot to all of this then is that there is indeed additional textual evidence
that Aristotle is speaking of a cosmic nature in this passage, and that the reason that
Ross’s word order is not accepted is not due to textual reasons but rather due to
philosophical reasons relating to a perceived inconsistency between a nature of the whole
and Aristotle’s understanding of nature in the other passages within the corpus. There
really isn’t much of a reason then to use Jaeger’s word order other than the assumption
that Aristotle’s discussion of a nature of the whole would be a violation of Aristotle’s
general theory of nature. At this point then, we have seen evidence for the fact that
Aristotle is both arguing that there is a separate good at which all things aim, and that
there is a good associated with a nature of the whole and which is understood through the
ordered arrangement of all things within the cosmos. It is now necessary for us to
consider just how we are to understand this nature of the whole and the relation it has
with both the various entities within the cosmos as well as with the UMM as a separate
good.
3. Nature and the Analogies of Λ 10

Now that we have established that all things aim at the UMM as a final cause, and
that there is good reason to believe that Aristotle is defending a cosmic nature in Λ 10,
we now should set out to see if these concepts can be explained on Aristotelian grounds
without conflicting with other basic Aristotelian claims. Thankfully, Aristotle provides
us with several analogies to help us understand the cosmic nature which I believe are
important in understanding Aristotle’s claims in Λ 10. Specifically, Aristotle uses an
army and a household in order to illustrate how the good is both a separate principle as
well as how it is found in the order and arrangement of things within the cosmos.
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Aristotle also seems to compare his understanding of how the good is found in the
cosmos with a polis and specifically with a monarchy when at the end of Λ 10 he
references Homer by stating that “And those who say mathematical number is first and
go on to generate one kind of substance after another and give different principles for
each, make the substance of the universe a series of episodes…and they give us many
principles; but the world must not be governed badly. ‘The rule of many is not good; let
there be one ruler.’”122 It is my view that these analogies are vital for unlocking the
meaning of Aristotle’s assertion of a cosmic nature or ‘nature of the whole.’
The analogies of Λ 10 then have been discussed by several commentators.
Sedley, who as we have already seen is one of the few contemporary scholars who
defends the cosmic nature reading of Λ 10, uses the household analogy to show that all
things share, to differing extents, in a single goal-directed activity. So when Aristotle
states that the “freemen are least at liberty to act as they will, but all things or most things
are already ordained for them, while the slaves and the beasts do little for the common
good, and for the most part live at random,” he means to show us that the arrangement of
the various entities within the cosmos is much like the arrangement of the members of a
household hierarchy in so far as in both cases the entities involved share in a single goaldirected activity albeit to a differing degree. Sedley states that “The level of participation
is higher among the free men than among the slaves…most of [the slaves’] own aims at
best merely coincide with the aims of the household…”123 So when Aristotle states that

οἱ δὲ λέγοντες τὸν ἀριθμὸν πρῶτον τὸν μαθηματικὸν καὶ οὕτως ἀεὶ ἄλλην ἐχομένην οὐσίαν καὶ ἀρχὰς
ἑκάστης ἄλλας, ἐπεισοδιώδη τὴν τοῦ παντὸς οὐσίαν ποιοῦσιν…καὶ ἀρχὰς πολλάς: τὰ δὲ ὄντα οὐ βούλεται
πολιτεύεσθαι κακῶς. “οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη: εἷς κοίρανος ἔστω. Metaphysics Λ 10 1075b37-1076a4
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the slaves and beasts act by chance and at random, he does not mean that the slaves and
beasts when acting by chance do not make a contribution to the household, but that rather
their aims when they do so are not those of the joint-activity of the household. Through
this interpretation of the household analogy, Sedley believes that Aristotle is arguing that
all thing in the cosmos “…share, to differing extents, in a single goal-directed
activity.”124 This single goal directed activity moreover is understood by Sedley to be the
imitation of the unmoved mover, which ultimately is understood as the desire for pure
actuality. So Sedley states that “Just as every heavenly sphere is motivated by love for its
mover, and through that mover ultimately by love of the prime mover, so too sublunary
things are motivated by love for the prime mover, even if the motivation is increasingly
remote as one travels down the natural hierarchy.”125 The more this motivation is remote,
the farther down the hierarchy an entity is; which according to Sedley is adequately
expressed by Aristotle through the household analogy. All of this amounts to Sedley’s
claim that it would be better “…to see this inclination toward everlasting recurrence as an
aspiration of the overall cosmic nature – than of the individual natures of cabbages,
flames, or drops of water.”126 This is especially so since it is difficult to see what it
means for a plant or a simple body to desire something like the unmoved mover. Finally,
a cosmic nature that is being expressed in this way would also successfully account for
Aristotle’s assertion that the good is found in the arrangement, which would be the
hierarchy of entities defined by their respective desire for the prime mover.
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In my view, Sedley is right regarding the fundamentals. He claims that there is a
cosmic nature and that this is exhibited hierarchically through each individual’s attempt
to imitate the prime mover. This view moreover has textual justification both in Λ 10 as
well as in those texts discussed in the first part of this chapter when discussing every
entity’s desire for the UMM. However, Sedley is also mistaken in crucial points as well.
He firstly seems to believe that the household analogy shows us that the shared goal
which is in general the motivating factor of the members of the household becomes
increasingly remote the farther down the household hierarchy one is. And that this in
turn illustrates for us that in the case of natural motions too the motivation is more
indirect and thus increasingly remote the farther down the hierarchy one goes. According
to Sedley, this is illustrated by the fact that most of the motions of the slave do not have
as their end the good of the household. But this is not the point of the household analogy
as far as I can see it. Rather, Aristotle is attempting to show us how various entities all
attain a different level of that which they desire. In other words, all things aim at the
UMM in so far as all things seek to share in the activity of actuality which just is the
UMM according to Aristotle. The difference then between various entities is not how
much of their movements directly aim at the good, but rather the way in which they are
able to attain the end that they seek. We have already seen that Aristotle’s ontology is
partly understood through the ways in which each entity seeks the divine activity, and
that there is a significant difference between the activity of the celestial bodies and the
activity of plants regarding the way in which they successfully imitate the divine activity.
And crucially, nowhere in the corpus is it found that the various entities seek or are
motivated by the UMM in a way which indicates that most things do not seek the UMM
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at least during some of their motions, which seems to be a necessary implication of how
Sedley understands the household analogy used by Aristotle.
When one examines the cosmos through this analogy then, Sedley argues that the
single goal directed activity in which all things share is the imitation of the unmoved
mover. I think that this is correct, but that Sedley misses the point that the household
analogy is meant to show us that just as all members of a household ultimately seek the
activity, which is the good, of the head of the household in so far as the head of the
household represents for Aristotle the fully actualized human life, so all things in the
cosmos ultimately seek the activity of the UMM, in so far as all things seek actuality and
the UMM represents pure act itself. There is not some external activity that things seek
by their nature, such as the good of the cosmos or the arrangement within the cosmos, but
rather they seek what would be in the household analogy the head of the household.
They aim at becoming the head of the household in so far as they are able, just as all
entities aim at becoming the UMM. This seeking, as I explained earlier, represents the
reason or final cause for each entity’s ultimate aim to realize its own nature, as this is the
imitative activity which manifests itself from the desire for actuality itself. This desire
then in the household ultimately manifests itself in the performance of the specific role
that they play in the household. It seems obvious that every member of a household is
understood to be lower in the hierarchy precisely due to the fact that they cannot perform
the same sort of activities that the head of the household performs, and it follows
straightforwardly from this analogy that the cosmos is hierarchically structured in so far
as beings can imitate the divine activity in vastly different ways, some of which are closer
to the divine activity than others due to their specific natures that they possess. Sedley

98

simply seems to confuse this point with attempting to indicate that there is some other
activity which all things take a part in, which is not what Aristotle is saying either in Λ 10
or in the other passages that mention the role and place of the UMM in the cosmos as
Aristotle sees it.
Sedley also argues that the cosmic nature that Aristotle is describing here is
exhibited by the desire for what he calls everlasting recurrence but which in Aristotelian
terms would be pure actuality. Sedley believes that it is the cosmic nature that is so
exhibited in such motions precisely because it is odd to say that certain entities such as
plants or even the elements desire anything, as they clearly do not have the type of soul
necessary to actually have a capacity to desire anything. However, Aristotle does not
need to account for a desire which he attributes to those entities that do not have such a
faculty according to his own ontology. Everything in the cosmos for Aristotle is directed
at actuality. And it is the nature of the UMM to be pure actuality. This of course
accounts for the desire of the outer sphere and the celestial bodies in general, a desire
moreover which in their case may in fact be a conscious one. But the desire for actuality
in general is not necessarily a desire that is a conscious one. For us humans, we are
aware of what it is that we want, and ultimately what it is that we want is actuality which
manifests itself in the desire to contemplate as it is in doing this that human beings
achieve the essential activity of the divine. But everything which has a potentiality is
also necessarily disposed toward and driven at the actuality of that potentiality. This is
not something that a life-form needs to be conscious of in order to do. Now of course
this is the case when we are speaking in biological terms when we describe the plant’s
tendency to actualize itself and grow into a fully functioning adult. But it is also the case
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that every entity according to Aristotle is driven at actuality simpliciter, which is
ultimately no more to say that every entity is driven to approximate the UMM in so far as
its nature allows it to do. This desire for actuality combined with the specific range of
capabilities and ends dictated to an entity by the nature that it possesses leads then to the
imitative motions that Aristotle believes can be found throughout the cosmos. To have a
potentiality for Aristotle is to also have a nature, which in itself defines and limits the
actuality of the potentiality. But every potentiality, and thus every nature, is driven to
achieve actuality, and thus every natural entity is disposed to approximate as best as it
possibly can the activity of the UMM, which is nothing other than the activity of pure
actuality as such. This is what it means for something to desire the UMM, which of
course implies that there is no need to entertain the notion that entities must be
consciously aware of their desire for such actuality. What this all implies finally is that
the notion that there must be a cosmic nature that is manifested in the desire for the
UMM betrays an inaccurate understanding of the general drive for actuality manifested
by every nature within the cosmos.
Finally, as I have discussed in the second chapter, Sedley also believes that Λ 10
serves as a justification for his anthropocentric interpretation of Aristotelian teleology.
Since Sedley believes that Physics II 8 and Politics I 8 serves as clear examples of
anthropocentric teleology, he then believes that the cosmic nature which is discussed in Λ
10 provides a further explanation of just how this anthropocentric external teleology
works. Sedley argues that it would be absurd to say that it is the nature of the individual
entities to aim at being consumed by an entity further up in the teleological hierarchy.
So, just as Sedley assumes that a cosmic nature is necessary in order to explain the desire
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for actuality among all the entities in the cosmos, he also believes that it is somehow the
cosmic nature that is expressed in the anthropocentric teleology he reads into Aristotle.
However, I have already shown in the last chapter that there is a distinct lack of anything
which could actually support an anthropocentric interpretation in Aristotle. Politics I 8 is
not explicitly promoted by Aristotle as a defense of his view on natural teleology, and
Physics II 8 certainly does not make such a claim either, although it certainly seems to
say more about the teleologically understood ends towards which things like winter rain
is striving then that winter rain should simply be understood in terms of the teleological
aims of water alone.127 And the idea that a cosmic nature is necessary in order to account
for an anthropocentric teleology is just as unfounded in relation to what is actually stated
in Λ 10 as the claim that a cosmic nature is necessary in order to account for the general
tendency for individuals to aim at actuality.
So at this point we have established that Λ 10 is speaking about and defending a
cosmic nature or ‘nature of the whole.’ I have also defended the point with Sedley that
this cosmic nature is ultimately a hierarchical one and which is ultimately explained
through every entities’ desire for the UMM, or more precisely the desire for the activity
of the UMM. However, Sedley seems to view the cosmic nature as the expression of the
desire of each entity to imitate the UMM, that certain entities are less motivated for the
UMM than others and that a cosmic nature is necessary for an anthropocentric teleology.
But we have shown that this is not a necessary nor even a good reading of what a cosmic
nature might mean on Aristotelian grounds.
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Another account which has been provided to explain the concept of a ‘nature of
the whole’ or a cosmic nature has been provided by Margarat Scharle.128 Scharle
ultimately believes that the cosmic nature Aristotle is describing in Λ 10 amounts to and
is understood through the theory of approximation that both she and I defend. The
activity of all things in the cosmos for Aristotle is fundamentally defined through the
attempt of each entity to approximate as far as it is able the divine activity of the UMM
which is ultimately the activity of actuality as such. Scharle ultimately identifies the
cosmic nature which Aristotle is referencing in Λ 10 with the desire of individuals to
approximate the UMM. So Scharle states that “…the natures of individual things are
cosmic to the extent to which individuals’ natural movements approximate the activity of
the Prime Mover.”129 Consequently Scharle believes that there is a cosmic principle
operating in each individual which is nothing other than the natures of these individuals
but which is to be understood through an individuals’ attempt to approximate the activity
of the UMM by imitating something higher in the ontological hierarchy of the
Aristotelian cosmos. This essentially boils down to the claim that individual natures are
cosmic from a certain point of view.
However, this account of cosmic nature is not satisfactory either. Essentially
Scharle’s account states that individual natures are also cosmic natures, whatever it might
mean for an individual nature to be cosmic at the same time. Scharle makes this
argument explicitly when she states that “…the expression of an individual’s own nature
just is an expression of the cosmic nature…”130 Scharle believes that this approach to the
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possibility of a cosmic nature in Aristotle avoids the pitfalls of attempting to account for
a cosmic nature which is at the same time not a principle of rest and motion as detailed in
the second chapter. Scharle argues that the problem with Sedley’s account of cosmic
nature in Λ 10 ignores the fact that Aristotle fails to provide an account of a natural
object which can accord with Sedley’s interpretation of a cosmic nature in Λ 10. She
thus believes that taking Aristotle to be stating that there is a cosmic nature mentioned
and discussed in Λ 10 allows her to provide the best and most natural reading of Λ 10 but
that she can also avoid the minimalist critique that the cosmic nature mentioned in Λ 10
does not accord with anything that Aristotle has to say regarding nature in the rest of the
corpus. But when one looks back at the two references to a cosmic nature in Λ 10, there
is no clear indication whatsoever that this cosmic nature is simply individual nature taken
from a certain point of view to be expressing a cosmic nature. When Aristotle states in Λ
10 that this ‘nature of the whole’ is a principle of each of them, he does not explicitly
imply that it is merely that each individual also possesses a cosmic nature or even that the
nature that each individual possesses is a cosmic nature from a certain perspective. And
frankly, Λ 10 is easiest and most natural to interpret when one just takes Aristotle to be
discussing what he states that he is discussing, namely a ‘nature of the whole.’131
The problem that Scharle has with this reading is seemingly that such a nature is
not accounted for in Aristotle’s description of what a nature is in the rest of the corpus.
We have already discussed Aristotle’s account of natural objects and explanation in the

Scharle agrees with me on this point, as she too believes that the natural reading of Λ 10 is a discussion
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Physics, and what these accounts have in common is that they all imply that a natural
thing possesses a principle of movement, and that that which is by nature in this sense is
that which both possesses matter as well as a form which directs the growth and
operation of the natural entity so that it can achieve the end dictated to it by the nature it
possesses. Finally, that which possesses a nature is an organized whole which is arranged
through the nature that it possesses and without which the parts of the whole would lose
their meaning and function, further implying that the parts of the whole are in fact
defined through the whole. But the cosmos does not grow for Aristotle, nor does it have
a source of growth or becoming. In addition, the parts of the cosmos are in fact
considered by Aristotle to have existential autonomy, and to be knowable through
themselves and not as parts of a cosmic whole. Scharle refuses then to acknowledge that
there is a cosmic nature over and above the individual natures explicitly defended in Λ 10
precisely because of the apparent lack of any account of nature within the corpus that
could help us understand what such a cosmic nature would look like. In other words, a
‘cosmic nature’ just simply does not accord with how Aristotle defines natural objects in
Physics 2.
Given the lack of a sufficient account for cosmic nature in Aristotle at this point,
it would seem plausible to take the traditional position which has been recently defended
by Bodnár and Johnson; namely that Λ 10 is not really speaking of a cosmic nature at all,
but really just defending the fact that all entities simply aim at the UMM.132 However,
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we have already seen that this view is not fully supported by the text, and that moreover
there is a distinct sense that the analogies used by Aristotle indicate for us that he is
speaking of something more than just the fact that things happen to be related to each
other.
In my view then, I think that it is best to re-consider the analogies that Aristotle is
using to help explain the cosmic nature mentioned by Aristotle in Λ 10. Let us take the
army analogy first. Firstly, it seems fairly obvious that the good of an army consists not
just in the fact that its various parts are in a good arrangement, but that an army must be
organized in such a way that each unit can do its particular function. And of course, we
can see that a good army is one where each unit in it is in some sense able to cooperate
with the other units in order to achieve its end. So for Aristotle an army possesses a
good, and is evaluated as such based upon how well each unit within the army performs
its function and how well it cooperates with the other units in the army in order to
achieve the overall end of victory over the enemy army. So it follows that the good of an
army is actually found both in the leader of the army and in the organization. The leader
or general actually accounts for the organization of the army, and in this sense is also the
good of the army. On the other hand, the organization of the army allows each unit
within the army to perform its function, which of course is only possible through a
coordinated effort which is a result of the general of the army.
This analogy clearly has implications that have already been indicated by those
commentators that I have already mentioned in this chapter. The general then is akin to

that he is doing precisely that when he mentions a ‘nature of the whole’ which Bodnár denies. I will defend
that there is a ‘nature of the whole’ defended in Λ 10, and account for this nature through an analysis of
alternative concept of nature found in the Politics. Doing this will hopefully provide a more natural
reading for Λ 10 then the one that Bodnár has provided.
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the UMM, in so far as each represents the highest good. We have already seen that the
UMM represents a kind of final cause for all things, and in this sense is responsible for
the arrangement found within the cosmos. We have also seen that there is a kind of
hierarchy within the cosmos which implies a kind of coordination which mirrors the
coordination of an army. Just as each unit within an army is defined in terms of the
function that it performs, in that an archer is defined in terms of what an archer is
supposed to do, so each entity within the cosmos is also defined by the function that it
performs which is ultimately explained by the natures that they possess. But an archer
unit can only perform the function that it does precisely because of the other units within
an army which allow for it to perform such a function. I think that this correctly mirrors
Aristotle’s understanding of the cosmos as well. Each thing within the cosmos possesses
a nature which determines its function. But the performance of such a function relies on
a kind of coordination which is only possible if the various entities within the cosmos are
related to each other in a kind of whole which itself is good. Finally, just as an army is
evaluated as being good or bad as a whole, it would seem to follow that the arrangement
of the entities must be evaluated accordingly. This whole that is above and beyond the
individual entities themselves would naturally be taken to be the cosmic nature that
Aristotle explicitly states that he is talking about in this passage.
The household analogy essentially makes the same points regarding the cosmos as
the army analogy. Just as is emphasized in the army analogy, there is in a household a
kind of arrangement which allows the particular function of each member of the
household to be expressed and pursued. However, the head of the household seems to
represent the UMM in a more literal sense than a general, precisely because Aristotle
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would have considered the head of the household to represent that which all other things
seek to be but are unable to fully achieve due to the limitations inherent in their
respective roles.133 So the household analogy indicates an emphasis both on the separate
good represented in the general and head of the household respectively, as well as on the
good in the arrangement which helps to make sense of the ordered arrangement that
exists between the various entities in an army and a household. When one applies these
analogies to the cosmos, we see that Aristotle is attempting to point out both a separate
good of the cosmos, which would be the UMM, as well as a good found in the order and
arrangement of the various things within the cosmos. These points are generally accepted
among all the commentators of Λ 10.
What has not been emphasized concerning the analogies however are two
additional characteristics of an army and a household that I believe Aristotle is also
attempting to apply to the cosmos as a whole. Firstly, there is the fact that both an army
and a household are not just mere collections of things that are accidentally arranged or
ordered. Rather both an army and a household are ordered together in a unified sense
which allows for the individual entities to attain the end that they seek. In my view, this
coordination of entities is also an important aspect of these entities which Aristotle is
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The limitations of the various members of the household would apply to anyone who is not the head of
the household. But Aristotle would have had in mind more specifically, and more controversially, the
limitations of women and slaves. Women are understood to be limited by Aristotle in so far as their natures
are directed at reproduction and care of the household, and as such are not able to achieve the kind of life
that is enjoyed by the head of the household who is able to fully realize his nature. Slaves on the other
hand are distinguished by Aristotle between natural and conventional. Natural slaves are those who are
unable to function on their own for Aristotle, and thus become a tool of a master who is both beneficial to
and is benefited from the relationship with the slave. Needless to say, these are suspect statements and
some are even convinced that such statements indicate that Aristotle could not have held that the
relationship between entities in the cosmos is like the relationship between the members of a household. I
don’t think that Aristotle is bothered by this however, and although we should most certainly dismiss his
assertions regarding slavery and women as mere nonsense, the hierarchical character of the household is in
my estimation most certainly for Aristotle a mirror of the hierarchical structure of the cosmos.
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attempting to apply to the cosmos as well. As Christoph Horn states “If, in an apartment,
every detail is in an optimal condition, this does not yet imply that everything is
optimally coordinated.”134 It is the coordination of an army that allows it to achieve
victory, and an uncoordinated army is a bad one which will be easily defeated by the
enemy. For a household, an uncoordinated one would be a bad one which will prevent
the various members of the household to fulfill their function and thus they will live less
than ideal lives. I believe that this is also an important emphasis of the analogies that
Aristotle wants us to apply to the cosmos as well. There is a sort of coordination at work
in the cosmos, which can be seen at the level of sublunary life in so far as every entity is
intimately arranged with other entities to create a balance or harmony which both allows
for that entity to achieve reproduction and thus imitate the UMM in so far as it is possible
for that entity to do so and which accounts for their interactions which allows for each
entity a place within a larger and unified whole. This balance is not accidental, and helps
to explain how entities are able to fulfill their desire for eternality through reproduction.
Secondly, the analogies both speak of an organization which in some sense has a
nature which is other than the nature that is expressed by the individual entities within the
arrangement. An army for instance is composed of multiple kinds of units which in
themselves express a kind of nature and function. But the particular nature and function
of the individual units within an army is not the same as the nature that the army itself
possesses. This seems to me to be equivalent to saying that the arrangement and order of
the cosmos is a good which must be accounted for, and which is accounted for by
Aristotle through expressing and defending an account of a cosmic nature which is other

Christoph Horn, “The Unity of the World-order According to Metaphysics Λ 10, in Aristotle’s
Metaphysics Λ – New Essays, ed. Christoph Horn (Boston: De Gruyter, 2016), 285.
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than the natures of the various entities within the cosmos. Now we have seen that Sedley
primarily defends an account of cosmic nature that is over and above the natures of the
entities within the cosmos. But the issue with Sedley’s account is that not only does he
fail to provide a defense of a cosmic nature in the face of the minimalist critique that
there is no account of a natural thing, and thus a nature, in Aristotle to provide an
explanation for what this cosmic nature could be, but he also seems to emphasize a
separate cosmic nature for the wrong reasons. According to Sedley, the cosmic nature is
defended by Aristotle for two reasons. Firstly, it allows Sedley to explain what nature is
being fulfilled through the anthropocentric teleological actions of the various sublunary
entities. Secondly, it helps to explain away what would otherwise be an anthropomorphic
account of desire for the UMM which Sedley believes cannot be attributed to entities that
do not have the capability to desire anything. But, despite these issues with Sedley’s
defense of a cosmic nature, I think that interpreting Λ 10 as discussing and thus
defending an overall cosmic nature is the correct reading, and that it is corroborated
through the analogies. The reasons for Aristotle’s defense of a cosmic nature however is
that there is also the need to explain the coordination of entities within the cosmos, and
that a cosmic nature is how, in Aristotelian terms, one can account for such coordination.
4. Conclusion

In conclusion, I by no means believe that everything has been settled at this point.
A cosmic nature is, as has been emphasized, something that Aristotle just simply does not
reference in his discussions of natural things in his other works. Natural entities for
Aristotle possess an internal principle which accounts for the essential motions of that
substance, whether these motions are considered to be locomotive, qualitative change or
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quantitative change, and it is associated with entities that can be safely considered to be
existentially autonomous. This just is not what the cosmos is for Aristotle, and thus it is
incumbent upon us to attempt to understand just what Aristotle is doing when ascribing to
the cosmos a nature. I believe that the clue for us to unlock this concept of a cosmic
nature is in the analogies as well. The household analogy is specifically what we ought
to consider when attempting to understand Aristotle in Λ 10. We generally acknowledge
that an army, although it may have a nature which helps to define what it does, what end
it is attempting to achieve, and how good it is at achieving such an end, is nevertheless an
artificial production. If we are to accept the fact that the cosmos possesses a nature, and
that it is through the nature that we can understood how the whole possesses the good
through its arrangement and ordering, then it seems that it is precisely at this point that
the army analogy fails to apply to the concept of a cosmic nature. This is because if the
cosmos does have a nature, it cannot be a nature on par with the artifacts of Aristotelian
ontology. Artifacts are created products which depend upon an artificer who has the
form or nature of the artifact in mind before producing the artifact.135 But the cosmos is
an eternal entity, not one which is dependent upon a creator. Thus the nature, or more
specifically the kind of nature, that the cosmos possesses must be something other than
the nature possessed by artifacts such as an army.
It is at this point, specifically regarding the kind of nature that the cosmos
possesses, that the household analogy serves as a better comparison for what Aristotle is
attempting to get us to see with his concept of a cosmic nature. For a household is not an
artifact, but rather something that exists by nature.136 The naturalness of the household is
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I have already pointed this distinction out in the second chapter.
Politics I 2.
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understood however through the relationship that a household has with the polis which
represents the end of a natural development which begins with the household. And it is
in the kind of nature that the polis possesses that can give us a clue into what the cosmic
nature might be within the general Aristotelian ontology.137
However, although this seems to be what Aristotle is attempting to convey in Λ
10, the implications of this kind of comparison still remain unclear. I contend then that
an investigation into the ontology and nature of the polis will help us to better determine
the nature of the cosmos defended by Aristotle in Λ 10. What will follow then in the
following chapters is an investigation into the metaphysical and ontological claims
regarding Aristotle’s concept of the polis and how this relates to the cosmos and its
ontological status within Aristotle’s general worldview. Specifically, we have seen that
the problem that has yet to be solved regarding the cosmic nature in Λ 10 is how we
should best understand and make consistent the concept of a cosmic nature given
Aristotle’s other commitments regarding substances and that which possesses a nature.
This needs to be resolved, and I think that the best way to do this is look at the
naturalness of the polis and how it fits best with the general idea of nature within the
corpus.

The comparison between the polis and the cosmos is even explicitly suggested by Aristotle within Λ 10
(1076a4).
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CHAPTER IV

THE NATURALNESS OF THE POLIS

1. Introduction
Our analysis of Physics II 8 and Metaphysics Λ 10 has established that Aristotle’s
account of teleology as it relates to that which is beyond simply explaining the internal
actualization of individual natures is not quite as clear as it has been at times assumed to
be. Specifically, I have shown that Physics II 8 does not have a clear meaning to it as of
yet, and that the attempt to interpret the passage according to the internalist approach fails
to account for what Aristotle actually states regarding the teleology of winter rain as
opposed to summer rain. In addition, we have seen that Λ 10 defends both a concept of a
separate good as well as a good of the whole, the latter of which is directly referenced in
the passage by Aristotle. This good of the whole moreover seems to be explained by
Aristotle through a series of analogies which lead one to the conclusion that there must be
a cosmic structure of a sort which involves an organization and a teleology which
surpasses the minimalistic reading of some. However, I have also shown that those who
have acknowledged and defended the idea that there is a cosmic nature being defended
and explained by Aristotle in Λ 10 have nevertheless failed to show how this cosmic
nature can be explained on Aristotelian grounds while remaining faithful to the text. I
then proceeded to argue that there is an account of nature in the Aristotelian corpus which
does indeed provide the interpreter with the key necessary to unlock the puzzle of a
cosmic nature. The account which I have in mind is of course Aristotle’s argument that
the polis is a natural entity. What this shows us, I believe, is that there is indeed an
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account of nature in Aristotle which can help us to explain a cosmic nature but which
does not violate other basic Aristotelian claims regarding substance and ontological
autonomy but which allows us to both assert the existence of and the necessity of a kind
of cosmic nature in which everything is organized in respect with the other entities in the
cosmos to create a cosmic order. Therefore, the next two chapters of the dissertation will
focus on the issues regarding the nature of the polis. What I hope to accomplish is to
show both that the polis can be regarded as natural and prior to the individual, and that
the precise account of nature and priority that Aristotle is using in the Politics is
analogous in an important sense to the account of nature and priority that he has in mind
regarding a cosmic nature in Λ 10. The application of this account of nature and priority
to the cosmos will then comprise the final chapter of the dissertation.
2. The Polis: Artifact or Natural?

At the beginning of the Politics, Aristotle makes a series of controversial claims.
He states that the polis, which is essentially a city-state or political community, is both
prior to the individual and is a natural entity. He also makes the assertion that man is a
political animal. The precise meaning of these claims is not quite clear, but the general
idea that Aristotle is attempting to convey is that the polis represents a necessary part of
human life and that it is impossible to live a good human life outside the polis since
human beings are by nature political and the polis is itself a natural entity. The second
chapter of the Politics begins then by providing a sort of genetic account concerning the
beginning of the polis.138 Aristotle argues that human communities begin through the
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The claim that the polis is natural, that it is prior to individuals and that human beings are by nature
political animals as well as the genetic account of the origins of the polis are provided by Aristotle in the
second section of the first book of the Politics.
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desire, which human beings share with other animals, to reproduce an image of
themselves. In order to do this, male and female come together, and thereby form a
household. When then several households come together a village is formed. Aristotle
then proceeds to argue that the combining of several villages then forms a polis, and he
states that “When several villages are united in a single complete community, large
enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state [polis] comes into existence,
originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good
life.”139 What then Aristotle apparently believes follows from this genetic account is the
claim that the polis a natural entity.
There are of course many questions that arise from this claim. First, it is not clear
what precisely it means, in Aristotelian terms, what the naturalness of the polis amounts
to. Does the naturalness of the polis imply that there is an internal principle of motion
and stationariness to the polis, and that therefore the polis is ontologically the same in
kind as the other natural things which populate the Aristotelian cosmos? 140 Moreover,
how does the account that Aristotle provide here actually demonstrate the naturalness of
the polis at all? For it seems as though one could certainly accept the genetic account that
Aristotle has just provided without thereby being forced to accept the claim that the polis
is a product of nature and that it itself is natural. Both of these questions are important
for understanding Aristotle’s conception of the polis, and especially how he conceives of
the ontological status of the polis, as well as for the argument I seek to defend concerning
ἡ δ᾽ ἐκ πλειόνων κωμῶν κοινωνία τέλειος πόλις, ἤδη πάσης ἔχουσα πέρας τῆς αὐταρκείας ὡς ἔπος
εἰπεῖν, γινομένη μὲν τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεν, οὖσα δὲ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν. Politics I 2 1252b27-30.
140
Miller calls this interpretation of Aristotle’s argument the internal cause interpretation, since he
understands the argument that the polis is natural due to its growth from earlier natural relations to be
equivalent to arguing that there is a kind of internal cause, much like that which other natural entities
possess, which leads to the natural existence of the polis. For this view see Fred D. Miller, Jr, Nature,
Justice, and Rights in Aristotle’s Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 37-40.
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the nature of the cosmos. I will accordingly proceed in this chapter to focus on the
arguments concerning the polis itself, and return to these arguments in the final chapter
when I am better able to defend an account of a cosmic nature and teleology.
To begin, it is important to point out that the claim that the polis or city/state is
natural is not a common one, as there have been many who have argued that the city or
state is quite clearly an artificial entity.141 This seems to be the case precisely because the
polis has been seen to be the deliberate creation of human beings who desired, for one
reason or another, to escape the state of nature and enter a contract which provided for
the protection and welfare of those which make up the polis. According to this view
then, the polis would not be a natural entity at all, but would rather be better considered
to be an artifact which helps human beings to achieve their end much like any other
artifact, such as cooking pots, schools, or computers. So Hobbes, a proponent of the
claim that the polis is an artifact, states that “For by Art is created that great Leviathan
called a Common-Wealth, or State…which is but an Artificiall Man.”142 This idea, of
which Aristotle was aware and which was stated or hinted at by other ancient thinkers,
makes a rather intuitive claim regarding the state. The state, according to this view, is an
artifact much like a building or a car. One does not simply find oneself in a natural
political community, but rather a political community is created through the deliberate
effort of a person or group of people who desire to create conditions which are somehow
better or which allow for something better to be achieved. In Aristotelian terms, this
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The Sophists made this argument and Aristotle is aware of this fact. Moreover, Plato has the Sophists
within his dialogues make this argument at several points. For Plato’s depiction of the Sophists argument
that the polis is artificial see Gorgias 482c4-484c3 and Republic II 357a-362d. Plato also attributes this
view to the atheists in Laws X 888d7-890b2. For Aristotle’s recognition of the Sophists’ argument see
Nicomachean Ethics I 3 1094b16, Nicomachean Ethics V 7 1134b24-1135a6, and Politics I 3 1253b20-21.
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Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909), 8. (My Italics).
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view holds that the state is the creation of art, and that it is a product of the practical
intellect. The questions as to why it is that Aristotle has argued that the state is not in
fact an artifact, or if indeed it is best to simply accept the fact that Aristotle made a
mistake in asserting that the polis is natural, needs to be addressed.
David Keyt has expanded upon the position that the polis must be considered an
artifact through arguing that Aristotle should have on his own principles conceived of the
state as a product of artificial production. Keyt argues that “Aristotle ought to agree with
Hobbes, that according to Aristotle’s own principles the political community is an artifact
of practical reason, not a product of nature, and that, consequently, there is a blunder at
the very root of Aristotle’s political philosophy.”143 Keyt uses passages such as that in
which Aristotle states that “For just as other craftsmen, such as a weaver or a shipbuilder,
must have matter that is suitable for their work (for the better prepared this happens to be,
the finer must be that which comes into being by their art), so also must the stateman and
the lawgiver have proper matter in a suitable condition.”144 Keyt believes that Aristotle
made a mistake in claiming that the polis is a natural entity, and that Aristotle should
have rather accepted the fact that the polis is a result of the imposition of form upon
matter, and that this process is precisely how Aristotle understands the creation of an
artifact.

David Keyt, “Three Basic Theorems in Aristotle’s Politics,” in A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics,
edited by David Keyt and Fred J. Miller, Jr (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 118. This interpretation is a very
common one. It has also been defended by C. C. W. Taylor, R. G. Mulgan, and even to a lesser extent by
Jonathan Barnes. See Jonathan Barnes “Aristotle and Political Liberty,” in Aristotles’ ‘Politik,’ edited by G.
Patzig (Gottingen: Van den Hoeck and Ruprecht, 1990), 249-263; R. G. Mulgan, “Aristotle’s Doctrine that
Man is a Political Animal,” Hermes 102, no. 3 (1974), 438-45; C. C. W. Taylor, “Politics,” in The
Cambridge Companion to Aristotle, edited by Jonathan Barnes (Cambridge and New York, 1991), 238.
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ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δημιουργοῖς, οἷον ὑφάντῃ καὶ ναυπηγῷ, δεῖ τὴν ὕλην ὑπάρχειν ἐπιτηδείαν
οὖσαν πρὸς τὴν ἐργασίαν (ὅσῳ γὰρ ἂν αὕτη τυγχάνῃ παρεσκευασμένη βέλτιον, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ γιγνόμενον
ὑπὸ τῆς τέχνης εἶναι κάλλιον,) οὕτω καὶ τῷ πολιτικῷ καὶ τῷ νομοθέτῃ δεῖ τὴν οἰκείαν ὕλην ὑπάρχειν
ἐπιτηδείως ἔχουσαν. Politics VII 4 1325b40-1326a5.
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In his analysis of Politics I 2, the passage which contains the arguments defending
the three claims mentioned above, Keyt argues that Aristotle is using a genetic argument
in order to defend the naturalness of the polis.145 Aristotle argues for the naturalness of
the polis by asserting that:
When several villages are united in a single community, large enough to be nearly
or quite self-sufficing, the state comes into existence, originating in the bare needs
of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life. And therefore, if
the earlier forms of society are natural, so is the state, for it is the end of them, and
the nature of a thing is its end. For what each thing is when fully developed, we
call its nature, whether we are speaking of a man, a horse, or a family. Besides,
the final cause and end of a thing is the best, and to be self-sufficing is the end
and the best.146
Keyt argues that the argument as a whole rests upon the assertion that that from which the
polis comes, namely the village and the household, are natural entities and that therefore
the polis is a natural entity. Of course, this is not a good argument, even on Aristotelian
terms. It is clear for instance that just because something comes from a natural entity, it
thereby does not make it certain that such a thing is natural itself. So it seems concerning
the polis as well, as it is clearly not enough to argue that the household is natural and the
polis comes from the household. In regard to the household, Aristotle asserts that the
household is natural precisely because of the relations that exist within the household,
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Keyt identifies four separate arguments that Aristotle provides in order to demonstrate the naturalness of
the polis: the genetic, telic, linguistic, and organic arguments. For the purposes of this chapter, we will be
focusing primarily on the genetic argument. Miller believes that the genetic and telic arguments are one and
the same argument, and that Aristotle is attempting to defend the idea that the reason that the polis is
natural is due in part to the end that the earlier communities aim to achieve, and that the polis is the final
realization of this teleological development. I agree with Miller on this, although it nevertheless does not
fully answer Keyt’s objections as we will see. For Miller’s account of these arguments see Fred D. Miller
Jr., “A Reply to David Keyt and David Gill,” Ancient Philosophy 16 (1996): 446.
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ἡ δ᾽ ἐκ πλειόνων κωμῶν κοινωνία τέλειος πόλις, ἤδη πάσης ἔχουσα πέρας τῆς αὐταρκείας ὡς ἔπος
εἰπεῖν, γινομένη μὲν τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεν, οὖσα δὲ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν. διὸ πᾶσα πόλις φύσει ἔστιν, εἴπερ καὶ αἱ πρῶται
κοινωνίαι. τέλος γὰρ αὕτη ἐκείνων, ἡ δὲ φύσις τέλος ἐστίν: οἷον γὰρ ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῆς γενέσεως
τελεσθείσης, ταύτην φαμὲν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἑκάστου, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπου ἵππου οἰκίας. ἔτι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ
τέλος βέλτιστον: ἡ δ᾽ αὐτάρκεια καὶ τέλος καὶ βέλτιστον. Politics I 2 1252b28-1253a1.
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which are themselves “grounded in natural instincts.”147 From the naturalness of the
household then, Aristotle proceeds to argue that the village and the polis are natural
entities. According to Keyt, the only way to make sense of the argument is that it
primarily relies upon the claim that the village and the polis are both prior to the
household, and that it is from this priority that the naturalness of both the village and the
polis can be ascertained.148
The problem for Keyt is that Aristotle really does not have much to say regarding
the village or its priority. What Aristotle does say is that “…when several families are
united, and the association aims at something more than the supply of daily needs, the
first society to be formed is the village.”149 This is clearly not enough to establish the
claim that the village is prior to the household. Keyt then attempts to reconstruct the
argument that he thinks Aristotle has in mind in order to establish the priority of the
village to the household.150 Firstly, according to Keyt, the idea that Aristotle is
attempting to express here is that the village, on account of it providing for a greater
number of needs than the household, is both more self-sufficient and a greater good than
the household. There are several passages from the Aristotelian corpus that are
seemingly tacitly assumed in the argument then. In the seventh book of the Politics,
Aristotle states that “…everyone would agree in praising the territory which is most selfsufficient; and that must be the territory which can produce everything necessary, for to

Keyt, “Three Basic Theorems in Aristotle’s Politics,” 128.
The notion of priority is an important concept for Aristotle. Priority will be the subject matter of the
fifth chapter of this dissertation.
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ἡ δ᾽ ἐκ πλειόνων οἰκιῶν κοινωνία πρώτη χρήσεως ἕνεκεν μὴ ἐφημέρου κώμη. Politics I 2 1252b15-17.
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have all things and to want nothing is sufficiency.”151 This passage then shows us that
Aristotle thought that the community which could produce everything necessary is
worthy of praise. This is something which the village clearly can do more than the single
household is able to do. Aristotle then, according to Keyt, claims that a community
which is more self-sufficient than another community is thereby a greater good then the
other community. Here Aristotle seems to support this claim in the second book of the
Politics when he states that “If then self-sufficiency is to be desired, the lesser degree of
unity is more desirable than the greater.”152 Keyt also references the Rhetoric to support
this claim. Here Aristotle states that “And of two things that which stands less in need of
other things is the greater good, since it is more self-sufficing. (That which stands less in
need of others is that which needs either fewer or easier things). And when one thing
does not exist or cannot come into existence without a second, while the second can exist
without the first, the second is the better. For that which does not need something else is
more self-sufficing than that which does and presents itself as a greater good for that
reason.”153 Self-sufficiency then is, according to both of these passages, a greater good
and Aristotle seems to believe that the village is clearly more self-sufficient then the
household and that therefore the village is a greater good then the household.

περὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ποίαν τινά, δῆλον ὅτι τὴν αὐταρκεστάτην πᾶς τις ἂν ἐπαινέσειεν (τοιαύτην δ᾽
ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν παντοφόρον: τὸ γὰρ πάντα ὑπάρχειν καὶ δεῖσθαι μηθενὸς αὔταρκες) Politics VII 5
1326b27-30.
152
εἴπερ οὖν αἱρετώτερον τὸ αὐταρκέστερον, καὶ τὸ ἧττον ἓν τοῦ μᾶλλον αἱρετώτερον. Politics II 2 1261b
14-16.
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καὶ τὸ ἧττον προσδεόμενον θατέρου ἢ ἑτέρων: αὐταρκέστερον γάρ: ἧττον δὲ προσδεῖται τὸ ἐλαττόνων ἢ
ῥᾳόνων προσδεόμενον. καὶ ὅταν τόδε μὲν ἄνευ τοῦδε μὴ ᾖ, ἢ μὴ δυνατὸν ᾖ γενέσθαι, θάτερον δὲ ἄνευ
τούτου, αὐταρκέστερον δὲ τὸ μὴ δεόμενον, ὥστε φαίνεται μεῖζον ἀγαθόν. Rhetoric I 7 1364a5-9. It is
important to note here that Aristotle is claiming that that which is self-sufficient is a greater good. The fact
that a village comes to be through a number of households and that therefore it would seem that the village
requires the household to exist in order to come to be and that therefore the village cannot be understood as
self-sufficing according to Aristotle’s own argument here is another matter which concerns a proper
understanding of the naturalness and the priority of the polis which I will discuss later in this chapter and
the next chapter.
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These claims that Aristotle makes of the village then seem to lead to the claim
that the village is prior to the household by reference to a claim made in yet another
passage, which Aristotle seems to be tacitly assuming in the argument. This claim comes
from the Physics, where Aristotle states that “For if a thing undergoes a continuous
change toward some end, that last stage is actually that for the sake of which.”154 The
idea presumably is that the village represents a stage toward self-sufficiency. And since
it represents a more self-sufficient community and is therefore the greater good, it
represents the end, or that which is closer to the end in the case of the village, toward
which the household is aiming. Since it is the end, the village, much like the adult
specimen as opposed to the juvenile specimen, is prior in substance to the household.
This concept of priority is clear from the following passage in which Aristotle states that
“…because the things that are posterior in becoming are prior in form and in substance, e.
g. man is prior to boy and human being to seed; for the one already has its form, and the
other has not. Secondly because everything that comes to be moves towards a principle,
i.e. an end. For that for the sake of which a thing is, is its principle, and the becoming is
for the sake of the end…”155 What this amounts to then is that the village is prior to the
household on account of the village being the goal which the household strives to

…ὧν γὰρ συνεχοῦς τῆς κινήσεως οὔσης ἔστι τι τέλος, τοῦτο <τὸ> ἔσχατον καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα· Physics II 2
194a29-30.
155
ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ οὐσίᾳ γε, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι τὰ τῇ γενέσει ὕστερα τῷ εἴδει καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ πρότερα (οἷον ἀνὴρ
παιδὸς καὶ ἄνθρωπος σπέρματος: τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἤδη ἔχει τὸ εἶδος τὸ δ᾽ οὔ), καὶ ὅτι ἅπαν ἐπ᾽ ἀρχὴν βαδίζει τὸ
γιγνόμενον καὶ τέλος (ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, τοῦ τέλους δὲ ἕνεκα ἡ γένεσις) Metaphysics Θ 1050a4-9. This
passage also helps to solve the issue raised in an earlier footnote in which the village seems to require the
household for its existence, and thus seems to fail to satisfy the conditions for self-sufficiency that Aristotle
provides. The fact that the household exists before the village is much like the fact that the boy exists
before the man. In both cases the fact that something exists before another does not imply for Aristotle that
it is prior to the thing which comes after. This is also another example of the general principle that
actuality is prior to potentiality.
154
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achieve, and that the self-sufficiency of the village implies that the village is a greater
good, and therefore closer to the end which is sought in the development.
This argument then leads to the crucial claim of Aristotle’s that the priority of the
village indicates that the village is natural, precisely because the village is prior and the
household is a natural thing which aims at the village and therefore the polis as an end. It
follows from this argument then that the polis, being more self-sufficient then the village
and administering to a wider range of needs and having come from the village, is prior to
the village. And given the fact that whatever is prior to a natural thing is also a natural
thing, it follows that the polis is a natural entity. What Keyt is emphasizing here is that
the naturalness of the village and of the polis is really a matter of the naturalness of the
household combined with the claim that the village and subsequently the polis is prior to
the household in substance. Keyt identifies this claim concerning the naturalness of the
village and the polis as the ‘Transitivity of Naturalness Principle,’ which for him
represents the primary failing of the argument. A thing which is prior to another thing,
and which is made up of natural components, is not, even on Aristotelian grounds, a
natural entity itself. Keyt uses the example of a house and states that “A house is prior in
substance to the materials of which it is composed…and all of these materials are
ultimately provided by nature – lumber comes from trees, bricks from clay and straw, and
so forth -but houses exist by art, not by nature.”156 Any artifact that is made up of natural
elements is not thereby natural in itself, which seems to be what Aristotle’s argument that
we have been discussing defends.
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Keyt, “Three Basic Theorems in Aristotle’s Politics,” 131.
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Keyt argues that the primary issue which underlies all of the arguments that
Aristotle provides in order to establish the naturalness of the polis is the claim that there
is a law-giver for a polis, a person who provides the polis with the specific form that it
will possess. Aristotle states that “A social instinct is implanted in all men by nature, and
yet he who first founded the state was the greatest of benefactors. For man, when
perfected, is the best of animals, but, when separated from law and justice, he is the worst
of all…”157 What this implies is that there is a crafter or artificer of the polis, which
although Aristotle acknowledges that the polis develops from the household and village,
also indicates that the polis is a product of productive activity and therefore reasoning.
But, as we have already discussed in the second chapter, the basic account of nature that
Aristotle provides is that a thing is natural because it possesses an internal principle of
motion which implies that such an entity is not produced through the rational activity of
an artificer.158 Now, our consideration of Metaphysics Λ 10 has plausibly defended the
position that Aristotle must have in mind a different account of a natural entity than that
which he provides in the opening chapters of the second book of the Physics. And
consequently the argument that the account of nature that is being used in the Politics
must be something other than these accounts does have some traction. However, to
simply say that the two uses of nature differ is not enough. For Keyt’s criticism of the
position that the polis is a natural entity does not simply rely upon the idea that the use of
nature in the Politics must be identical to the use of nature in the rest of the Aristotelian
corpus. Rather the point is that since the polis is represented as having a creator, who

φύσει μὲν οὖν ἡ ὁρμὴ ἐν [30] πᾶσιν ἐπὶ τὴν τοιαύτην κοινωνίαν: ὁ δὲ πρῶτος συστήσας μεγίστων
ἀγαθῶν αἴτιος. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τελεωθὲν βέλτιστον τῶν ζῴων ὁ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν, οὕτω καὶ χωρισθεὶς νόμου
καὶ δίκης χείριστον πάντων. Politics I 2 1253a29-32.
158
For this discussion see the first part of the second chapter.
157
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presumably deliberated about the kind of society that he wanted to produce, it would
seemingly follow that as a result the polis is the product of a reasoning process which
would normally be understood as producing an artifact. And for Aristotle it would seem
that if something comes about by nature and thus is natural, it is not going to come about
through the reasoning process of a craftsman, but rather on account of the internal
principle he normally associates with natural entities.159 And at the very least, whatever
is natural, if it does not come about through something which is identical to it in form and
thus through an internal principle, will not come about through the rational process of an
artificer. So Aristotle states that “This is most obvious in the animals other than man:
they make things neither by art nor after inquiry or deliberation. That is why people
wonder whether it is by intelligence or by some other faculty that these creatures work, spiders, ants, and the like…If then it is both by nature and for an end that the swallow
makes its nest and the spider its web, and plants grow leaves for the sake of the fruit and
send their roots down (not up) for the sake of nourishment, it is plain that this kind of
cause is operative in things which come to be and are by nature.”160 So the web or nest is
a natural entity not because it originates in a natural thing, nor because it allows for the
attainment of certain natural capacities in the animal who produces the web or nest, but
rather simply because it is for an end and is part of the purposeful actions of the animal in
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I will argue later in this chapter that in order to understand how the polis can be a natural entity it is
necessary to understand it as arising through and as a part of the practical rationality of human beings. I am
therefore somewhat sympathetic to the point that something natural can arise through human rationality. It
is important to note though that not everything that arises through the rationality of human beings is natural
simply because that very rationality is a natural feature of human beings. If this were to be the case, then
Aristotle would seemingly undermine his distinction between artifacts and natural entities altogether.
160
μάλιστα δὲ φανερὸν ἐπὶ τῶν ζῴων τῶν ἄλλων, ἃ οὔτε τέχνῃ οὔτε ζητήσαντα οὔτε βουλευσάμενα ποιεῖ·
ὅθεν διαποροῦσί τινες πότερον νῷ ἤ τινι ἄλλῳ ἐργάζονται οἵ τ´ ἀράχναι καὶ οἱ μύρμηκες καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα…
ὥστ´ εἰ φύσει τε ποιεῖ καὶ ἕνεκά του ἡ χελιδὼν τὴν νεοττιὰν καὶ ὁ ἀράχνης τὸ ἀράχνιον, καὶ τὰ φυτὰ τὰ
φύλλα ἕνεκα τῶν καρπῶν καὶ τὰς ῥίζας οὐκ ἄνω ἀλλὰ κάτω τῆς τροφῆς, φανερὸν ὅτι ἔστιν ἡ αἰτία ἡ
τοιαύτη ἐν τοῖς φύσει γιγνομένοις καὶ οὖσιν. Physics II 8 199a20-28.
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its attempt to achieve its form. The polis on the other hand is explicitly considered to be
the product of a deliberate process of a sort of craftsman, and thus it cannot according to
Keyt, even when accepting a looser concept of nature than that which has been
traditionally associated with Aristotle, be taken to be a natural entity. And this is a
problem even if one were to accept the fact that the concept of nature that Aristotle is
using in the Politics is not the same as the concept of nature in the rest of the corpus.
At this point then we have shown not only that the idea that the polis developing
from a natural thing, namely the household, does not actually demonstrate the naturalness
of the polis on Aristotelian grounds, but we have also seen that the very fact that the polis
is the result of rational activity on account of the law-giver seems to necessarily indicate
that the polis cannot be a natural entity, given Aristotle’s distinction between that which
arises from productive rationality and that which arises naturally. The question at this
point then is whether it can be shown, on Aristotelian grounds, that the polis is natural.161

161

Ernest Barker and A. C. Bradley provide versions of an argument which states that the polis is natural
because it is necessary for the development of human beings. For their specific arguments see Ernest
Barker, The Politics of Aristotle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1948); A. C. Bradley, “Aristotle’s
Conception of the State,” in A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics, ed. Keyt and Miller (Oxford: Blackwell,
1991), 13-56. Wolfgang Kullmann argues that the substantial status of the polis, and thus its nature
according to the Aristotelian ontology, is not at issue within the Politics. Rather, Kullmann states that “The
polis as such, therefore, seems to be neither a biological nor a technological product. Hence, we are rather
led to think, when the phusis of the polis is mentioned, of a metaphorical mode of expression similar to the
statement in the Poetics (4. 1449a 14ff.) that tragedy stopped changing after it had attained its phusis”
(Kullmann, “Man as Political Animal in Aristotle, 98). Kullmann then takes the Politics to be an
anthropological work which is not concerned with ontology/metaphysics at all, and is rather an
investigation which is always directed “toward the realization of values which apply to man as the subject,
and not, as one might have thought, to the polis…” (Ibid, 114). Thus the naturalness of the polis must be
taken, according to Kullmann, as a metaphor and heuristic. For Kullmann’s defense of this position see
Wolfgang Kullmann, “Man as Political Animal in Aristotle,” in A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics, ed.
Keyt and Miller (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 94-117. Trevor Saunders, on the other hand, recognizes the
possibility that the scope of what is considered to be natural for Aristotle seems to be widened considerably
in Politics I 2. Saunders states that “It seems we have to recognize a category of ‘natural artefacts’”
(Saunders, Aristotle: Politics Books I and II, 63). Saunders’ argues that there is a double us of the ‘Natural’
here, (a) the impulse men have to seek and adopt efficient means to meet their natural needs and (b) to
denote those means themselves. Saunders’ then argues that “…the fact that those means may be contrived,
by human ingenuity, is not a license to regard them globally as not natural…” (Ibid, 63). For Saunders’
argument see Trevor J. Saunders, Aristotle: Politics Books I and II (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 61-63.
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Fred Miller has argued, partially in response to Keyt, that there is a legitimate way in
which one can reconstruct Aristotle’s argument for the naturalness of the polis.162 Miller
essentially argues that, rather than attempting to argue that the polis is the result of an
internal cause which manifests itself through the growth that eventually leads from the
household to the polis, one should rather see the polis as fulfilling the teleological ends of
human beings. In so far as the polis does this, it is a natural entity. Miller states that
“…the ultimate basis for Aristotle is not the nature of the polis but human nature. His
claims about the polis must be understood within the context of his teleological account
of human beings as having natural ends.”163 Miller believes that the key point here is that
the polis is the result of natural impulses and capacities, and that the function of the polis
then is ultimately to promote “…an organism’s natural ends.”164 The strength of this
interpretation is that it allows one, according to Miller, to attribute a weaker causal role to
nature than what Keyt had demanded. Instead of making the contrast between that which
occurs without productive rationality and that which occurs through productive
rationality as the only choices through which the polis can come to be, Miller rather
argues that one can understand the polis as being the result of both human reason and

These arguments will for the most part be addressed in the rest of this chapter as I focus upon Miller’s
account of the naturalness of the polis. Specifically, the idea that the polis is natural because it is necessary
for the development of human beings, and the idea that there is a more expansive use of nature at work here
which includes something like ‘natural artifacts,’ will be addressed as a part of my criticism of Miller’s
account. As far as the assertion that the Politics is merely an anthropological study which attempts to make
no claim concerning the ontological and metaphysical status of things is one with which I am sympathetic,
and have already pointed out in the second chapter. However, it seems to me to be impossible to provide a
sufficient and satisfying reading of Politics I 2 without understanding it as having a metaphysical claim.
For Aristotle does not qualify his claim that the polis is natural and prior by stating this should be only
understood as a heuristic. I thereby believe that it is only in the last resort that one should simply say that
the arguments of Politics I 2 have no metaphysical implications.
162
Fred D. Miller Jr., Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle’s Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).
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Miller, Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle’s Politics, 40.
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Ibid, 41.
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natural impulses.165 Firstly the polis is the result of natural causes, which in Aristotelian
terms is a cause which occurs without productive rationality, but secondly the polis is
also the result of the application of laws by the lawgiver. There is no inconsistency here
according to Miller, and is similar to Barker’s assertion that “…art co-operates with
nature: the volition and action of human agents ‘construct’ the state in co-operation with
a natural immanent impulse.”166 This indicates for Miller that there is no contradiction
strictly speaking in asserting that something comes to be both by craft and by nature.
Regarding the concept of nature that has been traditionally taken to be standard
for Aristotle, Miller argues in response that there are clear indications in the corpus that
Aristotle does not understand nature to be exclusively that which possesses an internal
principle of motion. Rather Miller believes that Aristotle clearly had a broader
understanding of nature than simply that which is limited to possessing an internal
principle of motion. So in Physics II 8, a passage which I have already cited, Aristotle
states that spider webs and bird nests are both natural objects. The fact of the matter
however is that neither a bird nest nor a spider web come about due to an internal cause
of motion. And, although it must be admitted that Aristotle also claims that they do not
come about through deliberation unlike a polis, and that it is precisely this point which
seems to make them natural objects according to Aristotle, it is nevertheless the case that

Richard Kraut’s interpretation is similar to Miller’s argument here. Kraut argues that Aristotle is
insisting that the polis is natural in response to the claim of someone like Callicles in Plato’s Gorgias who
believes that the polis is a place where our natural desires to dominate others are held in check by unnatural
legal restrictions. Kraut argues that Aristotle on the other hand is insisting that the polis is natural. Kraut
states that “…we ought to recognize how urgent are the desires that bring people together for the purpose
of achieving common goals…Cities cannot be unnatural, because they are the outcome of a process that is
initiated by nature” (Kraut, Aristotle: Political Philosophy, 246). For Kraut’s arguments concerning the
naturalness of the polis see Richard Kraut, Aristotle: Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2002), 240-276.
166
Barker, The Politics of Aristotle, 7.
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such objects are simply not natural in the same way as those natural entities accounted for
in Physics II. At the very least then, according to Miller, this passage shows us that there
is indeed an expanded concept of nature at work in Aristotle’s ontology. And it is based
upon this expanded concept of nature, and despite the admitted difference between the
reason for a bird nest being natural and the polis being natural, that Miller argues we can
justifiably conceive of an account that does justice to the explicit claim made by Aristotle
in Politics I 2.
Miller also holds that we can then understand the genetic argument in a new light
as well given that there is an expanded concept of nature in Aristotle. Recall that Keyt
criticizes this argument due to the fact that it relies on the ‘Transitivity of Naturalness
Principle.’ This principle is false on Aristotelian grounds since in no way does it
demonstrate the naturalness of something simply to show that it comes from or is made
up of natural things. Miller believes that given the expanded concept of nature and given
that the polis is natural precisely because it results from human natural capacities and that
its function is the promotion of the natural end of human beings, we can understand the
transitivity principle in a new way. This modified transitivity principle states that if A
exists by nature and B is a natural extension of A, then B also exists by nature. This
transitivity principle holds that once one accepts that A comes to be at least in part from
natural potential, it will follow that a natural extension of A will also come to be at least
in part from natural potential. Miller goes on to state that “…it is plausible to speak of
the self-sufficient natural extension of [A] as the end (and hence nature) of
[A]…Aristotle will understand the transitivity principle as restricted to communities
which serve human natural ends: it will include villages and polises but not associations
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for vulgar pleasures…”167 The polis then is natural not because it simply comes from
natural entities and thus is a natural entity itself. Rather the naturalness of the polis is a
product of the fact that the polis arises naturally and as an end from earlier communities
which themselves are natural because they are the product of innate capacities and they
help promote the attainment of the teleological end of the organism.
However, this position has been criticized in turn. Concerning the modified
transitivity of naturalness principle just discussed, it would seem that it would allow
certain objects to be natural which Aristotle most definitely did not consider to be
natural.168 A frying pan, for example, seems to fulfill both of the conditions provided
here by Miller for the naturalness of the polis. A frying pan has the function of aiding in
the cooking process, which in turn is necessary in order for human beings to fulfill a
natural capacity and thus an end, namely nutrition. But frying pans are also the result of
a natural capacity within humans, namely to make food digestible in order to satisfy the
biological necessities associated with eating. This would presumably imply for Miller
that Aristotle also believed that frying pans are natural objects as well. In fact there
would be many objects which Aristotle considers to be artifacts which would have to be
natural according to Miller’s argument.169 And it is not enough to simply claim that

Miller, Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle’s Politics, 42-43.
Keyt raises this objection as well. See David Keyt, “Fred Miller on Aristotle’s Political Naturalism,”
Ancient Philosophy 16, no. 2 (1996): 428-429.
169
As I mentioned in the second chapter, the distinction between an artifact and a natural object for
Aristotle is not as clearly understood as I might be taken to be implying here. I therefore admit that my
argument does not have a satisfying interpretation of Aristotle’s distinction between an artifact and a
natural entity, or even an interpretation of his distinction between an artifact and a mere heap. However,
although I grant that it is not precisely clear in all cases what makes an artifact different from a natural
object, I will simply emphasize that Aristotle makes it clear that there is a difference, and he illustrates this
point by using examples of objects, such as houses, which seemingly satisfy the conditions for a thing
being natural according to Miller’s concept of natural extension. Houses are a result of a natural capacity
within humans and they help promote the attainment of the end for human beings. But houses seem to be
for Aristotle artifacts, however it is that he precisely understands the distinction between an artifact and a
natural entity. Assuming, for my purposes, that Aristotle desired to make a distinction between natural
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frying pans and other such objects are the result of an artificer who applied the form to
the object and thus the end that it was for, since it is the very heart of Miller’s argument
that that which results from the activity of one whose form is other than that which is
made through that activity can still be considered natural in some cases, since he admits
that the polis does arise at least in part from the causal effects of a law-giver.
Keyt also raises the objection to Miller’s argument that there is an extended
concept of nature being defended in Physics II 8 by arguing that spider’s webs and bird’s
nests are not comparable to how Aristotle conceives the polis. Thus Keyt states that
“Aristotle tells us in this very passage why a spider’s web or a bird’s nest exists by
nature. It exists by nature because it comes to be by nature. And for Aristotle if
something comes to be by nature, it comes to be without inquiry or deliberation (Phys. II
8 199a20-21).”170 The point here then is that Keyt believes that Miller still has not shown
how it is that the polis comes to be by nature if there is a lawgiver who ultimately
provides the constitution and thus the form of the polis through deliberate effort.
According to Keyt, for Aristotle if something comes to be by nature it simply does not
come to be through a deliberative process. And to argue that there is an extended concept
of nature at work in Aristotle based off of the Physics II 8 passage is not enough, since it
is still the case that that which comes about through deliberation is not something which
comes about by nature for Aristotle.
In response to this criticism, Miller has argued that, for one, Physics II 8 is not
meant to be understood as arguing that bird’s nests and spider’s webs are precise

entities or substances and artifacts, it is sufficient then for my argument to simply point out that Miller’s
concept of a modified transitivity principle cannot accept the very distinction that Aristotle clearly desires
in the corpus.
170
Keyt, “Fred Miller on Aristotle’s Political Naturalism,” 429.
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counterparts to the polis and its naturalness. Rather, the passage is important “…because
it shows that Aristotle uses ‘exists by nature’ in an extended sense even in the Physics.
The passage thus enables [one] to drive a wedge between existing by nature and having
an internal cause of motion and rest, the identification of which Keyt relied on in his own
strict-constructionist interpretation of Aristotle’s thesis that the polis exists by nature.”171
Miller asserts here that with an extended account of nature, one can still defend the
account that the polis is natural due to the two qualifications mentioned above.
As we have shown however, the problem with this argument is that it seems to
allow for entities that Aristotle considered to be artifacts to be considered natural objects.
Miller points out however that Aristotle has such a conception of nature that it allows for
certain things to be considered both natural and artificial. Miller believes that as soon as
one divorces oneself from the concept of nature that Aristotle offers in the Physics, and
thereby accept that there is an expanded account of nature in the corpus, then it seems
perfectly acceptable to allow for certain objects to be natural although they do not quite
satisfy the Aristotelian definition of a natural object provided in the Physics. The
evidence for this claim, outside of Politics I 2, is found in the Poetics. It is there that
Aristotle recognizes that “…poetry has two natural causes: first, imitation is innate in
human beings from childhood, and humans are superior to all other animals in being the
most imitative and in learning through imitation; and second, enjoyment of imitation is
innate in all human beings.”172 Human beings enjoy imitation due to the deeper sense of
Fred D. Miller Jr., “A Reply to David Keyt and David Gill,” Ancient Philosophy 16 (1996): 444-445.
Miller, “A Reply to David Keyt and David Gill,” 447. Poetics 4 1448b5-9. It is important to keep in
mind here that Aristotle actually states that the origin of the art of poetry has phusikai aitiai. There is
accordingly some difference in the translations of the passage that Miller is considering here. The Greek
that Aristotle uses is ἐοίκασι δὲ γεννῆσαι μὲν ὅλως τὴν ποιητικὴν αἰτίαι δύο τινὲς καὶ αὗται φυσικαί. τό τε
γὰρ μιμεῖσθαι σύμφυτον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐκ παίδων ἐστὶ καὶ τούτῳ διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ὅτι
μιμητικώτατόν ἐστι καὶ τὰς μαθήσεις ποιεῖται διὰ μιμήσεως τὰς πρώτας, καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς μιμήμασι
171
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wanting to learn that all human beings share, even if in a limited way.173 What this tells
us then according to Miller is that Aristotle saw the creation of poetry as arising from
natural inclinations and as serving to fulfill a natural capacity and thus an end in human
nature itself. Now this is not the end of the story obviously, for there would have to be a
person or a number of persons who sought to enact this natural capacity for imitation
found in human nature. These would be, according to Aristotle, the earliest poets, and
Aristotle states that “Imitation, then, being natural to us – as also the sense of harmony
and rhythm, the metres being obviously species of rhythms – it was through their original
aptitude, and by a series of improvements for the most part gradual on their first efforts,
that they created poetry out of their improvisations.”174 This of course entails that
Aristotle thought of poetry as being created through the deliberate process of a creator of
poetry. What results from this would be a number of artifacts which we would call
‘poems’ that are the creation of a person whose form is other than that which is created
but which also stems from the natural capacities of human nature. Miller believes that
this account successfully shows us that certain objects in the world are both artificial and
πάντας. Bywater then translates this passage as “It is clear that the general origin of poetry was due to two
causes, each of them part of human nature. Imitation is natural to man from childhood, one of his
advantages over the lower animals being this, that he is the most imitative creature in the world, and learns
at first by imitation. And it is also natural for all to delight in works of imitation.” On the other hand,
W.H. Fyfe translates the beginning of this passages as “Speaking generally, poetry seems to owe its origin
to two particular causes, both natural…” Miller seems to agree with the latter of these two translations.
However, it is not clear from the Greek that Aristotle is attributing natural causes to the art of poetry, but
rather merely stating that there the two causes for the origin of poetry which are both a part of human
nature. I admit that I am inclined to translate the passage according to Miller’s take on it, but it is not
certain what Aristotle is stating regarding the origin of poetry and its causes in this passage. I do not have
the room to investigate this issue concerning poetry in this dissertation, but it seems to me to be adequate to
simply point out this issue in Miller’s understanding of this passage and, especially when combined with
the fact that there is no explicit argument for artifacts to be considered natural in any of the other passages
within the corpus, to look for an alternative conception of the naturalness of the polis than the one that has
been provided by Miller.
173
Metaphysics A I.
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κατὰ φύσιν δὲ ὄντος ἡμῖν τοῦ μιμεῖσθαι καὶ τῆς ἁρμονίας καὶ τοῦ ῥυθμοῦ (τὰ γὰρ μέτρα ὅτι μόρια τῶν
ῥυθμῶν ἐστι φανερὸν) ἐξ ἀρχῆς οἱ πεφυκότες πρὸς αὐτὰ μάλιστα κατὰ μικρὸν προάγοντες ἐγέννησαν τὴν
ποίησιν ἐκ τῶν αὐτοσχεδιασμάτων. Poetics IV 1448b20-24.
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natural for Aristotle. This is of course much like how the polis is formed, namely
through the actualizations of the inherent capacities of human beings, whose form is other
than the form possessed by the polis, in order to form social communities with the end of
allowing life and eventually the attainment of a good life.
At this point then, we have provided an account of nature which supposedly
allows for the naturalness of the polis. We have seen that that the criticism of the genetic
argument relies on the notion that the polis is merely natural due to the fact that it is made
up of natural things, which of course is a fallacious assertion. However, Miller has
argued that this is not precisely what Aristotle has in mind in the genetic argument.
Rather, the fact that the polis is the result of a teleological development which allows for
the attainment of the human end and which is caused by the innate natural capacities of
human nature leads to the assertion that the polis is in some sense natural. The fact that it
is an artifact stems from the fact that there is a law-giver who undeniably provides the
polis with a constitution which gives the polis the specific form that it possesses, whether
that be the form of monarchy, polity, aristocracy etc… The polis then is both natural and
artificial, and according to Miller this reading of the argument is justified as soon as one
admits that there is an expanded concept of nature at work in the corpus. Presumably, it
is this expanded account of what is natural that Miller is relying on to make the claim that
it is perfectly Aristotelian to claim that the polis is natural and artificial.
However, the problem with this account of nature concerning the polis is
precisely this claim that objects are both natural and artificial in the Aristotelian
worldview. One can surely state that certain objects are the result of a natural process,
but nowhere in the corpus does Aristotle acknowledge that many of the artifacts
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commonly used by human beings are also natural. I acknowledge that Miller is correct to
point out that poems seem to be an interesting exception to the general distinction that
Aristotle wants to make between artifacts and natural objects. But pointing out such an
example is simply not enough to truly demonstrate that the polis is such an object. At the
heart of Miller’s argument is the contention that if the polis is to be considered natural
and artificial, then so would almost every other artifact mentioned by Aristotle. A frying
pan for instance would most certainly be considered natural and artificial according to
Miller’s definition, and his account of an expanded concept of nature does nothing to
avoid this fact. A frying pan is both the product of natural inclinations and it allows for
the attainment of the human end. This would also be the case for computers and axes as
well. Miller seems to agree with me on this and even considers the possibility of
computers perhaps being both natural and artificial and states that “To the extent that [a
computer] arises from the natural desire of human beings to know and serves the natural
human end of wisdom, it would ‘exist by nature,’ although its genesis also depends on
very sophisticated technology. The ‘natural’ and the ‘artificial’ are not mutually
exclusive categories, as in the Physics, but refer to the different factors that give rise to
human culture and politics.”175 This just does not fit in with the Aristotelian conception
of artifacts as it is provided in the corpus. It is one thing to claim that the account of
nature found in the Politics is one which does not fit the account in the Physics. This is
something with which I would agree with Miller. But it is something altogether different
to say that the various tools and devices that human beings have contrived which indeed
help them to achieve their end, and which arise from natural inclinations, are indeed
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natural and artificial. The problem is that Aristotle makes it clear that certain objects
which would fit the account of natural and artificial that Miller provides here are
explicitly described as artifacts by Aristotle. To use just one example from the corpus,
Aristotle argues that “For the word ‘nature’ is applied to what is according to nature and
the natural in the same way as ‘art’ is applied to what is artistic or a work of art. We
should not say in the latter case that there is anything artistic about a thing, if it is a bed
only potentially, not yet having the form of a bed; nor should we call it a work of art.”176
Here Aristotle is clearly implying that a bed is an artifact. However, according to
Miller’s conditions for being a natural artifact, Miller would have to argue that Aristotle
also admits that beds are natural as well. This position however is clearly not expressed
or defended by Aristotle in this passage. My contention here is that Miller has thus
provided a thoroughly un-Aristotelian ontology, in which everything created by human
beings and which serves to promote the attainment of the human end is natural at least in
part, and that therefore almost every artifact would thereby also be natural in some sense.
Nowhere in the corpus can one find such a statement, and indeed one finds explicit
statements to the contrary.
To just briefly expand upon this last contention, when we look at Aristotle’s
statements regarding artifacts, it is clear that for the most part he sees a distinction
between artifacts and that which is natural as being at bottom a distinction between the

ὥσπερ γὰρ τέχνη λέγεται τὸ κατὰ τέχνην καὶ τὸ τεχνικόν, οὕτω καὶ φύσις τὸ κατὰ φύσιν [λέγεται] καὶ τὸ
φυσικόν, οὔτε δὲ ἐκεῖ πω φαῖμεν ἂν ἔχειν κατὰ τὴν τέχνην οὐδέν, εἰ δυνάμει μόνον ἐστὶ κλίνη, μή πω δ´
ἔχει τὸ εἶδος τῆς κλίνης, οὐδ´ εἶναι τέχνην, οὔτ´ ἐν τοῖς φύσει συνισταμένοις· Physics II 1 193a32-36. I
would also mention the four passages in the Metaphysics which Aristotle argues that artifacts are not
substances. These passages are B 4 999b17-20, K 2 1060b16-28, H 3 1043b18-23, and Λ 3 1070a13-20.
In these passages Aristotle nowhere makes the distinction between artifacts that are natural and those which
are not, which would be what one would expect if Miller’s thesis is correct.
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location of the moving cause which gives rise to the entity in question.177 The efficient
cause of a natural thing is the same as the thing which is caused, which essentially means
that a tiger causes a tiger. So when one wants to know what causes the generation of a
natural thing for Aristotle, one merely has to look for the adult specimen of the thing that
one is investigating. And although it certainly is true that Aristotle acknowledges that
polises can beget polises, he nevertheless sees that not all polises are caused by polises.178
And this is where the lawgiver comes into play, which seemingly tells us that the polis
must be considered an artifact despite Aristotle’s assertion to the contrary. This is what
Keyt contends, and it seems to be validated by much of what Aristotle states regarding
natural and artificial entities in the physical and biological works. However, to respond
to this position by stating that there is a class of things that are natural and artificial is not
satisfactory either. Such a claim seems rather sloppy, precisely because it holds that most
artifacts, at least the truly beneficial ones in the sense of aiding the person to attain the
natural end as is dictated by human nature, are both natural and artificial. And this claim
is just simply contrary to what we find throughout the corpus.
Furthermore, recall that Aristotle believed that the nature of something could be
said to be its matter or its form.179 When he states this, he means to say that we could

I have already discussed at length Aristotle’s account of nature in the Physics, and it is recommended to
review that section for the following arguments. I have also already admitted that I do not have an exact
account of what makes a thing an artifact in Aristotle. I noted in the second chapter however that I do not
believe that I need such an account for the argument that I am making here. For whatever may be the
precise interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of artifacts, it is nevertheless the case that Aristotle believes that
there are artifacts. And it is my contention that Miller’s conditions for something to be natural in the
expanded sense that he provides virtually eliminates the distinction between an artifact and a natural object.
Almost every single artifact that Aristotle explicitly identifies as such can meet the conditions provided by
Miller for a natural thing, and thus there would almost be no true artifacts for Aristotle if one were to accept
Miller’s argument here.
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describe the nature of a bed as being wood, and as a frying pan as being metal, and as a
computer as being the various metallic and plastic components which make up a
computer’s innards. This would be correct, but it would not really tell the whole story or
provide us with the account of the object in question. Rather Aristotle emphasizes that it
is the form of a thing which is really the nature of it, stating that “The form indeed is
nature rather than the matter; for a thing is more properly said to be what it is when it
exists in actuality than when it exists potentially.”180 So a bed, to use Aristotle’s
example, would not have the nature of the material which makes it up, but would rather
have a form imposed upon it by some external craftsman. So as Lear puts it “That a bed
does not reproduce other beds shows that the bed does not have a nature. For the form of
a bed is not a principle internal to the bed…Aristotle thinks that this [point] reveals an
important difference between natural objects and artifacts.”181 The conditions concerning
a bed for Aristotle then is that a bed has its form imposed upon it by an alien craftsman,
and thus a bed does not have an internal cause which is the mark of nature for Aristotle.
So the fact that the polis has a form imposed upon it much like how a craftsman imposes
a form upon material seems to lead us to Keyt’s conclusion that the polis is an artifact,
since its creation is not a matter of an internal cause. 182 This is a crucial point in
determining the difference between an artifact and a natural object for Aristotle, and

καὶ μᾶλλον αὕτη φύσις τῆς ὕλης· ἕκαστον γὰρ τότε λέγεται ὅταν ἐντελεχείᾳ ᾖ, μᾶλλον ἢ ὅταν δυνάμει.
Physics II 1 193b7-10.
181
Lear, Aristotle: The Desire to Understand, 17.
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One response that needs to be mentioned here is that unlike a bed, which does not and cannot produce
other beds, a polis seems to be have the ability to produce other polises. I think that this does indeed show
that there is a difference for Aristotle between simple artifacts and the polis, but it crucially does nothing to
address the problems that I am raising here for Miller’s account of naturalness of the polis. For Miller’s
account, I am arguing, leads to the virtual elimination of the nature/artifact distinction that Aristotle seems
to want to make. I do however think that the fact that it could be argued that the polis is capable of
producing another polis does indeed give Keyt’s account some trouble.
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Miller has not successfully answered it without thereby eliminating the distinction
between natural entities and artifacts in the first place. When we look at a polis then,
determining whether a polis is natural would presumably be the same as determining
whether a bed is natural or artificial. The question would be regarding not the matter of
the polis, namely the various households and perhaps even human beings which make up
the polis, but rather regarding the form of the polis. And the form of the polis does not,
in every case, come from another polis. Rather, Aristotle states that there is a law-giver,
who should be praised for providing the form to the polis and thus providing the specific
‘nature’ to the polis, which presumably would show us that Aristotle must hold that the
polis is an artifact.183
There are other accounts concerning the naturalness of the polis which attempt to
solve the fundamental problem that Keyt has pointed out in his criticism of Politics I 2.
Richard Kraut for instance argues that there is no incompatibility in saying that
something owes its existence both to a process of growth and to human beings.184 He
therefore insists that what marks a polis as being different than an artifact is the fact that
it grows inevitably from human social interactions. This inevitability is not a
characteristic of artifacts according to Kraut, and this point is coupled with the fact that
the polis is the “…outcome of a process that is initiated by nature.”185 Kraut does not
deny that human care and influence is projected upon the polis, but he does not see this as
being equivalent to the claim that the polis is merely the product of a craftsman. Rather
Kraut argues that the creation of a polis is much like the growth of plants in an
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agricultural setting. There are certain plants that may require the art of agriculture in
order for them to survive and flourish, but this does not imply that those plants are
therefore artificial.
On the other hand, Joseph Chan argues that determining the naturalness of the
polis is, as opposed to Miller, a matter of determining an inner principle of change.186
Chan believes that it is important to take seriously the claim that nature is an inner
principle of motion and stationariness, and that Aristotle’s claim that the polis is natural
must amount to the claim that the polis possesses such an inner principle. However,
Chan argues that possessing an inner principle of change does not imply that there can be
no external cause affecting the growth and development of the entity in question. Rather,
external causes exist throughout nature for Aristotle; such as the requirement that plants
possess for water and nutrition which in turn implies that there be external causes to
provide the necessary nutrients to the plant. Chan believes that the same holds for the
polis, namely that there are external causes which affect the development of the polis.
This point however does not show us that the polis is an artifact. Rather, Chan believes
that the polis does indeed possess an inner principle of change despite the fact that polises
are clearly affected by external causes as well. The inner principle that Chan identifies as
that which is possessed by the polis is in fact human nature itself. Chan explains that “As
human nature develops, it correspondingly determines types of human relation…since
human nature has an autonomous tendency to develop itself, human relation has,
accordingly, an autonomous tendency to develop into successive types in which the polis

Joseph Chan, “Does Aristotle’s Political Theory Rest on a ‘Blunder?,’” History of Political Thought 13,
no. 2 (1992): 189-202.
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is the last and most embracing one.”187 So for Chan the naturalness of the polis is based
on the fact that the polis, like other natural entities in the Aristotelian world, possesses an
inner principle of change. This inner principle is in fact human nature, and it works
through the fact that human nature necessarily establishes relations, and these relations
form the basis for communities which eventually and necessarily end in the polis, which
is itself the end of the development resulting from the establishment of human relations.
It is important to note then that the fact that there are external causes for the polis does
not in itself undermine the thesis that the polis is a natural entity for Chan. He states that
“…human effort plays the role of the external conditions of the existence of the polis
and…individual human persons or groups play the role of an artificer who is responsible
for and wholly explains the type of human relation the polis takes.”188 Thus Chan asserts
that the naturalness of the polis is compatible with the claim that human effort is a
necessary condition of the polis.
Both of these interpretations are similar in so far as they assert that there is no
issue whatsoever in asserting that there is an inner principle of change or growth
possessed by the polis. However, the problem here is that this inner principle of change
does not actually seem to be the same sort of thing that truly natural entities possess
according to Aristotle. Firstly, both of these theories hold that the polis is much like a
plant that needs the care of humans and requires external causes for its existence and
flourishing. But as we have seen, one of the fundamental claims of Aristotle’s
conception of natural objects is that they are eternal, in that they are not created at one
point or another in order to exist. However, Aristotle clearly indicates that the polis may

187
188

Chan, “Does Aristotle’s Political Theory Rest on a ‘Blunder?,” 193.
Ibid, 194.

139

not have existed at some point, as we have already seen when discussing Keyt’s criticism
of Politics I 2. What this implies then is that there needs to be some external cause,
whose form and thus nature is other than the polis, who needs to create the polis, or at the
very least needs to create the first polis.189 This is of course identified by Aristotle as the
law-giver. And it is at least conceptually possible, given Aristotle’s genetic account of
the beginning of the polis in Politics I 2, for the polis not to have existed at some point
and thus for it to be necessarily created or made by a law-giver. This point by itself
should warn us that the polis is not a natural thing in precisely the same way and without
qualification as those natural entities that possess an internal principle of change.
Secondly, it is important to point out that the teleological conditions concerning
natural entities as compared to the polis also seem to be different enough for us to hold
back using the agricultural analogy in order to show how the polis is natural.
Agricultural practices, although they may be necessary for Aristotle at least in some
instances in order for the respective plant to survive, nevertheless rely on the teleological
development of an internal principle in order to operate effectively. There is no need
whatsoever for an external cause to create the natural entity. Rather, for the farmer the
natural entity with an internal principle already exists and it is her job to care for the plant
in order for the plant to fully develop itself according to the end that is dictated by the
nature that the plant possesses. The difference then between an agricultural plant and a
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The possibility that Aristotle might not seriously think that there was a first polis is a real one in my
view. However, such a claim does not change the argument that I am making here. The fact that the polis
is necessarily understood to be provided its form by a law-maker is all that I need to make my criticism
work, for it shows that the polis could at least conceptually be created. This is simply not the same as other
natural entities who never come to be as a kind, only individually, and which therefore conceptually cannot
have been created by some divine craftsman or artificer whose form is other than the one possessed by the
maker of the entity in question. I will be arguing in the third part of this chapter however that the fact that
there is a kind of craftsman of the polis does not in fact show us that the polis must be an artifact.
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polis is that such a plant does not require an external cause whose form is different than
that which is possessed by the plant in order for the plant to come to be. The key
difference than is precisely in the fact that a polis does indeed, by Aristotle’s own
confession, require an external cause whose form is other that which is possessed by the
polis. This external cause is not necessary in order to help the polis achieve its end, but
rather is necessary in order for there to be a polis with a supposed internal cause of
motion and rest at all. Thus using agricultural practices in order to explain a natural polis
simply does not seem to work given the difference I have just pointed out between those
entities which agriculture concerns itself with and the naturalness of the polis.
3. The Naturalness of the Polis

Despite the fundamental issue with the claim that the polis is natural that I have so
far outlined, I believe that it is nevertheless possible to argue that the claim that the polis
is natural is not a fallacious one, but rather consistent with how Aristotle understood the
concept of nature broadly speaking. Firstly, I believe that Miller is correct to assert that
there is a broader conception of nature at work in the corpus. For evidence for this, I
would point to Metaphysics Λ and its conception of a cosmic nature or a ‘nature of the
whole,’ which I discussed at length in the third chapter. What is important to take from
my discussion there concerning the topic at hand is that the nature that is associated with
the cosmos seems to imply a concept of nature that is other than the strict concept of
nature used to describe a natural entitiy in the Physics. In addition, I agree with Miller in
believing that the passage asserting the naturalness of bird’s nests and spider’s webs also
points to an expanded concept of nature in the corpus.

A nest is clearly not an entity

which possesses an internal principle of motion like the bird possesses, for it at the very
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least requires an external cause which does not have the same form as the nest for its very
existence. And of course as we have seen several times so far, this just necessarily makes
a thing natural in a different sense than something which comes to be from another
individual who is identical in form, such as the parent of a bird. Yet both entities are
considered to be natural for Aristotle, and it is this description of such things as nests and
webs which thereby allow for an account of nature that does not simply require one to
associate the natural thing with something that must possess an internal principle of
motion in precisely the same exact way as animals and plants possess such a principle.
What this ultimately implies is that there is indeed an expanded concept of nature in
Aristotle.
Secondly, at the same time I also believe that Chan and Kraut are correct in
emphasizing an internal principle of motion in relation to the polis. Although as I have
just argued, I do not believe that the polis can possess the same internal principle of
motion as an animal or a plant for instance, it is nevertheless true that there must be
something about the way that a polis begins and develops that involves an internal
motion. Even an expanded concept of nature must include something like this in order
for the thing in question to be considered natural, otherwise we would simply be
describing an artifact. The issue with the interpretations provided by Chan and Kraut, as
we have seen, is that they both ultimately attempt to make the polis satisfy the
requirements for naturalness provided in the Physics and the Metaphysics. This is where
Miller’s point regarding bird’s nests can help, as it shows us that there are some objects
that are natural for Aristotle but which are also constructed or made by something which
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possesses a form other that that which is possessed by the nest itself.190 I believe that the
kind of internal principle that a bird’s nest possesses is much like the internal principle
that the polis possesses, and I aim to show this point later in the chapter.191
Keeping these points in mind, I believe that it is possible to provide an
interpretation that explains the naturalness of the polis and that does not fall to the
criticisms that I have already mentioned. Briefly, I believe that the naturalness of the
polis is understood by Aristotle through a correct understanding of the nature of human
beings.192 Human beings are identified by Aristotle as ‘rational animals,’ which is further
explained by him to imply that human beings are animals with speech, as opposed to
merely possessing a voice. Possessing a voice is, for other animals, used to express
pleasure and pain which is associated with the sensitive soul possessed by animals as a
whole.193 However, the possession of reason associated with the rational soul leads to the
possession of what Aristotle calls speech, something significantly different then mere
voice. Aristotle states that speech [logos], flowing from the rational nature of human
beings, is able “…to set forth the expedient and inexpedient, and therefore likewise the
just and unjust. And it is a characteristic of man that he alone has any sense of good and
evil, of just and unjust, and the like, and the association of living beings who have this

Crucially, this is not to agree with Miller’s assertion that the polis is natural and artificial. I merely am
acknowledging Miller’s point that a bird’s nest is a good example of the kind of natural entity which exists
due to a form which is other than what it possesses, but which is also natural precisely because it does not
come about spontaneously nor through rational productive activity.
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This is not to say that bird’s nests are natural in exactly the same way that the polis is natural. I am
simply here emphasizing the point that there is an internal principle of motion that can be identified with
the polis, and that bird’s nests and other natural entities similar to bird’s nests can help us to identify the
internal principle of motion of the polis due to the fact that the internal principle that a nest possesses must
be similar in some important sense to the internal principle that a polis possesses.
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sense makes a family and a state [polis].”194 With Cherry and Goerner, I will call this
particular kind of sociality, logos-sociality. Logos-sociality points out to us a particular
kind of social interaction which is unique to human beings for Aristotle, and which is a
part of the teleological development and growth of human beings. By asserting that
human nature possesses logos-sociality, I am merely pointing out that human growth and
development is “…dependent on exercises of reasoned and communicated judgments
about what is to be done, about the advantageous and the harmful, the good and the bad,
the just and the unjust, and other similar things.”195 And it also must be admitted that the
entirety of the ethical, political, and rhetorical writings of Aristotle attest to the fact that
the discovery of the good and the bad and all of the rest is made over time, and
accomplished through the relationships and institutions that human beings establish in
interacting with each other by means of expressing their logos-sociality.
What this then leads to is the establishment of households, which have been
admitted by all of those that I have discussed thus far as being a natural entity. The
household is natural partly because it indeed arises from a natural desire to procreate,
which is a desire that human beings share with other animals. But the household also
emerges from the expression of an essential component of human nature, namely logossociality. As Cherry and Goerner state “Whereas man is placed among the genus of
animals which form partnerships, the specifically human kind of partnership is tied to the
exercise of the specifically human capacity for logos.”196 This then leads to

ὁ δὲ λόγος ἐπὶ τῷ δηλοῦν ἐστι τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ βλαβερόν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον: τοῦτο
γὰρ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἴδιον, τὸ μόνον ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ τῶν
ἄλλων αἴσθησιν ἔχειν: ἡ δὲ τούτων κοινωνία ποιεῖ οἰκίαν καὶ πόλιν. Politics I 2 1253a14-19.
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establishment of the household, which is natural not only due to the fact that it is a
necessary part of the expression of the procreative drive that human beings share with
other animals, but also because it is a necessary part of the expression of reason itself.
However, the logos-sociality aspect of human nature does not just end with the
household. Rather it begins with the household, but in order for it to fully express itself,
it must do so within the context of the polis. Aristotle states as much Politics I 2
1253a14-19.197 So therefore the household leads to the village and then the polis. The
polis represents the end of this development precisely because it is only in the polis,
which itself is made up of a series of households, that the logos of human beings can fully
express itself. It is only in the polis that human beings are able to develop fully the
activity of ordering human life through reasoning and discourse.
What this shows us is that the naturalness of the polis is a matter of understanding
human nature itself. Human beings are identified by Aristotle as possessing reason. One
of the fundamental ways in which human reason can manifest itself is through
determining what Aristotle identifies as the right and wrong, the just and unjust, and in
general the good way of life. But this is accomplished through discussion and discourse.
And it is only in discussion and discourse that one is able to express this aspect of human
nature. But discussion and discourse is only possible within the context of a community,
a social structure which allows for and provides the conditions necessary to express
human logos. This is why then the household is considered natural, because it is a
necessary emergent entity from the mere expression of logos itself. This is not to deny
that the household is also natural because of the desire for procreation, for this is an
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aspect behind the assertion that the household is a natural entity. But households
necessarily lead to polises for Aristotle, and polises emerge as a part of the realizing of
the logos-sociality aspect of human nature. It is in discussing and realizing the good, and
all that is related to that, through the polis, that human nature is able to achieve what
Aristotle identifies as the ‘good life,’ i.e. the ultimate goal of the polis to begin with. The
idea here then is that the structure of a polis is a necessary one, in that it will ultimately
arise from the fact that logos is being expressed. This is then what is behind the assertion
that the polis is natural for Aristotle.
I also believe that this account answers the other fundamental criticisms that we
have discussed thus far. Miller and those who make similar arguments concerning the
naturalness of the polis miss a crucial point in their accounts. As we have seen, the issue
with Miller’s account is that his qualifications for naturalness which he argues the polis
satisfies allow for a wide range of entities to be considered natural. What Miller
essentially does is undermine, at least to a large extent, the distinction between an artifact
and a natural entity that Aristotle explicitly makes. However, what Miller seems to want
to argue with the qualifications that he offers is to emphasize the point that the polis is a
result of human nature, and that its naturalness is due to the expression of human nature
itself, which will inevitably bring about a polis through which such a nature fully
expresses itself. However, the inevitability of the polis being brought about due to
human nature is simply not enough to demonstrate that the polis is natural. Having said
this, I argue that the account that I have just provided allows us to avoid the pitfall that
Miller and similar commentators seem to fall into. Rather than accepting the
qualifications that Miller offers, I believe that it is better to simply say that the polis is
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more like the bird’s nest or the bee hive then has been previously admitted. A bird’s nest
comes about through the natural actualization of the bird’s nature, and the polis comes
about through the natural actualization of human nature.198 The important point here is
that the polis is a special kind of entity, not like other artificially constructed institutions
such as schools or hospitals, which do indeed allow for the realization of human nature,
but which require productive activity to create on the part of a sort of practical craftsman.
I believe that polises, on the other hand, come about in a teleological fashion but not
primarily through the conscious productive activity of a ‘polis-maker,’ but rather a polis
comes about necessarily through the mere expression of human nature itself. This is
what makes such an entity natural and not merely a nice artifact for the attainment of the
actualization of human nature. This is the point that Aristotle is trying to make when he
states that human beings are political and that the polis is natural.
As we have seen, I also believe that the emphasis on an internal principle of
motion, such as what was emphasized by Kraut and Chan in their respective arguments,
is important as well. But the internal principle of motion is not like that which
agricultural plants possess, or which animals and plants in general possess, as Kraut and
Chan suggest. Rather, the principle of motion that the polis possesses is human nature
itself, and this must be considered an internal principle precisely because the polis is a
part of and comes about through the teleological development of human nature itself.
Crucially, this would seemingly make the polis and other natural entities which are
natural in the same sense as the polis a different sort of natural entity then what we
normally find in the corpus. The principle of motion of such entities would come from
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something whose form is other than that which is possessed by the natural entity in
question, much like the form of a bird would be different than the form that is possessed
by the nest that the bird happens to make. But at the same time, acknowledging this does
not force one to admit that such entities are really artifacts in the end. Rather, what is
unique about the polis is that it is really a part or expression of human nature, and its
naturalness is truly found in the fact that it emerges from the actualization of the
particularly human characteristics associated with the form of a human being. Other
artifacts are not like this, for they require conscious productive activity and do not
necessarily have to exist in every case for human beings to realize their natures.
If I am right in asserting that the polis is natural because it emerges inevitably
from human social interactions, then I think that it is safe to say that Aristotle believes
that the principle of motion which leads to the development of the polis is human nature
itself, and especially human nature as it is expressed in its logos-sociality. What this
interpretation allows for then is the claim that the polis is natural, and that the
development of the polis is on account of the social interaction of human beings, and that
the full expression of this social interaction is the polis itself. This is moreover the inner
principle of motion for the polis. But what I am not claiming is that the polis is natural
simply because it is the social aspect of human nature. Rather the polis is a distinct
entity, that which emerges from the social interactions of human nature, and which
possess its own form and matter, a claim that is basic to Aristotle’s conception of the
polis and is found throughout the Politics. What I am saying is that the polis, along with
the household and the village, is a separate entity which requires effort and input, but it is
a special kind of entity which has as its counterparts in the natural world the hive of a bee
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colony and the nest of a ‘family’ of birds. What makes it such a special entity is the fact
that it will inevitably arise, precisely on account of the actualization of human nature
itself, and that it is actually an integral part of the expressing of logos-sociality. And it is
in expressing the various components of logos-sociality that human beings are able to
attain the good life. Of course, we have seen in earlier chapters that the attainment of the
good life of a natural entity implies nothing other than the fulfillment of the natural
capacities that an entity possesses. Now Aristotle is aware of course that there are certain
artifacts that are necessary for the attainment of the good life. But I believe that Aristotle
is attempting to get us to see that the polis is more than simply an artifact necessary for
the attainment of the good life. Rather the polis is part of the natural expression of
human nature, in so far as it arises inevitably and is necessary for the meaningful
expression of the social and rational components of human nature. When Aristotle
claims that the polis is natural then, I take it that he means to say that the very expression
of the social impulses found in human nature itself, which being a component of the
attainment of the good life and thus the fulfillment of those capacities, involves the
emergence of a special kind of entity called a polis which in turn is necessary in order for
those components of human nature to be expressed and made meaningful.
The account of the naturalness of the polis that I have thus far provided has
ignored a very important criticism however. The critique that I have yet to answer, and
which I think is vital to respond to in order to defend my argument, is the claim that the
polis is constructed through the conscious productive activity of a law-giver. As we have
seen, the fact that the polis is a product of a political craftsman seems to mean that the
polis must be an artifact. I think that Keyt is right moreover to press this claim, in that an
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activity which involves a person consciously taking matter and imposing a form onto it
results in the creation of an artifact. However, I do not believe that Aristotle believes this
is how we should understand the creation of the polis.
Firstly, it might be argued that the wording that Aristotle uses in describing the
creation of the first polis indicates that he conceived the polis as an artifact. However, I
do not think that this is the case. In just one of the relevant passages, Aristotle asserts at
one point that the person who first created the polis is the cause of the greatest of goods,
stating that “ὁ δὲ πρῶτος συστήσας μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν αἴτιος.”199 It might be argued that
this passage is best translated as the person who first formed, or constructed, something is
the cause of the greatest of goods. But ‘συστήσας’ here is used by Aristotle to describe
merely coming together, rather than deliberately constructing something, and is used to
account for the coming together of the family by Aristotle as well, which is clearly a
natural, and not an artificially constructed, institution.200 There is a sense even in these
passages in which Aristotle seems to be explicitly asserting that there is craftsman of the
polis, that one can understand these passages without thereby making the polis an artifact.
This is especially so when one understands the relevant verb in the above passage as
indicating that the polis comes together without ever implying, necessarily, that the polis
was formed deliberately by a craftsman.
Having said this, it is still true that Aristotle seems to admit that there is a first
polis which was made by a kind of craftsman. Aristotle even mentions a few of the
famous Greek law-givers such as Solon and Lycurgus as examples of those who formed a
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constitution and thus provided the form to the relevant polises that they are credited with
creating. In response, I will use Cherry and Goerner’s argument as a basis, in which they
state that “…the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics are designed to promote a fully
human approach to self-formation by societies of social animals the form of whose
sociality is not wholly dictated by instinctive biological drives but rather leaves itself
open to reflexive transformation…”201 This is the key point to the interpretation I have
been defending throughout this section. It is vital to keep in mind the fact that the polis is
simply a part of the expression of the nature of human beings, primarily the social and
rational nature of human beings, and that this aspect of the polis connects it with other
fundamentally natural institutions such as the family and the village and which separates
it from other non-natural entities which may indeed help human beings achieve their end,
such as educational institutions and medical care facilities. Nowhere does Aristotle claim
that a good law-maker, one who manages to create a polis which does indeed allow for or
could allow for the attainment of the good human life, merely imposes a form on a group
of passive people acting as the matter in a process akin to the creation of an artifact.
Rather, when human beings act naturally they proceed to not only attain what is
necessary for both survival and the fulfillment of their basic biological functions, but they
also naturally act in a social and rational manner, which necessarily involves discussion.
Primarily, the discussion is about what is good and bad, and how to attain the good and
avoid the bad. All of this naturally leads to further conversations and debates concerning
the right manner through which the good life can be attained. It is at this precise moment
that the polis begins to form. It is not as though human beings are merely passive, and
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that they require some ruling craftsman to come along and shape the group into some
artificial society. Rather, the very expression of the rational nature that humans possess
itself forms the structure that we call the polis.
However, this is not to say at the same time that there isn’t a law-giver, for
Aristotle clearly believes that there exists such individuals, and that they are even the
cause of the greatest of goods. But the point that I am attempting to make here, which
also resolves the difficulties of the critique raised by Keyt, is that such law-makers work
with the people that will inevitably make up the society in question, and also and at the
same time are the result of the discussions that are the expression of human nature
itself.202 In other words, there are law-givers for Aristotle, but there are no polissculptors. Law-makers are rather like leaders who are not separate from, but rather
represent a vital part of the natural expression of human social and rational instincts
which aim at eventually reaching the good life. This process does indeed include such
leaders and law-givers as Solon and Lycurgus for Aristotle, but he does not see these men
as somehow separate from the process itself. Rather the debate, argument, and discussion
which must occur as part of the expression of human nature inevitably leads to the
formation and development of the polis, which also in the process determines the form of
the polis in question, and it is only in the polis that the speech about the good life to be
attained can reach its fullest expression.
4. Conclusion
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This then is my account of the naturalness of the polis. I have shown that it is not
an artificial entity, primarily because I believe that Aristotle saw the polis as a part of the
expression of human nature itself. Crucially, the polis is not natural because it possesses
the same kind of internal principle of motion that the natural entities of the Physics
possess, nor is it natural simply because it stems from the natural development of human
beings and helps to allow human beings to achieve their end. The fact of the matter is, as
I have already shown, that there are many artifacts which satisfy such conditions. Rather,
the polis is the end of a teleological development stemming from the household all of
which represent natural structures in so far as they are a part of the expression of the
natural capacities of human nature. Simply speaking, one cannot express the social and
rational aspects of human nature that Aristotle believes are so important to being and
living a human life without at the same time doing it within the structures of the family,
the village, and the polis. And the expression of such parts of human nature is to
establish such structures which are a part of, and not just a means to, the achievement of
the good human life.
Having said all of this, I also believe that this account requires some
supplementation. An important issue, and one which is quite relevant to the thesis of this
dissertation, is how to understand the priority of the polis in relation to the individuals
who make up the polis. The priority question is relevant as it is connected to Aristotle’s
theory of a natural entity. And therefore, a consistent account of the priority of the polis
can, when combined with the account I have just defended, provide us with an account of
nature in Aristotle that will indeed help us to understand the idea of a cosmic nature.
Accordingly, I will proceed to investigate the priority issue concerning the polis in the
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next chapter, which will assume the interpretation concerning the naturalness of the polis
that I have just defended. What all of this will lead to then will be the argument of the
final chapter in which I will defend the concept of a nature of the cosmos as a whole.
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CHAPTER V

THE PRIORITY OF THE POLIS

1. Introduction
In the last chapter, I argued that Aristotle’s claim that the polis is natural can be
defended in terms of what has been called the logos-sociality component of the
Aristotelian conception of human nature. Once we understand and recognize that the
social and rational components of human nature cannot function without at the same time
giving rise to the polis, it becomes clear that the polis is fundamentally connected to the
very expression of what is essential to human expression as such. However,
demonstrating the naturalness of the polis is but one part of fully understanding
Aristotle’s conception of the ontology of the polis. We have yet to discuss another
important issue concerning the polis which is closely connected to the thesis we have
been discussing, namely the priority of the polis. This chapter will accordingly discuss
this aspect of Aristotle’s conception of the polis, along with the various interpretations
that have been provided concerning what Aristotle might mean when he states that the
polis is prior to the individual. I will argue in this chapter that the priority that Aristotle
has in mind in regard to the polis and the individual is an ontological priority, but in a
qualified sense. This implies that the polis is prior to the individual in that the individual
cannot live a human life outside of the polis, and that the individual thus ceases to be
human for the most part. The relevance of this topic in relation to the concept of a
cosmic order will be discussed in the final chapter of the dissertation.
2. Priority and Totalitarianism
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In the first book of the Politics, Aristotle asserts not only that the polis is a natural entity
but also that it is prior to the individual by stating that:
Further, the state is by nature clearly prior to the family and to the individual,
since the whole is of necessity prior to the part; for example, if the whole body be
destroyed, there will be no foot or hand, except homonymously, as we might
speak of a stone hand; for when destroyed the hand will be no better than that.
But things are defined by their function and power; and we ought not to say that
they are the same when they no longer have their proper quality, but only that
they are homonymous. The proof that the state is a creation of nature and prior to
the individual is that the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing; and
therefore he is like a part in relation to the whole. But he who is unable to live in
society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a
beast or a god: he is no part of a state.203
This claim that the polis is prior to the individual seems a rather radical statement.
‘Priority’ suggests that Aristotle is arguing and defending a concept of a state which has
complete control over the individual, and so much so that the individual would be
expendable given the right circumstances. Aristotle for instance compares the
relationship between the individual and the polis as being like the relationship between a
hand and the whole of which it is a part. What such an understanding of the polis in
relation to the individual would imply, an implication defended by some scholars, is that
Aristotle is here justifying a totalitarian state which has complete control, at least in terms
of what it is justified in doing, over the individual.204

ἡ δὲ τούτων κοινωνία ποιεῖ οἰκίαν καὶ πόλιν. καὶ πρότερον δὲ τῇ φύσει πόλις ἢ οἰκία καὶ ἕκαστος ἡμῶν
ἐστιν. τὸ γὰρ ὅλον πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ μέρους: ἀναιρουμένου γὰρ τοῦ ὅλου οὐκ ἔσται ποὺς οὐδὲ
χείρ, εἰ μὴ ὁμωνύμως, ὥσπερ εἴ τις λέγοι τὴν λιθίνην (διαφθαρεῖσα γὰρ ἔσται τοιαύτη), πάντα δὲ τῷ ἔργῳ
ὥρισται καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, ὥστε μηκέτι τοιαῦτα ὄντα οὐ λεκτέον τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι ἀλλ᾽ ὁμώνυμα. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ
πόλις καὶ φύσει πρότερον ἢ ἕκαστος, δῆλον: εἰ γὰρ μὴ αὐτάρκης ἕκαστος χωρισθείς, ὁμοίως τοῖς ἄλλοις
μέρεσιν ἕξει πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, ὁ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενος κοινωνεῖν ἢ μηδὲν δεόμενος δι᾽ αὐτάρκειαν οὐθὲν μέρος
πόλεως, ὥστε ἢ θηρίον ἢ θεός. Politics I 2 1253a19-30.
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1-26. Popper argues that the totalitarian tendencies found in Plato’s political theorizing is echoed and
repeated by Aristotle in his own political theorizing. Moreover, the mere proposition that the polis is prior
to the individual seems to also justify the complete authority of the state in every aspect of the life of an
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Jonathan Barnes has made a convincing defense of this thesis.205 Barnes argues
that totalitarianism is at the heart of the Aristotelian political theory in part due to the
metaphysical underpinnings of Aristotle’s conception of the polis and the function that it
is said to possess. The function of the polis is in fact to ensure the welfare and
eudaimonia of its citizens. Aristotle of course believes that eudaimonia is attained
through living a virtuous life, which entails that the person acquires the virtues that
Aristotle identifies in the Nicomachean Ethics. And the acquisition of such virtues
depends on how a person acts and what a person does in their individual lives. Since the
attainment of eudaimonia is clearly a political concern for the polis in question, and the
attainment of such requires the acquisition of the virtues that Aristotle enumerates, it
follows that the polis must be concerned with legislation regarding many aspects of the
life of an individual within that state. And Barnes argues that the definition of
totalitarianism is roughly that “…all questions are political questions.”206 And, as Barnes
puts it, “…since most citizens live by their πάθη the legislator will in effect be obliged to
operate περὶ πάντα τὸν βίον.”207
Barnes also argues that this totalitarian impulse in Aristotle’s political theory is
found in the assertion that the polis is prior to the individual. Barnes points out that
“Individuals are posterior to the State insofar as they are parts of the State. A citizen

individual within that state. So not only would it seemingly be the case that such aspects of political life
like participation in the government, education of children, and the market are completely under the
judgement of the government, but even what most would understand as non-political aspects of life such as
what one wears and were one works would also be under the purview of the ruling government. This of
course certainly seems to justify the claim that Aristotle defends a totalitarian approach to government rule.
205
Jonathan Barnes, “Aristotle and Political Liberty,” in Aristotles’ ‘Politik,’ ed. G. Patzig (Gottingen: Van
den Hoeck and Ruprecht, 1990), 249-263.
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stands to the State as a hand stands to a body…”208 This kind of priority then implies that
just as a hand loses its meaning and function when separated from the body, so does a
person. And that furthermore, a hand exists in order to serve the functions of the person
to which it is connected. Similarly, a person is a part of the state in the same sense, so
that the person not only ceases to exist outside or separated from the state, but also the
person exists for the state. Barnes asks the pointed question by stating that “If a citizen is
not ἁυτοῦ but τῆς πόλεως, does it not follow that citizens are slaves, that all rule must,
despite his denial, be despotic – and despotic in a literal sense?”209 For Barnes, the
priority of the polis seems to raise the state above that of any individual in terms of its
priority, and that since the primary concern of the state is the eudaimonia of the
individuals that are a part of the state, it follows form both of these points that most if not
all aspects of one’s individual life is a valid subject of determination for the state.
David Keyt also believes that the priority thesis is problematic, stating that it is
“…undoubtedly the most provocative assertion in the Politics.”210 Not only does it imply
that the individual is subsumed under the interests of the polis, but it also implies that a
human being ceases to be a human being outside of the polis. No individual human being
then remains a human being outside of the polis of which he/she is a part. The more
disturbing part of the thesis is seemingly that even if such a separation were to occur by
accident, the breaking of the connection between the individual and the whole would
nevertheless still imply that the individual would cease to be human.211 This seems to
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entail that not only would the priority thesis imply a justification for the totalitarian
regimes that Barnes points out, but that the kind of totalitarianism that is justified by the
priority thesis goes so far as to entail that a person is not even a human unless they are
part of a political community.
Keyt goes on to assert that the priority thesis is also false by Aristotle’s own
principles. The inability to share in a polis must be distinguished according to two
different senses. Firstly, there is the inability to do such a thing by nature, in so far as the
form or soul of the living thing in question simply is not capable nor will ever be capable
of sharing in the political community. Secondly, there is the inability to be a part of the
polis due to the lack of an opportunity to do so, in so far as a person may not be able to
express those social and rational aspects required to participate in a political community
simply because he/she is not in a situation that would allow for the expression of such.
So a person who is untrained in carpentry and the carpenter without tools and material are
both unable to express and carry out the essential function of carpentry, but their inability
to express such a function does not necessarily say anything about the individuals
themselves. For a trained carpenter lacking the necessary materials to do her work does
not thereby cease to be a carpenter, but is rather simply unable to carry out the functions
of carpentry because they are missing the necessary conditions for carrying out such an
activity. Aristotle explicitly recognizes that there are situations when a person possesses
knowledge but is not actively using that knowledge at the moment, such as when he
states that:
But we must now distinguish different senses in which things can be said to be
potential or actual; at the moment we are speaking as if each of these phrases had
only one sense. We can speak of something as a knower either as when we say
that man is a knower, meaning that man falls within the class of beings that know
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or have knowledge, or as when we are speaking of a man who possesses a
knowledge of grammar; each of these has a potentiality, but not in the same way:
the one because his kind or matter is such and such, the other because he can
reflect when he wants to, if nothing external prevents him. And there is the man
who is already reflecting – he is a knower in actuality and in the most proper
sense is knowing, e.g. this A.212
The carpenter who possesses knowledge of her craft does not thereby cease to be a
carpenter when they are unable to actually carry out the activity of carpentry due to a lack
of the necessary materials. So Keyt argues that the same holds for human beings in
general according to Aristotle’s own principles, as the human being who is polisless by
chance does not thereby cease to be a human being, but is rather unable to carry out the
political activities essential to being human due to a lack of opportunity. So, Keyt
believes that the priority thesis is mistaken due to Aristotle’s own commitments in his
general ontology.
Another critic of the priority thesis is C. C. W. Taylor who argues that the priority
thesis entails a kind of relationship between the individual and the state which is on par
with the relation which holds between a master and his slave. Aristotle famously
(infamously) argues that the natural slave, as opposed to the conventional slave to which
Aristotle is opposed, is the living tool of the master.213 And the priority thesis, according

διαιρετέον δὲ καὶ περὶ δυνάμεως καὶ ἐντελεχείας· νῦν γὰρ ἁπλῶς ἐλέγομεν περὶ αὐτῶν. ἔστι μὲν γὰρ
οὕτως ἐπιστῆμόν τι ὡς ἂν εἴποιμεν ἄνθρωπον ἐπιστήμονα ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῶν ἐπιστημόνων καὶ ἐχόντων
ἐπιστήμην· ἔστι δ’ ὡς ἤδη λέγομεν ἐπιστήμονα τὸν ἔχοντα τὴν γραμματικήν· ἑκάτερος δὲ τούτων οὐ τὸν
αὐτὸν τρόπον δυνατός ἐστιν, ἀλλ´ ὁ μὲν ὅτι τὸ γένος τοιοῦτον καὶ ἡ ὕλη, ὁ δ´ ὅτι βουληθεὶς δυνατὸς
θεωρεῖν, ἂν μή τι κωλύσῃ τῶν ἔξωθεν· ὁ δ´ ἤδη θεωρῶν, ἐντελεχείᾳ ὢν καὶ κυρίως ἐπιστάμενος τόδε τὸ Α.
De Anima II 5 417a21-30.
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So the best life that can be lived for those who Aristotle describes as natural slaves is one which is wholly
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to Taylor, seemingly implies the same kind of relation, so that “…like the slave we find
our good not in the realization of any aims of our own, but in the fulfilment of the aims of
that of which we are a part [the polis].”214 And like Keyt, Taylor argues that there is a
contradiction in the priority thesis, which is found not in the metaphysics of substance in
which Keyt believes the contradiction can be found, but rather in the fact that it
contradicts two important theses in Aristotle’s political and ethical theory, “…that the
aim of the polis is the promotion of the good life for its citizens, and that the central
activity of the good life is the exercise of autonomous practical rationality.”215 The
contradiction here then rests in the claim that, on the one hand, the individual stands in
relation to the polis in the same sense as the natural slave stands in relation to the master.
In this sense, the individual’s good would be wholly subsumed by the good of the whole
which represents its master in the master/slave relationship. On the other hand however,
the polis is defined by Aristotle through its promotion of the good life for its citizens,
which would make the life of the citizen the central focus of the individual/polis
relationship, which seems manifestly at odds with the priority claim as Taylor
understands it. Taylor believes that this inconsistency in doctrine was developed by
Aristotle through an attempt to explain that human beings achieve their natural ends in a
social system. But Taylor argues that acknowledging this dependence in no way
demands a radical claim such as what the priority thesis implies.
Finally, Pierre Pellegrin also takes Aristotle to mean that the priority of the polis
over the individual is of such a kind as to hold that the individual is wholly subsumed by
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the state. Pellegrin states that “If we take this analogy seriously, we have to acknowledge
that, according to Aristotle, just as in the case of a dead hand or a stone hand, a man who
is not part of a city should be called a man only homonymously.”216 Such a claim, as we
have seen already from Keyt and Taylor, seems to subordinate the individual in such a
way as the good of the individual is wholly directed at and understood through the good
of the polis. This then lays the foundation for the claim that Aristotle defends
totalitarianism, in that every aspect of an individual’s life, including the individual’s
family and the direct community that he/she is a part of and works with, must necessarily
submit to the dictates and rules of the ruling class, and thus to the dictates and good of the
polis itself.
3. Aristotle’s Concepts of Priority
The understanding of the priority of the polis that has been defended, which is
organic insofar as the priority of the polis over the individual is of the same kind as the
priority of the whole body over the hand, is not the only sense of priority that Aristotle
defends however. And in order to fully comprehend the claims made by Aristotle
concerning the relationship between the polis and the individual, and whether such claims
imply that Aristotle defends a totalitarian conception of rule, can only be accomplished
once one works through the various senses of priority that Aristotle identifies.217 I
believe then that this is an important first step in understanding what Aristotle might
mean by stating that the polis is prior to the individual. 218
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The first text we should examine to attain an account of priority is Aristotle’s
discussion of priority in Metaphysics Δ 11. In this passage, Aristotle first identifies what
I will call (1) priority in beginning:
We call things prior and posterior in some cases (on the assumption that there is a
first, i.e. a beginning, in each class) because they are nearer some beginning
determined either absolutely and by nature, or by reference to something or in
some place or by certain people, e.g. thing are prior in place because they are
nearer either to some place determined by nature or by reference to something or
in some place or by certain people, e. g. things are prior in place because they are
nearer either to some place determined by nature, e. g. the middle or the last
place, or to some chance object; and that which is further is posterior.219
This sort of priority is clearly the priority that occurs in generation for instance, as in the
child is prior to the adult as it is nearer the beginning of the life of the individual
organism. This priority is determined then by the acknowledgement of a beginning, from
which things are called prior as they are closer to the beginning that has been identified.
Something X is prior in this sense to another thing Y if it is closer to the beginning, and
that this may be understood in an absolute or relative sense, and it may be in terms of a
place, a time, etc. So when we say that a cub is prior to a bear, we mean by priority in the
sense of priority of beginning.
Secondly, there is (2) priority in formula. The passage describes this kind of
priority by stating “…in another sense that which is prior for knowledge is treated as
absolutely prior…”220 This entails the kind of priority which comes up in definitions and
for Aristotle knowledge as well. Something X is prior to another thing Y in formula just
in case knowledge of X is required for knowledge of Y but knowledge of Y is not

πρότερα καὶ ὕστερα λέγεται ἔνια μέν, ὡς ὄντος τινὸς πρώτου καὶ ἀρχῆς ἐν ἑκάστῳ γένει, τῷ ἐγγύτερον
εἶναι ἀρχῆς τινὸς ὡρισμένης ἢ ἁπλῶς καὶ τῇ φύσει ἢ πρός τι ἢ ποὺ ἢ ὑπό τινων, οἷον τὰ μὲν κατὰ τόπον τῷ
εἶναι ἐγγύτερον ἢ φύσει τινὸς τόπου ὡρισμένου (οἷον τοῦ μέσου ἢ τοῦ ἐσχάτου) ἢ πρὸς τὸ τυχόν, τὸ δὲ
πορρώτερον ὕστερον: Met. Δ 11 1018b9-14.
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required for knowledge of X. So in order to know what a musical man is I must first
know what being musical is, but to know what musical is does not in itself require that I
know what a musical man is. So in this case musical is prior in formula to musical man.
Next, Aristotle briefly mentions the (3) priority of certain kinds of attributes
stating “The attributes of prior things are called prior, e. g. straightness is prior to
smoothness; for one is an attribute of a line as such, and the other of a surface.”221 This
kind of priority is to be understood then through the idea of certain things being prior at
least in certain ways to other things. It follows then that the attributes and properties of
these prior things are themselves prior to the attributes of those things that are posterior to
the original prior thing. It seems to me then that the priority spoken of here relates to
priority in formula, in that those things which are in formula prior to other things possess
properties that are themselves prior to the properties of the posterior thing.
In the Categories Aristotle identifies another kind of priority not mentioned in the
philosophical lexicon of Metaphysics Δ. He states that “Further, besides the ways
mentioned, what is better and more valued is thought to be prior by nature: ordinary
people commonly say of those they specially value and love that they ‘have priority.’”222
I will call this (4) priority in nobleness. By this sort of priority I take Aristotle to mean
that that which is considered to be more valued, either absolutely or relative to an
individual person, is thought to be prior. The way in which such a thing would be
considered to be more prior would be how individuals consider the more valuable things
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in their life to be more important to protect and more vital to their lives than the more
inessential things in their lives. Considered more absolutely, one can see that that which
is considered to be better is also considered to be more actual, and actuality is considered
by Aristotle to be prior to potentiality. This also seems to connect with the basic
Aristotelian claim that the end toward which something aims at by nature is more
complete and better. So the end by nature is also prior in being better and more valued,
absolutely in this case, to the beginning.223
Aristotle also mentions elsewhere the kind of priority which can be called (5)
teleological priority, which holds that a thing which is an end is also prior to that which is
aiming at the end but which is still in potentiality in relation to the end at which it is
aiming. So Aristotle states that actuality is prior in this sense “…firstly, because the
things that are posterior in becoming are prior in form and in substance, e.g. man is prior
to boy and human being to seed; for the one already has its form, and the other has not.
Secondly, because everything that comes to be moves towards a principle, i.e. an end.
For that for the sake of which a thing is, is its principle, and the becoming is for the sake
of the end; and the actuality is the end, and it is for the sake of this that the potentiality is
acquired.”224 This type of priority is a fundamental aspect of Aristotle’s general
teleological theory. For every natural motion that occurs, Aristotle understands the

I am also reminded here of Aquinas’ argument against the notion that God is a Body. Aquinas states
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beings…Hence, it is impossible that God should be a body.” (Summa Theologica I, Q. 3, A. 1) The
argument that Aquinas provides here clearly involves more than simply the claim that what is more noble is
prior, but it also involves this kind of priority. God, being the most noble of beings, is also prior to all other
beings, who are themselves less noble than God.
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reason for such motions as aiming at an end which itself actualizes the motion in
question. This also holds for natural living substances, in so far as a juvenile member of
a species is moving towards adulthood, the actualized form of the adult member of the
species is the reason for the motion and growth of the juvenile. Aristotle makes this
priority clear by arguing then that the potentiality to move needs to be actualized by
something, which of course is actualized by the mover who possesses the end towards
which the movement is aiming. The actuality toward which the motion is aimed at is
prior precisely because the potentiality toward that end requires an actuality to aim at in
order for the potentiality to be possessed in the first place. For Aristotle, the fundamental
reason for all types of motion is that they all aim at an end toward which the motion is
striving, and the end must exist in actuality in order for the motion to happen in the first
place.
Finally, there is (6) priority in ontology, existence, or separateness. Aristotle
states that some things are called prior “…in respect of nature and substance, i. e. those
which can be without other things, while the others cannot be without them.”225 This
type of priority can be understood by stating that something X is prior to another thing Y
in existence just in case X can exist without Y, but Y cannot exist without X. The
Aristotelian example of this kind of priority is the relationship between the hand and the
whole living body. As we have already discussed, the hand does not exist as such when
separated from the body. We may still call such a separated limb a hand, but we only do
so according to Aristotle homonomously. The sculpted or carved hand of a statue is
understood in the same sense by Aristotle. The hand only exists as such when it is
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connected to the whole body, and its function is only utilized when it is part of such a
whole.
This notion of priority has received some attention in the recent scholarship.
Precisely what it actually means for something to be capable of being without another
thing is somewhat unclear.226 Kit Fine has argued that the notion of priority in respect of
nature entails a modal/existential dependence relationship.227 The existential construal of
dependence is defined by Fine as “…taking the existence of the one to depend upon that
of the other.”228 The modal construal of dependence is then defined by him as “…it is
necessary that if the one item has its ‘being’ then so does the other.”229 The combination
of these two senses of dependence then leads to the account in which “One thing x will
depend upon another y just in case it is necessary that y exists if x exists.” Fine then
proceeds to argue that this existential/modal construal of the dependence relationship is
precisely what Aristotle means by priority in nature by arguing that “…the obvious way
to construe [Aristotle] is by reference to the notions of existence and modality.” 230
However, this construal of the priority in nature relationship is by no means the
only interpretation of Aristotle’s claim. Peramatzis argues that Aristotle has an
essentialist notion of ontological independence and thus of priority in nature.231
According to Peramatzis, the priority relation expressed here concerns the ‘what it is to
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essentially be A’ rather than the existential independence of A. So Peramatzis argues that
ontological priority or priority in nature should be understood as the following: A is
ontologically prior to B if and only if A can be what it essentially is independently of B
being what it is, while the converse is not the case.”232 Peramatzis argues that this is the
case precisely because the existential construal of priority by nature does not make sense
of some of the examples that Aristotle uses in order illustrate what he means by priority
in nature. For instance, Peramatzis points out that substantial forms are clearly
ontologically prior to the particular compounds that they inform, but it is nevertheless the
case that substantial forms require the body in order to exist. In fact, substantial forms
are the kinds of things that in order to exist at all, there must also exist a body which is
informed by their corresponding substantial form. But the existential/modal construal of
ontological priority would necessarily imply just this point, namely that substantial
forms, being ontologically prior, necessarily are able to exist without their corresponding
bodies. This is just not the case in the Aristotelian ontology, and thus Peramatzis argues
that we must modify our understanding of ontological priority and rather see it as a claim
regarding the priority of the essence of a thing in relation to that to which it is prior.
However, Peramatzis’ interpretation is clearly not the only interpretation that
Aristotle intends by identifying ontological priority or priority in nature. There are clear
instances that Aristotle does seem to me to defend a type of ontological priority that does
indeed imply the existential variety. The hand for instance, which is by the by the very
example that Aristotle uses in the Politics passage we are considering, does not exist if
the human soul does not exist. But on the other hand, the human soul can exist even if
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the body which it informs does not possess any hands.233 This leads then to admitting
that Aristotle seems to have several senses of this type of priority in mind as well.
Following Emily Katz, I distinguish at least four senses of the priority that Aristotle
seems to intend.234 The first of the four senses states that A’s existence is a necessary
condition for B’s existence, but not conversely. Secondly, A’s existence is a cause of B’s
existence, but not conversely. Thirdly, A’s essential being is a necessary condition for
B’s essential being, but not conversely. And fourthly, A being what it is is a cause of B’s
being what it is, but not conversely. The question of what kind of priority then seems to
be more involved than simply assuming that the priority of the polis is of the ontological
variety.
4. The Ontological Priority of the Polis

Miller believes then that the priority thesis as it is understood by Keyt involves
interpreting priority according to the fifth sense just outlined, the ontological or
separateness sense. The problem that Miller has with this interpretation of the priority
thesis is that, as has already been pointed out, it firstly seems to lead to the totalitarian
impulses that Barnes and Taylor indicate in their analysis of the thesis. Miller states
explicitly that such an interpretation inevitably understands the polis as a ‘social
organism,’ much like the Hegelian understanding of the political community.235 This of
course leads not only to the thesis that a person cannot be a person at all outside of the
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polis, but also that the polis has the kind of jurisdiction over the individual as the person
has over their own hand. Secondly, Miller agrees with Keyt on the point that such a
thesis is inconsistent with Aristotle’s own metaphysical commitments. Just as a painter
does not cease to be a painter if they are missing their paint and canvass, so a person does
not cease to be a person if they are missing the opportunity to actualize those essential
aspects of humanity such as the social and practical reason that Aristotle examines so
extensively in the Nicomachean Ethics.
On the other hand, Miller believes that the priority thesis defended by Aristotle
should be understood according to what Miller calls “priority in completeness.”236
Something X is prior in completeness to another thing Y just in case X is more perfect or
actualized or realized then Y. Given Aristotle’s commitment to teleology, this sense of
priority can best be understood as recognizing that a thing can be closer to actualizing its
own nature than another, and it is the nature of that thing as its form that represents the
truest sense of that thing. So, a cub may be prior in generation to the adult bear, but the
adult bear is prior in completeness to the cub. The cub still needs to actualize what is at
the moment merely potential, and such an actualization represents the manifestation of
the nature that the cub already possesses. So the bear on the other hand already possesses
in actuality that which is only potent in the cub. This is what makes the bear, or of course
any other adult life form, prior in this sense to the cub.
Miller takes the priority argument to argue that the relationship between
individual persons and the polis is the analogue of the relationship between the hand and
the whole of which it is a part. It is not the case for Miller that the individual person
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ceases to be a human being when outside the polis. Rather, the part when separated from
the whole cannot perform its defining function, which therefore implies that the part as
such is not self-sufficient. The whole is self-sufficient and is therefore according to
Miller “…prior (in completeness) to the part.”237 The individual human being therefore,
when separated from the polis, is not self-sufficient, and as a part of the polis, this implies
that the individual when separated is not able to perform its defining function. Since the
polis is self-sufficient, this implies that the polis is prior in completeness to the
individual.
Trevor Saunders, in his commentary on the first two books of the Politics, also
argues that this is what Aristotle means by claiming that the polis is prior to the
individual. Saunders states that “Though the state is of course chronologically later than
its parts, it is ‘prior by nature’ to them in having been immanent in them as the structured
unity, the end or form, to which they naturally developed historically.”238 Saunders
believes that Miller is correct in asserting that the kind of priority that Aristotle intends is
not simply the basic ontological priority that Keyt and the others defend. He believes that
Aristotle sees the polis as a complete actualization of what is there in the parts of the
polis, including the individual. Saunders also believes that, with Miller, the human being
does not cease to exist when separated from the polis, like the hand does when separated
from the body. Rather Saunders states that “…a man cut off from a state suffers
functional impairment, and his happiness diminishes. He can indeed exist outside a state
(the analogy of the severed and therefore dead hand does not imply he would be dead),
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but not in his complete and functional fulfilment…”239 Miller and Saunders therefore
understand the priority relationship between the polis and the individual as one which
implies completeness and self-sufficiency. So the priority of the polis does not indicate
the ontological relationship that Keyt and the others believe.
Furthermore, Miller believes that the claim that the human being does not cease to
exist when separated from the polis gains some justification once one recognizes that
Aristotle understands this separation of the individual from the polis as producing a
corruption rather than a simple ceasing to exist. Aristotle uses the participle διαφθαρεῖσα
in the argument concerning priority and what happens to the thing which is separated
from the whole of which it is a part. The relevant passage as a whole in Greek is stated
thusly “τὸ γὰρ ὅλον πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ μέρους· ἀναιρουμένου γὰρ τοῦ ὅλου
οὐκ ἔσται ποὺς οὐδὲ χείρ, εἰ μὴ ὁμωνύμως, ὥσπερ εἴ τις λέγοι τὴν λιθίνην (διαφθαρεῖσα
γὰρ ἔσται τοιαύτη)…”240 Miller argues that διαφθαρεῖσα here does not necessarily mean
to be destroyed, but rather merely to be corrupted. It is this corruption which occurs to
the individual when separated from the whole polis that marks the polis to be prior to the
individual. Miller believes that this interpretation of διαφθαρεῖσα is especially relevant
once one considers that later in the same book of the Politics Aristotle uses the same term
to contrast things that are in a corrupted state with things that are in a natural state.
Aristotle argues that “But then we must look for the intentions of nature in things which
retain their nature, and not in things which are corrupted (diaphtharmena). And therefore
we must study the man who is in the most perfect state both of body and soul, for in him
we shall see the true relation of the two; although in bad or corrupted natures the body
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will often appear to rule over the soul, because they are in an evil and unnatural
condition.”241 What this indicates for the interpreter is that one does not necessarily have
to understand Aristotle here as arguing that the human being as such is necessarily
destroyed when separated from the polis. Rather, the human being, and specifically the
nature of the human being, is corrupted when separated. Thus for Miller the argument
“…obviously assures that human beings can exist in an imperfect, debased, corrupted
condition.”242 So the priority thesis that Aristotle defends can be understood as the kind
of priority which represents completeness, and with it self-sufficiency. The polis is
obviously complete and self-sufficient, and the individual human being is not precisely
because the individual person is corrupted outside of the polis, and the individual requires
the polis in order to function and actualize the potencies found in their nature.243 Thus
the individual is posterior in completeness to the polis.
Miller believes then that his interpretation of the priority thesis allows him to
answer the objections to the priority thesis that Keyt and Taylor raised, namely that it is
in some sense inconsistent according to Aristotle’s own principles for Aristotle to claim
that the human being is posterior to the polis even though Aristotle claims as much. One
would be able to answer such a charge precisely because one is able to understand the
priority claim according to a different sense of priority than the one which Keyt and
Taylor take to be Aristotle’s understanding of priority. As we have seen, Taylor argues
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that the priority thesis justifies a master-slave conception of the ruler and ruled
relationship for the state as such. However, because Aristotle recognizes firstly that the
master slave relationship is only one type of rule, and since, unlike the master slave
relationship, the polis is partly there for the eudaimonia of the individuals within the
polis, the priority thesis is inconsistent with Aristotle’s ethical-political theory in general.
Keyt believes that the priority thesis, on the other hand, is inconsistent with Aristotle’s
general ontology, in that a substance such as a human does not cease to exist when
accidentally separated from a polis, unlike a hand which clearly does cease to exist as
such when separated. Miller’s solution is simply to understand the priority thesis in a
different light, and according to a different sense of priority that nevertheless is still
acknowledged by Aristotle in his discussions of the meaning of priority.
Miller seems to me to be correct in some sense here, although I also believe that
his interpretation of the priority thesis is problematic. One of the issues with Miller’s
argument is that once one takes the passage just cited with the context of the overall
argument that Aristotle is providing concerning priority in Politics I 2, it seems
reasonable to believe, as Keyt and Taylor clearly believe, that Aristotle is not simply
stating that the polis is complete and self-sufficient and the individual is not. As I have
already noted, Aristotle first compares the priority of the polis with the priority which
exists between a hand and the whole of which it is a part. Now, it takes some convincing
then to understand Aristotle as interpreting the separation of the individual from the
whole as not being identical to the separation of the hand from the whole. For Aristotle
states that the priority that he is talking about is much like the priority of the body to the
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part, and that since things are defined in terms of their function, it follows that the loss of
this function entails that the thing itself has ceased to exist as it once was.
Despite acknowledging the context of the passage in which we find the priority
thesis, I nevertheless think that Miller is correct to emphasize the loss of the ability to
function outside of the polis. And in defense of Miller’s thesis, Aristotle explicitly states
that an individual separated from the polis by nature is not a human being, but he also
states that when separated from the polis by accident the human being does not
necessarily cease to be a human being. Specifically, Aristotle states that “And he who by
nature and not by mere accident is without a state, is either a bad man or above humanity;
he is like the ‘Tribeless, lawless, hearthless one,’ whom Homer denounces…”244 This
claim by itself seems to vindicate Miller’s claim that Aristotle is not speaking here of
ontological priority such as that which holds in the relation between a part of a substance
and the whole substance as such. Aristotle also explicitly states that self-sufficiency is
the important point that he is emphasizing concerning the priority of the polis. It is the
fact that the individual is not self-sufficient outside of the polis which makes the
individual posterior to the polis.245 Aquinas, in his commentary on the passage, seems to
also agree with this point regarding self-sufficiency and the necessity of a polis for the
individual by stating that “And if someone should need nothing, being self-sufficient, as
it were, and so should not be part of a political community, the individual is superior to
human beings, for such a one is a kind of god, as it were.”246 Aquinas here is precisely
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indicating what Miller has also argued concerning the priority thesis. The individual
requires the polis in order to actualize and ultimately achieve eudaimonia.247 But the
polis does not require the individual in order to achieve its end, which for a polis would
constitute one of the ideal political communities discussed by Aristotle.248 The priority
thesis then certainly is connected to the self-sufficiency of the individual, and Miller is
correct to point this out.
However, it is not simply self-sufficiency as such that completely defines
Aristotle’s use of priority here. For if we are to take self-sufficiency to simply mean
survival or the ability to live outside of the polis, Aristotle certainly believes that this is
possible for human beings outside of the polis. Rather complete self-sufficiency
represents the ability for a human being to actualize their nature, including that part of
their nature which is social and rational, or the logos-sociality component of what it
means to be a human being for Aristotle. Simply surviving is not living the human life,
but is rather closer to the life of beasts and animals. But outside of the polis, it is not
possible for the individual to actualize these components of human nature. Miller also
believes that his interpretation can account for this point as well. Miller states that there
are three successive stages of potentialities and actualizations for Aristotle.249 There is
first of all the young child, who certainly has the capacity to acquire the ethical and moral
virtues of action and desire as well as the rational virtues, both the practical and the
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theoretical.250 The child has these potentialities precisely because of the human nature
that the child possesses, which of course in turn explains why it is that the child will be
expected to be able to acquire these virtues and also why a tree sapling for instance would
not possess this potentiality. The child then grows into a healthy adult and acquires these
virtues through being habituated in the right way and through careful studying. This
person then has the third stage of actually carrying out these virtues through action and
engagement. What we can see here is that in order for this person to acquire the higher
stage it is necessary for them to be in a community which allows for or provides the
capability for the actualization of the corresponding potentialities that the child possesses.
This is of course the case when considering how to reach the second stage, as it is simply
not possible to acquire the virtues enumerated by Aristotle on one’s own, unless of course
the person in question is more than human and rather is something divine. But of course,
in order to carry out and engage in the activities that constitute the realization of any of
the virtues, one must be in a situation in which one is capable of engaging in the first
place. But the only way in which one is given the capability is within the confines of a
political community of some sort. The political community which provides all of the
conditions necessary for virtuous activity is of course the polis, and thus the polis is
necessary for an individual to reach a higher stage of development.
However, although I believe that Miller’s argument is correct in some important
senses, especially regarding the lack of self-sufficiency on the part of the individual who
is outside of the polis, and the fact that such an individual is corrupted when outside of a
polis, it still does not strictly speaking correctly conform to Aristotle’s own analysis of
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what priority means for him. As we have seen, Aristotle designates several senses of
priority. And in the passages that mention these senses of priority, there is indeed a sense
which can be construed as teleological. However, the teleological sense of priority is one
which involves the posterior entity aiming at an end which is represented by the prior
entity. So the bear cub is posterior to the adult bear in a teleological sense precisely
because the adult bear represents the end toward which the cub is aiming at. All
movements that are essentially ordered for Aristotle are ordered in such a way as they
aim at an end, which itself explains both the potentiality that exists and the actualization
of that potentiality which proceeds to aim at the actuality that it is attempting to acquire.
All of this is standard fare as far as Aristotle is concerned, but I do not see how the selfsufficiency interpretation provided by Miller and Saunders can be understood according
to this sense of priority. The polis may very well be considered the aim of the other
political organizations like the household and the village, and thus can be understood to
be prior to these communities in the teleological sense. But the individual, although
certainly a political animal, is nevertheless aiming at something other than simply the
polis. The aim of the individual is rather eudaimonia, which is the actualization of the
various natural capacities of the human being. What this involves of course is the
acquiring of the various virtues of character as well as the virtues associated with
practical reason.251 This is the aim of the potentialities associated with the human being
and which Aristotle explicitly recognizes. However, the teleological sense of priority
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involves understanding the potentiality or capacity in terms of the actuality that it is
aiming at, and although the human being is certainly understood by Aristotle to be a
political animal, the aim of the natural capacities of the human being is not the polis as
such, but rather the various virtues identified by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics.
Rather than simply understanding the priority thesis to entail the self-sufficiency
interpretation defended by Miller and Saunders, it seems more appropriate then to take
Aristotle to have in mind the ontological or natural sense of priority. I think that this is
the right interpretation of the priority thesis for two reasons. Firstly, it better accords
with Aristotle’s actual explanation of the priority thesis in Politics I 2. As we have seen,
Aristotle states that the polis is prior to the human being much like the body is prior to the
hand. When the hand is separated, it loses its function or capacity to be a hand, and thus
retains only the shape of a hand. The kind of relationship that is expressed here is clearly
the ontological sense of priority that Aristotle discusses in other passages. Secondly, the
self-sufficient interpretation of priority is not explicitly identified by Aristotle in his
discussions concerning priority. Aristotle recognizes a teleological sense of priority, but
as we have seen something is prior to another thing in this sense through the fact that the
potentialities of the posterior thing require an actuality to aim at as an end. But the kind
of relationship expressed by the polis and individual is not of this sort.
It must be admitted though that Miller’s emphasis on self-sufficiency and function
is an important aspect of the kind of priority that Aristotle is attempting to defend in the
Politics. I think that his emphasis on the corruption of the individual which occurs when
the individual is outside of a polis is also a good one. However, the priority that Aristotle
is insisting upon in the passage seems to be an ontological one, rather than simply one
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emphasizing self-sufficiency or completion. We have already marked several senses of
ontological priority, and I believe that of the four senses identified the first sense, in that
A’s existence is a necessary condition for B’s existence but not conversely, is the sense
that Aristotle is defending in the Politics passage. Aristotle is arguing here that the polis
is necessary for the functioning of human beings. As we saw in the last chapter, the very
act of logos/sociality produces an emergent entity called the household whose aim is then
fulfilled through the emergence of the polis. In other words, in order for a human being
to achieve the good life, and even to function at all in an essential manner, the polis must
exist as a condition for the functioning. I believe that the first sense of the ontological
sense of priority is correct precisely through the fact that the other senses of ontological
priority do not quite accurately describe the relationship that exists between the polis and
the individual for Aristotle. The essence of the human being, or its form/nature, is not
caused by nor explained by the polis, and the polis does not in itself cause the existence
of the human being. Rather, the polis is an emergent entity which comes about through
the discussions of the good and bad life which thereby provides a framework through
which the good life can be achieved. It is therefore best to understand Aristotle here as
stating that the polis is a necessary condition for the existence of individual human
beings.
Of course, at this point it is relevant to return to the criticism provided by Keyt.
Recall that Keyt states that the ontological understanding of the priority thesis is not
consistent with Aristotle’s understanding of priority in his other writings. Keyt states that
the carpenter without her tools is nevertheless still a carpenter, and that this Aristotelian
principle flatly contradicts the priority thesis. However, I do not believe that the
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carpenter analysis is an accurate depiction of what Aristotle is attempting to defend here.
Carpentry is a type of productive knowledge, and the carpenter is therefore defined by
possessing this type of knowledge.252 Aristotle describes craft knowledge or productive
knowledge by saying that “A craft, then, as we said, is some sort of state involving true
reason concerned with production…”253 To know how to do the productive work
involved with being a carpenter is the condition necessary for someone being a carpenter.
So I agree with Keyt’s assessment that for Aristotle the carpenter without her tools
remains a carpenter despite the fact that she cannot practice her knowledge regarding
carpentry, or in other words despite the fact that she cannot fulfill the function of
carpentry. However, when it concerns human beings, it is also recognized by Aristotle
that the very function and nature of what it is to be human is to act rationally, and to do
so in a practical manner. Without the ability to do this the life that can be led by such an
individual can only be one that resembles the lower animals or beasts. The difference
between the carpenter without tools, and the individual without a polis is that the
carpenter still retains the knowledge of doing carpentry. This possession of the relevant
knowledge is precisely what makes the carpenter remain a carpenter despite the fact that
the carpenter is unable to do her essential activity of carpentry. However, what makes a
human being live a human life is, for Aristotle, to live the life involving logos/sociality,
or to live a life involving practical reason. The goal of such a life is of course to attain
practical wisdom, but what is important for the purposes of the argument here is precisely
that the human life consists in the practical rational activities that constitute

For Aristotle’s distinction between the different types of knowing see Nicomachean Ethics VI
ἡ μὲν οὖν τέχνη, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ἕξις τις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική ἐστιν, Nicomachean Ethics VI 4
1140a20.
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logos/sociality. It is not the case that the human being remains human and therefore lives
a human life outside of the polis, precisely because practical knowledge and its activity
consists in actually practicing and acting it out. Without the ability to do this, the
individual seems to merely resemble a human being and thus can be justifiably described
by Aristotle as being a human being homonomously.
The difference of course between the separated hand and the separated individual
is that there is the possibility for the individual to live a human life even after being
separated from the polis. Acknowledging this point seems to lead to also agreeing with
Miller in saying that it might be better to understand Aristotle as arguing that the
separated individual is in a ‘corrupted’ state, rather than simply being destroyed
altogether.254 As we saw, Aristotle uses this term in the very passage we are examining,
and I think that it is a better one to describe the unique situation of an animal who
requires a political community to truly express itself as such but is found to be outside or
separated from the community.
What is important to add to this account however is the fact that the expression of
the logos-sociality aspect of human nature is what, according to the argument given in the
fourth chapter, leads to the existence of a polis, in that the polis emerges from the
practical and social actions of individuals as they discuss the good and the bad and the
just and the unjust. According to my view, the polis is natural precisely because it is a
part and manifestation of these activities, and it constitutes a part of the very expression
of these aspects of human nature. So how is it that the polis is able to be prior according
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I do not have the room in this dissertation to analyze all of the ways in which Aristotle understands
corruption as opposed to simply being destroyed in the rest of the corpus. It suffices for the argument here
though that Aristotle does indeed make a distinction, and we can see that he does in the Politics I 5 passage
quoted both earlier in this chapter as well as by Miller.
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to my view? My answer is that priority according to the first sense of ontological priority
identified earlier allows us to see that the priority in question is one in which the
individual is only able to achieve their end through the means provided by the polis, and
that the polis is able to provide such means through emerging from the logos-sociality
aspect of human nature. What this also allows us to do is to see that the human being is
corrupted in a very important and meaningful sense when separated from the polis, and
that it is much like the hand when separated from the whole of which it was a part in that
the human being for the most part ceases to exist as a human outside of the polis since
she cannot practice those essential aspects of what it is to be human, namely the activities
of practical reason. The difference between the hand and the individual is that the
individual does not cease altogether to exist in an unqualified fashion as a human being
when separated from the polis. However, the individual is not able to express their social
and practical potentialities which also implies that they are de facto outside of a polis or
at the very least a political/social community such as the family unit. So, although they
remain human beings simpliciter, they are much like the stone hand that Aristotle
mentions in that almost every aspect of what it means to be a human being for Aristotle is
missing, and the person in question would be living a life more similar to a beast than to
anything that one might recognize as being distinctly human. This allows us to
understand Aristotle’s notion of priority in relation to the polis and the individual as
being an ontological one, since it is a fact that a human being virtually ceases to be
human outside of the confines of polis, which itself necessarily emerges from the
essential activities of human life. I would argue that then that a person who is even
accidentally outside of the polis is not able to really live anything like a human life, and is
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thus not really human except in technical sense. The difference, just to emphasize, is that
the ostracized or separated person does not absolutely cease to be human, but
nevertheless resembles that of a beast more than that of a human being.
An example which will flesh out the thesis that I am defending here is also one
that is frequently discussed both by Aristotle and by a large part of the interpretive
literature on this topic. The example I have in mind is Philoctetes in the play by the same
name written by Sophocles. The play describes the events and fate of the character
Philoctetes during the events of the Trojan war. Nine years before the play begins,
Philoctetes is abandoned on the desert island Lemnos. The reason for his abandonment is
due to a snake bite that Philoctetes received which was found to be incurable, and which
festered. The snakebite proceeded to cause constant pain and began to fester, which
accordingly convinced the Greeks who were on their way to Troy to abandon Philoctetes
rather than having to put up with the noisome pain that the wound clearly caused in
Philoctetes. The play itself then tells of the visions of a seer who declared that the Greeks
would not be able to take Troy without the famous bow of Philoctetes, which was left
with Philoctetes on the desert island nine years previously. The Greeks, led by Odysseus,
decided to go back to the deserted island and take possession of the bow that they left
behind. Odysseus, the infamous wordsmith, thought it best to trick Philoctetes into
coming back with them to Troy, and afterword simply admits that he merely wants the
bow, and does not care what happens to Philoctetes the person. After becoming aware of
the plot, Philoctetes’ bow is taken from him by Neoptolemus and the latter is about to set
sail with Odysseus back to Troy and once again abandon Philoctetes on the island
without a means to even survive given the festering wound which has nearly crippled
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him. At the last minute however, Neoptolemus decides that it is best to give back the
bow to Philoctetes despite Odysseus’ warnings that doing so would mean that
Neoptolemus is a traitor. After Neoptolemus gives the bow back Philoctetes then sees a
vision in heaven of Heracles, his ancestor, who convinces Philoctetes to return with the
Greeks to Troy and fight with them to take the city.
Aristotle is quite familiar with the play as he references it several times
throughout the corpus.255 Keyt uses the play as an example of how Aristotle is
contradicting his own doctrine when he states that the polis is prior to the individual, in
that Aristotle is forced to admit that Philoctetes remains a human being even when left
alone on the deserted island by those whom he considered to be his friends and
compatriots. Keyt states that “Thus by Aristotle’s own principles Philoctetes while living
in isolation remains a human being.”256 But as we have seen, the priority that Aristotle is
speaking of here is not identical to the part/whole priority of an organic being as Keyt
believes. Rather Aristotle is arguing that there is an important aspect found in the
relationship between a hand and the body which allows us to better understand the
relationship between the individual and the larger political community of which he is a
part, and the hand/body relation illuminates this important aspect.
Miller argues then that Philoctetes indeed remains human, but since we are to
understand the priority thesis to imply that the polis is prior in completeness, indicating
that the polis is necessary for the individual to actualize his/her capacities and
potentialities, Aristotle can hold that Philoctetes remains human, but in a lesser way.
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Contrary to Keyt, Miller argues that “If we recognize different levels or degrees of being
human, then there is a plausible sense in which a Philoctetes stalled…has failed to realize
his humanness and is ‘less than human.’”257 This understanding of the priority thesis
seems to be borne out by the way Sophocles depicts Philoctetes after years of separation
from the political community of which he was a part. While Neoptolemus is searching
the island for Philoctetes, the chorus of sailors describe the state that Philoctetes is in by
saying that “O how piteous thy lot, luckless man, by man forgot; none thy solitude to
share, none to tend with loving care; plagued and stricken by disease, never knowing
hour of ease, facing death each moment, how hast, poor wretch, endured till now?”258
The chorus proceeds to describe Philoctetes as resembling a wild beast, which in turn
lends support to Aristotle’s claim that a person outside of a polis is like a beast. Now
what the play also shows us however is that Philoctetes is not simply a beast, or that he
has absolutely lost his humanity. Rather, his condition is corrupted in so far as he is
unable to act on those essentials of what it is to be a human being, especially the social
and political aspects of being human. Without these, what is left is simply the base parts
of being an animal with the higher parts of the human soul stalled and unable to be
expressed in any concrete way.
Crucially however, Philoctetes does not cease to be a human altogether, and this
is marked by the first meeting between Neoptolemus and Philoctetes when Philoctetes is
overjoyed to hear someone speak to him again. Philoctetes expresses his joy by saying
“O welcome utterance! Ah, how good to hear those accents, long unheard, from one like

Miller, Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle’s Politics, 53.
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thee! What quest, my son, what venture brought thee here, what breeze compelled thy
canvas? Happy breeze! Speak, tell me all, that I may know my friend.”259 What occurs in
the rest of the play, the deception and trickery and Philoctetes’ final decision to go with
his bow to Troy bears out the re-actualized logos-sociality that Philoctetes is experiencing
once again. Cherry and Goerner argue that this experience bears out not only a different
understanding of the priority thesis than the one that Keyt defends, but that it also shows
us just how Aristotle would have conceived the thesis that human beings are by nature
political animals.260
The political animal is in an important sense corrupted by being outside of a polis,
even if this person is found to be without a polis by accident. This corruption is what is
meant to be illustrated by the hand analogy that Aristotle uses to depict the kind of
relationship that persists between the part and the whole when it comes to the polis and
the individual. This corruption does not, as Keyt imagines, imply precisely the same type
of priority as the one which exists between a hand and the body of which it is a part.
There is technically a human being left over when separated from the polis, like
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Philoctetes stranded on the island, but the human being is firstly not able to express his
own nature fully in such a position, and secondly as a result of this he will be corrupted
and not able to really be a human being in any meaningful way. With Aquinas and
Miller, I believe that it is better to understand this priority in terms of the ability for a
human being to realize itself, and that the lack of being able to do this implies living the
life of a beast rather than of a human being. All of this best fits with the ontological
sense of priority that I have identified above. Understanding priority in this way allows
us to see that the polis is essential to living a human life, so that without a polis a human
being will be barely human and almost a human in name only. The difference is however
that, as we have seen with Philoctetes, a human being is capable of becoming a
participant in a political community once again and thereby actualizing their logossociality once they are a part of a community which allows for such activities to take
place.
5. Is Aristotle a Totalitarian?261

In regard to the claim that the priority thesis implies a justification of
totalitarianism, I argue that it is mistaken to simply assume that Aristotle believed the
state should have control over every aspect of one’s life, which is the definition of
totalitarianism that I assume Barnes has in mind. Not only does the Nicomachean Ethics
recognize the importance of acquiring the right habits without explicitly mentioning
anything like the fact that these habits and virtues are acquired exclusively through the
laws and legislative acts of the state, but Aristotle seems to recognize at points that any
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This section is not intended to be an exhaustive argument/defense of Aristotle political theory. I am
rather simply pointing out that for Aristotle the priority thesis did not necessarily imply the kind of
totalitarianism that Barnes, Keyt and Taylor seem to argue.
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state which in fact does legislate concerning every aspect of an individual life is not a
good state. An example of Aristotle being against the overriding power of a state can be
found in his criticism of Plato’s utopian state defended in the Republic.262 There
Aristotle argues that it is wrong for the state to abolish the family and to abolish private
property. Aristotle goes so far in his criticism of Plato as to state that “since the nature of
a state is to be a plurality, and in tending to greater unity, from being a state, it becomes a
family, and from being a family, an individual; for the family may be said to be more one
than the state, and the individual than the family. So that we ought not to attain this
greatest unity even if we could, for it would be the destruction of the state.”263 So
Aristotle argues that the state should be understood in terms of a plurality and not a unity,
and this plurality does indicate some limits to the state’s ability to control the lives of
individuals. In general, and as we have seen, Aristotle founds the concept of the state on
the household or family unit, and believes that the family is the foundation to the state, as
it is in the household that the practical rationality of human beings begins to be practiced
and actualized. It is clear then that Aristotle would object to the state abolishing the
family, or even to some degree at the least to the state legislating and controlling the
family rather than the head of household leading the family as Aristotle clearly believes
should be the case. Aristotle also clearly objects to the elimination of private property in
this section, and complains that a state which shares all property in common would suffer
from people neglecting to care for any of it, since Aristotle believes that people care more
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for things they consider their own, and care less for things that are held in common since
they will expect others to care for those very things.
All of this simply goes against the idea that Aristotle justified and defended a
totalitarian state, since Aristotle clearly believed that there were limits to the power of the
state in regard to private property and the household. I admit though that Aristotle did
not at any point go through an exhaustive argument demonstrating what he believed
should be the limits of a state’s power to interfere in an individual life. But I believe that
his emphasis on the importance of the family and the recognition of private property at
the very least points the way to an account of the limitations of the state in order to
preserve its plurality and thus allow for the healthy development of the household/family
and thus the ability for the citizens of the state to acquire the virtues necessary for
eudaimonia. Once one recognizes the value that Aristotle has in the foundation of the
family and the happiness of the individual being acquired through the acquisition of the
right habits and the right reasoning, it follows that Aristotle did not believe that the state
should have absolute power over every aspect of an individual’s life.
And if this is true, then it also follows that Aristotle’s belief that the state is prior
to the individual was not for him an implicit justification for a totalitarian state. The
problem as far as I can see it however is that Aristotle does not anywhere in the corpus
actually discuss this problem at length, and thus leaves it an open question as to whether
and if the state would have power over a certain aspect of an individual life. The fact that
this is missing for Aristotle though does not, in my view, imply that Aristotle’s priority
thesis necessarily leads to the justification of a totalitarian state. Rather, as I have argued
throughout this chapter, the priority thesis simply emphasizes the necessity of a state for
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the realization of what is essentially human, namely the practical and rational aspects of
human nature. Without a state, the human being is unable to carry these things out, and
thus lives a life that more closely resembles the life of a beast than it does the life of a
human being.
The human being must be in a polis to live a human life, and to have the chance at
achieving eudaimonia. And given Aristotle’s account of happiness or flourishing in the
Nicomachean Ethics, the idea that the government should have total power simply flaunts
Aristotle’s own concept of human nature. It is clearly up to the individual to acquire the
virtues, and the state is there in order to facilitate this acquisition. But this does not imply
that the state has the authority and power over every aspect of the life of a citizen. How
to live one’s life is precisely for Aristotle a question of how to acquire the right habits, or
virtues. And the acquisition of these right habits is a matter of the individual and the
family just as much as it is the polis.
All of this assumes that the political community which emerges from the ethical
discussions and actions of individuals is a good community as Aristotle identifies them at
the end of the Politics. There are of course perversions of the ideal communities, and
these can emerge as well. But the perversions of the ideal communities are not what
Barnes’s critique is discussing, rather I understand him as implying that even the ideal
communities are totalitarian. But given the argument that I have just provided, I do not
think that Barnes is necessarily correct in simply stating that Aristotle is necessarily
justifying a totalitarian state. For Aristotle, the important aspects of an individual’s life,
namely those that concern the attainment of his/her happiness, are most definitely a
concern for the polis. But it is also an open question in many cases if the state actually
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should have the power to interfere in the life of an individual, especially as this concerns
the family and private property. It is therefore a mistake to simply assume that
Aristotle’s political theory is a justification of totalitarianism simpliciter.
6. Conclusion
Having defended my interpretation of Aristotle’s concept of the priority of the polis then,
it is now time to move to the conclusion of this dissertation. What I will attempt to show
is that based upon the interpretations that I have defended concerning the teleological
system in Aristotle’s writings, the cosmic nature hinted at by Aristotle in Λ 10, and the
naturalness and priority of the polis defended in Politics I 2, is that Aristotle conceived of
a broader and more complex understanding of the teleology within the cosmos then what
has usually been ascribed to him. There is indeed a cosmic nature in Aristotle marked
primarily by the fact that the entities within the cosmos are ultimately attempting to
achieve the actuality found and described by Aristotle in the Unmoved Mover, and that
the textual and philosophical explanation of this cosmic nature can be found in an
analysis of Politics I 2 and specifically through the interpretations that I have defended
regarding the ontology of the polis in Politics I 2. What I will attempt to show is that
Aristotle understood the cosmic nature in an ontological and teleological sense at least as
being comparable to his understanding of the teleology and ontology of the polis, and that
this is indicated for us by Λ 10 itself.
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CHAPTER VI

COSMIC TELEOLOGY

1. Introduction

The argument of this dissertation has so far focused upon two important and what
I believe to be interrelated subjects. In the first two chapters I discussed some issues with
the interpretation of Aristotle’s account of teleology and of specifically Physics II 8, and
Metaphysics Λ 10. In the fourth and fifth chapters I argued for a specific interpretation
of the polis, especially concerning its naturalness and its priority over that of the
individual. The aim of these chapters was very restricted however, and that was to offer
an interpretation of Aristotle’s account of the polis that could provide the framework for
an interpretation of Λ 10 and of Aristotle’s brief hints at a teleological system which
extends beyond the teleology involved in the actualization of individual natures.
Therefore, whatever may be the consequences of the arguments that I have provided in
the previous chapters, the aim of these chapters was first and foremost an attempt to
provide a reading of Λ 10, and secondarily of Physics II 8. In this chapter, I intend to
provide this reading of which this dissertation has established what I believe is the
framework. Concerning the particular structure of the cosmic teleology, a further
explication of such a topic would require a deeper and more thorough analysis of the
natural works of Aristotle and in particular the biological works. Such an account would
neither be justified by the specific arguments I have given in this dissertation, nor would I
be able to give a satisfactory account of the specifics of an Aristotelian cosmic structure
without a lengthy treatment of the relevant works. The goal of this chapter then is to
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merely show that a cosmic structure or order is defensible from the corpus, and that the
interpretive moves that I have made in this dissertation allow for a reading that can
provide the framework necessary for a further exploration of the cosmic order mentioned
in Λ 10.
2. Λ 10 Interpretations
I have shown in this dissertation that the interpretation of the 10th chapter of book
Λ in Aristotle’s Metaphysics has been unsuccessfully interpreted by modern scholarship.
Aristotle clearly claims in the relevant passage that there is a ‘nature of the whole’ which
contains a good. Aristotle of course asks in what way the good is contained in this nature
of the whole, but he does not apparently or explicitly question if the whole does indeed
possess a good at all. On the contrary, Aristotle argues that the whole possesses the good
in both ways, but just as an army relies more on the good found in its leader so the
cosmos possesses the good more as a separate thing then in its order. However, it is vital
here to admit and understand Aristotle’s claim that although the good is certainly found
as a separate entity, it is also found in the order or arrangement of the whole. In the third
chapter, I have attempted to explain precisely how I understand these claims. In
summary, I argued that the good as a separate entity is clearly to be identified as the
Unmoved Mover found in the discussions of Metaphysics Λ. In my discussion
concerning the accepted account of a natural object and the four causes found in the
Aristotelian corpus I indicated there that it is vital to understand that the final cause
represented the good at which every entity strives. This good then is identified and
understood through the nature or form that that entity possesses. So, if we are to
understand the good of a kitten for example, we should look at the adult cat. This will
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allow one not only to understand the good toward which the kitten is striving, but also
explain metaphysically the movements and actualizations of the kitten itself. But of
course, this does not completely explain the fact that this sort of actualization happens at
all, but rather simply explains how it is that a life form will develop given the right
conditions. The fact that it happens at all is because Aristotle’s teleology is theocentric,
in the sense that every entity strives to attain and become, in so far as it is able, the
Unmoved Mover.264 I have shown in the third chapter that the separate good that
Aristotle acknowledges in Λ 10 is in fact that unmoved mover, and that this makes sense
for Aristotle of the very fact that there is motion at all. And, of course, these motions are
inherently and fundamentally teleological, so that every entity strives toward a separate
good which is found in an entity which exists beyond the natural world, namely the
Unmoved Mover. Every entity then has a proximate good toward which it strives, and
which is identified as the end dictated by the nature that that entity possesses. But
everything in the cosmos also indeed strives to attain a good in the unmoved mover as
pure act, and which is separate from the natural itself. I argue that this explains why it is
that there is motion at all, and why it is fundamentally that creatures strive to attain the
various ends that they pursue.
However, Aristotle in my view also argues that there is a structure within the
cosmos which is also to be accounted for in his metaphysical system. I argued in the
third chapter that Aristotle’s account of the nature of the whole is not simply a sloppy
description of all the entities within the cosmos. It is rather an explicit acknowledgement
of an ordered structure within the cosmos. This ordered structure of course is described

I borrow this term from Sedley. For his discussion of it see Sedley, “Is Aristotle’s Teleology
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by Aristotle through his use of analogies, in which he compares the order of the cosmos
to the order that is exhibited by an army and a household. I argued that an army is an
organized structure composed of various units whose function is only possible though the
cooperation of the other units within the army. The general is responsible for the
cooperation and organization of the army, but each unit within the army is able to
perform its specific function due to the organization which the army possesses as well as
due to the general who directs the army towards its goal of victory. The organization of
an army then is precisely one of the aspects that Aristotle is emphasizing in explaining
the nature of the whole referred to in Λ 10. Just as the excellence of an army is in part
determined by the organization it possesses, which in turn allows for the various units
within the army to perform their respective functions satisfactorily, the cosmos possesses
such an order and organization.
Aristotle also compares the whole with a household, which provides another
useful analogy for what I argue to be the organization of the cosmos. The head of the
household is that at which all the other members of the household strive to become. The
other members are unable to become such a one merely because of their respective
natures, but not because they do not seek to be the head of the household in actuality. As
was discussed in the third chapter, this is not to say that the members of the household
nor the entities within the cosmos seek to eliminate themselves in an effort to become
something other than what they are. Rather, the seeking at actuality provides the causal
explanation for their actualizations in the first place. And for Aristotle, the head of the
household represents the highest stage of actuality that a human being can possess, so it
stands to reason that Aristotle also held that the other members of the household seek the
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same kind of actuality that the head of the household possesses, but that due to their
specific natures they are unable to achieve that kind of actuality, and are thus capable
only of imitating the head of the household by actualizing their own specific natures.265
And the household also requires an organization in order for the respective members to
successfully fulfill their particular functions. Both of these aspects of a household then
are to be understood as also applying to the cosmos as a whole, as I have already
demonstrated.
What these analogies show us then, and what I have attempted to defend, is that it
is very unlikely that the correct interpretation of Λ 10 is one which attempts to simply
dismiss the reference to a nature of a whole. For Aristotle, any purposeful order that is
found, whether it is in relation to individual animal bodies or in relation to the ordered
structure involved in certain communities that some animals construct, must be accounted
for and is not simply a mere accident. The fact is that the cosmos for Aristotle is an
ordered whole, and this is clearly indicated in the passage that we are considering. The
main thrust of my argument then is that this position that I am defending has been
generally ignored for primarily two reasons.266 Firstly, it has been assumed that there is
no account of this ‘nature of the whole’ elsewhere, and especially that there is no account
of nature specifically within the corpus that can account for the sense of nature that
Aristotle seems to be using here. Secondly, even if there were to be some larger cosmic

Once again, this ontology assumes Aristotle’s specific views on the role of women and slaves within the
household. However unfortunate and repugnant this view of human beings is, it is, according to my
reading, a useful analogy for understanding Aristotle’s views concerning the nature of the whole.
266
There are exceptions to the general dismissal of a ‘nature of the whole.’ For instance, both Sedley and
Scharle accept that there is a cosmic nature being defended here to some degree. However, their arguments
regarding Aristotle’s understanding of the cosmic nature fail to account for what Aristotle states here, or
simply do not provide enough of an explanation for how Aristotle can conceive of the cosmic nature given
his other claims within the corpus.
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order being hinted at here, such an assertion would fly in the face of much of what
Aristotle has to say in regard to his ontology. Not only, the argument goes, is there no
account of nature that would adequately explain Aristotle’s assertion that there is a
‘nature of the whole,’ but such an entity as a cosmic whole would seemingly have to be a
substance understood in the Aristotelian variety. And given Aristotle’s account of
substance, in which each part is defined as such precisely because it is a part of the
whole, like a hand to the body of which it is a part, it would seemingly follow that if we
are to accept Aristotle’s assertion of a ‘nature of the whole,’ then we would also be
forced to accept the claim that Aristotle’s cosmos is one substance, and that each part of
the cosmos is merely a part like the hand is a part, so that each part possesses a function
and purpose to benefit and work toward the end of the whole cosmic substance. But this
would fly in the face of Aristotle’s account of substances in his other works, most
especially the Categories, the De Anima, the Metaphysics, and the biological works.
Whatever one believes about Aristotle’s account of substance, the fact that he believed
that individual life forms were substances is almost undeniable. But the cosmic order
thesis that I am defending would seemingly make the various substances of the world
merely parts, and thus by Aristotle’s own definition, not substances. These then are the
reasons I would argue that the thesis that I am defending here has been for the most part
ignored or dismissed by the commentators.
3. The Ontology of the Polis

Instead of abandoning the cosmic order thesis as a result of the issues just
mentioned, I believe that Aristotle provides for us in this passage an explanation of what
he means by the ‘nature of the whole.’ As we saw, Aristotle compares the good that
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exists in the whole, as well as how the separate good exists in relation to the cosmos, with
the order exhibited by an army and a household. It is the household analogy that allows
us to understand Aristotle’s account of the cosmic order. The army analogy, although
useful to see just how it is that Aristotle conceives of the order and how it allows each
entity within the cosmos to achieve its good and also strive for the UMM, fails to fully
explain how the whole represents a nature in Aristotelian terms. The army is an artifact,
and as an artifact it does not possess an internal principle which explains its existence.
Rather the form of an army, its size and organization, is established by something
external, both locally and in form, to the army itself. Thus an army needs to be formed
through the result of a productive capacity of an entity whose form is other than what the
army possesses itself. The cosmos cannot be an artifact like this, as there is nothing in
the Aristotelian world that can explain its existence in the way that artifacts are explained
by the craftsman who constructs them. Additionally, the role of the general in an army is
indeed to provide the organization of the army so that the army can be as successful as
possible. In so far as the general is responsible for the order of the army, the general
provides a good analogy of the role that the UMM plays in the cosmos. Clearly, that
which is responsible for the order of the whole that Aristotle explains in Λ 10 must be the
UMM.267 But the general fails to be analogous in the sense that the individual parts of
the army do not actually strive to be the general in the same or in an analogous way that
the individual entities of the cosmos strive to become the UMM in so far as they are able.
The household analogy provides this account in a better way, and it seems to
better represent what Aristotle means by the order of the whole that he is describing. The
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Precisely how this happens is not quite the goal of this project. However, I will provide some account of
my understanding of this aspect of the UMM later in this chapter.
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head of the household represents for Aristotle the pinnacle, and it is toward that pinnacle
that the other members of the household strive in so far as they are able. The household
is also organized by the head of the household, and the organization that is produced is
for the benefit of each of the members of the household. This represents a very nice
analogy for the cosmos and the ordered structure that Aristotle believes the cosmos
represents. However, from what I have described in the first part of the second chapter of
the dissertation, I showed that Aristotle’s conception of organized things seems to fall
between that which is natural, which possesses an internal principle of motion and which
has a nature which organizes the matter as the principle much like a syllable is the
principle of organization for the letters that make up the syllable, or that which is
artificial which is given its form and thus organization by something which possesses a
form that is other than the form that is possessed by the artifact. What this analysis
seemed to show us is that organized things in general for Aristotle are not accidentally
formed, like a heap into a statue, but are rather the result of a principle that is either
provided to the body by an artificer, or it is the result of natural reproduction, or finally it
is eternal. We know that the cosmic order as such cannot be an artifact, for the only
potential artificer for Aristotle would be the UMM, and the UMM as such is immovable
and thus does not partake in the productive process necessary for the creation of an
artifact. It is also not the case that the cosmic order can be the result of natural
reproduction, since it is not the result of something that has the same form as it as well as
the simple fact that Aristotle seems to believe that natural reproduction is reserved for
sublunary things. The cosmic order then might be eternal, but even if it is eternal, it
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would still need an account of the kind of nature that it has and how it can be explained
without thereby making the cosmic order into a substance.
I argued then in the third chapter that the best route for answering these issues is
to understand Aristotle’s use of the household analogy as also providing an alternative
avenue for an account of nature and priority in Aristotle. The household as such for
Aristotle is discussed in the Politics, and in the Politics Aristotle states that the household
is part of a genetic development which ends in the establishment of the polis. Aristotle
states that the household and village are there to provide for the necessities of life, and
the polis is established for the sake of the good life. The polis then represents the end of
the development which begins with the household, and thus it seems at least permissible
to understand what Aristotle has to say regarding the polis and see how it might relate to
the account of cosmic order that Aristotle is defending in Λ 10, specifically relating to the
nature and ontology of the cosmic order in question. This move in my argument gains
additional support when Aristotle at the very end of Λ 10 compares the cosmos with a
polis through his citation of a Homeric quote citing the fact that it is better that the
cosmos is ruled by one principle rather than many.268 The polis, and the account that
Aristotle provides for its ontology, is indeed key to my interpretation of the cosmic order.
In the next two chapters of the dissertation I argued that the account of the polis,
and especially the account of the nature and the priority of the polis, provides the
necessary framework that can help us to understand the order of the whole and answer
the important issues that I have raised with my interpretation. Firstly, Aristotle makes it
clear that the polis possesses a form and a matter, and that such entities in his ontology
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I will discuss this claim and the citation further later in this chapter.
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seem to be either artifacts or the kind of natural entities that he describes in the Physics.
As I argued in chapter four, the polis is not an artifact and it is not the case that Aristotle
was simply mistaken in claiming that the polis is natural. The naturalness of the polis is
rather the result of the logos-sociality of human beings. To reiterate, the rational
components of human nature, and especially the ability to discuss the just and unjust, the
good and the bad, and virtue and vice, leads necessarily to the establishment of a polis.
The polis is not then the result of a deliberate process but is rather an emergent entity that
is a part of the very expression of what is essential to the nature of being a human being.
Its naturalness then is unique for Aristotle, as its nature is not the same as the nature that
is possessed by those entities that are also substances in the primary sense, such as
individual human beings or individual animals and plants in general. Rather, the polis is
natural because it is part of a fundamentally teleological process that is itself natural and
is necessary as part of the fulfillment of that process. This then is what leads me to argue
that the order of the cosmos in Λ 10 can be understood as natural precisely because
Aristotle does indeed have a concept of nature in the corpus that can explain the
naturalness of the cosmic order. The naturalness of the cosmic order is of the same kind,
at least in the relevant sense that I am discussing here, as the naturalness of the polis.
What is the same for both of these concepts of nature for Aristotle is that neither of them
comfortably fit into the nature/artifact distinction that is expressed explicitly in the
natural/metaphysical works of Aristotle. Rather, the nature of these entities lies
somewhat between the nature of a substance and artifact. A polis does indeed possess a
separate nature or form, represented by Aristotle as a constitution, and of course a matter,
and the cosmos likewise I would argue possesses a form and a matter. However, this
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does not imply that the cosmos or the polis is like a primary substance. Rather, these
things are natural for Aristotle in so far as they arise from the teleological motions of the
inhabitants of the respective entities.
As far as the second critique that needs to be answered, namely whether the
cosmic order is a substance unto itself, I would accordingly refer to the arguments I have
presented in the fifth chapter in addition to those which I presented in the fourth chapter.
I argued there that the priority of the polis is not such as to subsume the individual under
the polis. The individual is not lost under the polis in such a way as to make the
individual a mere part of the polis like a hand is to the body of which it is a part. Rather
the priority of the polis is such as to indicate that the individual cannot really be a human
being outside of the polis. I pointed out that the person is corrupted, in that they are only
a human being homonymously in such a position, like Philoctetes stranded on an Aegean
isle. This is the case precisely because the practical rationality of a human being can no
longer function, and its not functioning truly does prevent a human being from living a
human life. The only life that can be lived by a human being in such circumstances is
one of a beast.269 The practical rationality of a human being leads to the emergent
construction of a polis by its very functioning, so that not only is it the case that a person
cannot live the human life outside of the polis, but also just by performing what is
essentially human a polis emerges. The priority of a polis then is such that the polis is
prior ontologically to the individual human being. But all of this, including the specific
sort of priority that I am defending here in relation to the polis and the individual human
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Another life is that of a god who has no need of a polis. What Aristotle has in mind here is not quite
clear, but it certainly is not what happens to a human being if they are separated from a polis against their
wishes. I will discuss this type of person later in this chapter.
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being, does not imply that the human being’s sole function is to be a part of the polis and
thus to work exclusively for the good of the polis. Rather the polis (and this of course
follows from Aristotle’s definition of the polis) is there in part to provide the individual
members of the polis with the good life that they seek through their own natures. This
then leads to the concept of the polis that I am defending, namely that it is not an
Aristotelian substance that is prior to the individual in the same sense as the body is prior
to the hand. It is not the case that the individual’s good is solely aimed at the good of the
polis, although the individual’s good is most definitely tied up with and connected to
living within and participating in a polis. The polis is indeed prior to the individual, but
only in the sense that the individual is unable to exist outside of the polis and remain a
human being in all the important senses that being human means for Aristotle.
The polis emerges from the natural rationality of the human being, and its
naturalness is a function of the rational practices of the human person. Understanding
this then leads to the point that the polis is natural as it constitutes a part of the very
rationality that at the same time requires the polis in order to function. Its naturalness
then is founded in the very act that inevitably leads to the emergence of the polis itself.
The polis is ontologically prior to the individual in that the individual cannot exist as such
outside of a polis, and it is natural because the very functioning of the social and rational
aspects of a human life leads to the emergence of the polis as a very part of that
functioning. It is not the case, according to my argument, that the polis is natural merely
because it is necessary for the functioning of those essential aspects of the human person.
Rather it is natural because it is a part of the very functioning of a natural process, and
thus its naturalness is established as being a part of practical rationality itself. And its
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priority is grounded in the fact that in order for a human being to live a human life, and
thus to be human at all, she must be a part of a polis. The two theses then are closely
related, the naturalness of the polis leads to the priority of the polis, and the reason that
the polis is prior is due to the way in which it is natural.
The priority thesis that I defended in the fifth chapter then, as well as the
emergence thesis I have defended in the fourth chapter, provides us with the theoretical
framework to explain the ontology of the ‘order of the whole’ or the cosmic order. I
would argue that just as the polis is not a substance in the primary sense for Aristotle, so
the cosmic order is not a substance in the primary sense. And the theoretical apparatus
for this reading is found in the very passage that Aristotle seems to refer to in Λ 10,
namely the political passages and especially those arguments that concern the ontology
and nature of the polis itself. It is there I have argued then that one finds a sense of the
natural and of the prior within the Aristotelian corpus that one can use to understand how
the cosmic order or ‘order of the whole’ is natural and prior, and it is there that one can
find the arguments necessary to establish that the cosmic order does not necessarily imply
one cosmic substance, so that the general theory of substance that is taken to be basically
Aristotelian can still be preserved while providing a reading of Λ 10 that does not ignore
the explicit claims made there by Aristotle.
4. Cosmic City and Cosmic Teleology

In the second chapter of this dissertation, I discussed the varying interpretations
concerning Aristotle’s account of teleology in the cosmos. I discussed this issue by
dividing the interpreters into two camps broadly speaking, namely the internalist and the
externalist camp. The major view within the externalist camp moreover is the
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anthropocentric one, which holds that Aristotle viewed the good of the human being as
the aim at which all other sublunary things strive. I then argued that this position is not
convincing, since the texts that are used to support the anthropocentric position are few
and rather weak. However, I also argued that the internalist camp, which holds that
Aristotle’s view on teleology is simply confined to the teleological motions of the
individual substances within his ontology, is mistaken. The internalist believes that there
is no evidence of a broader cosmic teleology in which some entities aim at benefiting
other substances. I argued in the second chapter that there are, however, several passages
within the corpus that the internalist must ignore in order to defend their position.
Among these passages is Λ 10, which speaks of a good of the whole and a broader
ordering and arrangement that seems to have problematic consequences if accepted for
the internalist position. I pointed out then that in order to understand the claims of Λ 10,
one must seek an alternative concept of nature to account for the cosmic nature defended
by Aristotle. I have just shown how I accomplished this project.
However, I also pointed out there that the internalist has an issue interpreting
Physics II 8. In this passage, Aristotle seems to argue that winter rain ought to be
considered as teleological since it aims at the benefit of something, whereas summer rain
should not be considered as such. This passage then seems to make a claim that is
difficult to account for given the internalist assumptions. According to the internalist
approach, winter rain cannot be specifically teleological and summer rain not teleological
if the teleology that is involved with rain is nothing other than the teleology involved
with the internal motion of water. I concluded the second chapter then with an
acknowledgement of this difficulty and a promise to return to it. Now that I have
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provided the arguments necessary to defend my reading of Λ 10, I believe that it is
possible to return to the passage and to provide an interpretation of it that can
successfully deal with what Aristotle explicitly claims there.
I believe that a correct reading of Physics II 8 must involve an understanding and
recognition of the cosmic order which I have defended. Firstly, in a general sense, the
cosmic order implies that the ordering of all things within the cosmos allows for certain
entities within the cosmos to benefit each other and to generally relate to one another in
an arrangement and coordination that can only make sense if one accepts a cosmic order.
To use Aristotle’s army analogy again, one can understand the coordination of an army as
being such that not only do the parts of an army gain the ability to perform their specific
functions through this coordination, but in the process of performing their specific
functions they thereby help or benefit the other parts of the army. So, the archers for
instance provide the missile fire necessary to cover for the charge of the infantry, thereby
aiding the infantry in the fulfillment of their function. The infantry moreover allows the
cavalry to flank the enemy, and thereby allow for maximum damage applied to the
enemy. All of these functions not only are made possible through the organization of the
army, but they also provide benefits to the other parts of an army in a coordinated and
organized way. The benefits that are so provided then are not the direct aim of each
function respectively, they rather arise out of the successfully actualized functions
themselves. All of this of course requires coordination, which is provided to the army as
a whole by the general. This view of how an army functions then is, I argue, very
similar to the way that Aristotle understands the order that the cosmos possesses. It is not
that each thing simply possesses a nature which provides it the teleological functions that
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it must carry out. Rather these functions, and the teleological motions of entities in
general, are understood by Aristotle within the context of an ordered, organized and
coordinated whole. The animal aims at the fulfillment of the nature that the animal
happens to possess, and this gives rise to the knowable and purposeful motions that are
characteristic of the animal. But these very same motions also provide benefits and are
for the better of the other entities that exist in coordination with the entity in question. So
in the process of carrying out those motions that are characteristic of the nature that the
animal possesses, the animal actually benefits and perhaps even gives rise to other
characteristic and essential motions of other entities around it. All of this requires, and I
believe Aristotle is aware of this, a context which involves a community or group of
entities which are all intricately related to each other and which in a sense, although
certainly not directly, provide benefits for each other. As Aristotle states “…all things
are ordered together somehow…both fishes and fowls and plants; and the world is not
such that one thing has nothing to do with another, but they are connected.”270 The
organization and coordination, which indeed resembles that of an army in certain
important senses, of natural things provides for us then a distinctly Aristotelian approach
to a theory of ecosystems and habitats in general.271 All of this is given firm foundations
from the interpretive arguments that I have provided in this dissertation, as we now have
the ability to develop such ideas without the fear of violating basic Aristotelian
principles.

Metaphysics Λ 10 1075a15-17.
I do not have the room in this dissertation to examine this idea in any great detail. However, I do
believe that the account that I have provided here of the nature and priority of the cosmic order also
provides a context within which one can further develop such a theory. I therefore intend to return to this
thesis and develop a theory involving ecosystems, habitats and biomes which rests upon an Aristotelian
basis.
270
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The order then that exists within the cosmos for Aristotle provides for us the
necessary background for interpreting Physics II 8. The idea that winter rain is
specifically the teleological event that must be explained is a matter of understanding the
coordinated order that is manifested in the complex structure that the nature of the whole
possesses. It is my contention then that winter rain is specifically for the better, and that
summer rain is not.272 This follows once we recognize that, according to Scharle,
“…Aristotle maintains that water’s movement is teleologically directed towards the
Prime Mover via the heavenly bodies.”273 The idea here is that water’s rectilinear
motions imitate the circular motion of the heavenly bodies, which in turn imitates the
activity of the UMM.274 However, not just any of water’s downward motion is an
This contention is at odds with my argument in “Man, God, and Rain.” In that paper, I generally agreed
with the view defended by Robert Wardy. For Wardy’s view on the winter rain phenomenon see Chapter
2. My view on the passage has certainly evolved since I originally wrote that paper, and I no longer believe
that Wardy’s reading of it is correct. Specifically I firstly deny Wardy’s claim (and my own claim in “Man,
God, and Rain”) that there is no difference teleologically in the occurrence of summer rain with that of
winter rain. Wardy argues that it is the conditions which produce rain that occur more often in the winter
than in the summer which thus produce the regular occurrence of winter rain and the irregular occurrence
of summer rain. I agree with him on this point. But Wardy also claims that acknowledging this point does
not in any way force us to understand winter rain as teleological and summer rain as not teleological, and I
disagree with Wardy on this. I have changed my position on this partly because of the obvious sense of the
passage, in which Aristotle states that winter rain is for an end. Moreover, I believe that the main reason
for avoiding this straightforward reading of Physics II 8 was I believe to avoid the anthropocentric
interpretation of Aristotle’s teleology. However, I have shown in the second chapter that this interpretation
has very little support in Aristotle generally. Therefore, if one can accept the straightforward reading of
Physics II 8 without thereby committing oneself to the anthropocentric interpretation then I believe one
should take this approach to interpreting Physics II 8. This is precisely what I am doing with the current
argument here. Secondly, Wardy argues that there is a difference in Aristotle between something being
phusei and being phusis. I agree with him on this, and I also agree that understanding either the polis or the
cosmic order as a phusis in the Physics sense of that term contradicts much of Aristotle has to say
throughout the corpus and which I have discussed throughout this dissertation. However, I do not believe
that Wardy is correct in simply stating that the cosmic order is phusei, since Aristotle clearly states that
there is a phusis of the whole in Metaphysics Λ 10. What I take Aristotle to mean rather is that both the
polis and the cosmic order are phusis in the sense of an emergent entity that comes from and are a part of
the very teleological motions that give rise to it, and not that they are substances in the full-blooded sense
themselves. There is a ‘nature of the whole’ though, and its ontology is an emergent one which is natural
much like the polis is natural.
273
Margaret Scharle, “Elemental Teleology in Aristotle’s Physics II 8,” Oxford Studies in Ancient
Philosophy 34, (2008): 178.
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The account that I am providing here is mostly taken from Scharle. The difference of course is that,
unlike Scharle, the account that I have given allows for constructive order in the cosmos necessary to
provide the foundational context of the order that Scharle and I defend.
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imitation of the UMM. Rather, the movement of water that occurs due to the recession of
the sun during the winter, which is what produces the effect of winter rain, is an instance
of water moving because it is better. This movement is of course better in an Aristotelian
sense precisely because the movement is an instance of water imitating the UMM, and
this movement is an imitation of the UMM precisely because it is part of a rectilinear
movement that imitates the circular movement of the celestial bodies which in turn is an
imitation of the UMM. This is not to say that winter rain is specifically good because of
the benefits that it provides to the crops or anything else, which is what the
anthropocentric interpretation would hold. Rather it is good, because it is specifically
teleological in so far as it is winter rain that represents the imitation of the UMM through
the imitation of the circular motion of the heavenly bodies. Although summer rain is
certainly teleological in so far as it represents the element of water seeking its natural
place in the cosmos, it is as a whole an accidental occurrence for Aristotle. And as such
summer rain is not an event that seeks an end, but rather simply happens to occur
irregularly.
Expanding upon the assertion that the movement of winter rain is for the better,
Scharle states that rectilinear movement imitates circular movement, which is itself an
imitation of the divine activity of the UMM. So it follows that the movement of winter
rain can best be understood as an activity which aims at and thus imitates the UMM
through the intermediary of the circular motions of the heavenly bodies. And this
rectilinear movement occurs on the heels of another rectilinear movement with which it
composes a cycle. It is therefore in the cyclical nature of the respective rectilinear
movements that the component elements involved in these rectilinear movements imitate
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the circular motions of the heavenly bodies, and thus imitate the activity of the UMM. So
the motions of water falling to the earth during winter occurs in relation to other elements
and these motions of the elements then form a continuous cycle. And the repetition of
this cycle is in itself an imitation of the most perfect of motions, namely circular motion,
which is itself the closest imitation of the activity of the divine.
All of this is clearly grounded in Aristotle’s account of the elements and his
meteorology. In this context, Aristotle specifically makes the claim that the rectilinear
motions of the elements form a cycle in their imitation of the circular motion of the
higher bodies by stating that “For when Water is transformed into Air, Air into Fire, and
the Fire back into Water, we say the coming-to-be has completed the circle, because it
reverts again to the beginning. Hence it is by imitating circular motion that rectilinear
motion too is continuous.”275 But the point here that is crucial to keep in mind is that the
way in which water forms a part of this imitation of the circular motion is through its
being efficiently caused by the sun, and specifically the position of the sun as being
farther away from the earth, which of course occurs in the winter and not in the summer.
All of this is further confirmed through Aristotle’s account of the process of the
formation and reason for rain. Aristotle states in the Meteorology that as the sun
approaches and recedes it causes dissipation and condensation, and when the sun is near
the earth it produces heat which causes the moisture around the earth to evaporate. But
when the sun is farther away, the heat which caused this evaporation to take place is no
longer present, and thus the vapor cools and turns into water and rains.276 So one can

ὅταν γὰρ ἐξ ὕδατος ἀὴρ γένηται καὶ ἐξ ἀέρος πῦρ καὶ πάλιν ἐκ πυρὸς ὕδωρ, κύκλῳ φαμὲν
περιεληλυθέναι τὴν γένεσιν διὰ τὸ πάλιν ἀνακάμπτειν· ὥστε καὶ ἡ εὐθεῖα φορὰ μιμουμένη τὴν κύκλῳ
συνεχής ἐστιν. On Generation and Corruption II 10 337a4-7.
276
Meteorology I 9 346b 20-32.
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clearly see from this understanding of the causes of rain that the production of rain is not
merely mechanistically understood, although the process that Aristotle describes is
certainly mechanistic in part, it is nevertheless also a part of a larger teleological process
which has as its focus the imitation of the UMM, which thus also causes an imitation of
circular motion among the elements. Aristotle then proceeds to describe the process of
the creation of rain as an effect of the sun’s motions and as a part of an imitative circular
motion. He states that:
…we get a circular process that follows the course of the sun. For according as
the sun moves to this side or that, the moisture in this process rises or falls. We
must think of it as a river flowing up and down in a circle and made up partly of
air, partly of water. When the sun is near, the stream of vapor flows upwards;
when it recedes, the stream of water flows down; and the order of sequence, at all
events, in this process always remains the same.277
All of this leads to the conclusion then that for Aristotle it is not just any rain whatsoever
that is for the better. Rather it is specifically winter rain, but not because winter rain is
somehow teleologically aiming at the benefit of the creatures and plants that actually do
benefit from it, but rather because it is winter rain that forms part of the rectilinear
movement that causes the formation of water due to the distance of the sun, and thus
causes winter rain to occur. And all of this is an imitation on the part of the elements of
circular motion, which is itself understood by Aristotle to be one of the primary ways in
which things imitate the UMM. Winter rain is specifically a teleological process then
because it is an example for Aristotle of something acting for the better, but what makes
such a process actually for the better is that winter rain is a part of a larger imitative

γίγνεται δὲ κύκλος οὗτος μιμούμενος τὸν τοῦ ἡλίου κύκλον· ἅμα γὰρ ἐκεῖνος εἰς τὰ πλάγια μεταβάλλει
καὶ οὗτος ἄνω καὶ κάτω. δεῖ δὲ νοῆσαι τοῦτον ὥσπερ ποταμὸν ῥέοντα κύκλῳ ἄνω καὶ κάτω, κοινὸν ἀέρος
καὶ ὕδατος· πλησίον μὲν γὰρ ὄντος τοῦ ἡλίου ὁ τῆς ἀτμίδος ἄνω ῥεῖ ποταμός, ἀφισταμένου δὲ ὁ τοῦ ὕδατος
κάτω. καὶ τοῦτ´ ἐνδελεχὲς ἐθέλει γίγνεσθαι κατά γε τὴν τάξιν· Meteorology I 9 346b35-347a6.
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process that seeks in so far as it can the UMM and its activity. Thus it makes sense for us
to understand the Physics II 8 passage as stating that winter rain, and not summer rain,
acts for the better.
This reading of Physics II 8 is consistent with what Aristotle has to say elsewhere
concerning his cosmology, and successfully understands the passage in its most explicit
and direct sense without having to ignore or muddle the translation in order to get
something out of it that better fits the interpreter’s conception of Aristotle rather than
what Aristotle himself is actually arguing. What was missing, and why it is that I waited
until the sixth chapter to provide my reading of Physics II 8, was a coherent conception
of a cosmic nature that provides the necessary context for the reading I have just
defended. A cosmic order of the kind that I am defending, one which is both prior to
individual entities that exist within the cosmos as well as natural, also allows us then to
explain the structured order and coordination which exists within the cosmos and which
is exemplified by the very example of winter rain. For it is due to winter rain that crops
grow, and plants and animals in general are able to thrive, and the success of these life
forms thus provide a greater eco-relationship that provides an environment in general for
living things to thrive. This is of course, and as I have already mentioned, not to say that
winter specifically aims at this benefit. Winter rain itself is for the better because it,
unlike summer rain, is specifically aiming at the UMM in the form of imitating the
UMM. Rather the various goods provided to the other entities through such things as
winter rain is produced through the cosmic order that is necessarily emergent from the
various teleological motions of the entities within the cosmos. And among these
teleological motions is winter rain which provides these benefits, but does so through the
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larger cosmic order that is both natural and prior and which emerges from the teleological
motions of the entities within the cosmos seeking actuality which pans out as an imitation
of the UMM and which explains the entities desire to realize their own natures in the first
place. And the living things which thus are able to thrive are then able to pursue in their
own ways the UMM. So winter rain is explained through the pursuit for the UMM, and it
produces benefits that thereby make possible the pursuit of the UMM for other entities,
especially and specifically the sublunary ones which require the regular occurrence of
rain during certain seasons to thrive themselves. All of this forms a complex structure of
interrelationships which must be accounted for. And how this is in fact accounted for by
Aristotle is through his acknowledgement that there is a ‘order of the whole’ in which all
things are arranged according to each other and which is a good separate and distinct
from but clearly related to the separate good represented by Aristotle as the UMM. This
structure of course emerges from the motions of the various entities and is thus natural
and prior to each of them like the polis is natural and prior to each of the individuals
which compose it.
The teleological nature of reality for Aristotle is thus not anthropocentric, nor is it
merely internal to natural things. It is fundamentally theocentric, in that all entities aim at
achieving the life of the divine.278 However, this fact also produces for Aristotle a kind
of ordering that is both natural and prior to any individual entity within the cosmos. The
ordering that Aristotle has in mind is partly acknowledged through the elements’ activity
which attempts to attain circular motion. There is in this very description an
acknowledgement of an order which exists not only between the elements themselves,

This claim that Aristotle’s teleology is fundamentally theocentric was made by me originally in “Man,
God, and Rain,” and is something with which I still agree.
278
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but also with the celestial bodies which carry out the circular motions that the elements
imitate. Moreover, the fact that the elements carry out such organized activity then
implies that the whole of the sublunary realm also is ordered by and responds to the
activity of the elements. What this allows for is the establishment of communities of
entities which exist as a result of the ordered movements of the elements which
themselves are ordered by the celestial bodies. Each of these entities possess a nature
which then seeks to actualize itself, but also carry on activities that are ultimately an
attempt to achieve the divine in their own way. This imitative activity for living things is
reproduction, and the fact that things reproduce allows for living things which prey upon
these entities to thrive. The fact that all of these things do occur then allows for human
beings to carry out the best activity that they can, namely the theoretical wisdom which is
the activity of the UMM itself. These various movements and arrangements do not imply
specifically that any of these entities seek the benefit of other entities in their teleological
motions, but rather they imply that there is an ordered structure which emerges from each
entity’s own characteristically teleological motions.
I believe then that this order and arrangement can best be explained through
Aristotle’s conception of the polis. Just like the emergence of a polis, the cosmic
structure emerges from each entity’s desire to attain its end. The ability to do so is
predicated upon the fact that there is an ordered whole which allows for each entity to
attain its end. And this ordered whole is a kind of structure which is a very part of the
teleological movements of these entities. The structure is exemplified by the fact that
plants need winter rain, predators need prey, and human beings need both crops and
animals in order to survive. This structure is in turn also prior, in the same sense as the
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polis is prior to the individual, in that it is not possible for an animal, plant or human to
truly be what it is outside of the order exemplified within the cosmos. Each entity then
pursues its own good dictated by its nature, and in the process a cosmic order emerges
that is natural and thus possesses a good, but its naturalness is a result of being a part of
the very same teleological processes that these entities carry out.
Furthermore, the point of the polis for Aristotle is to allow its members to achieve
the good life, which is the actualization of the nature for a human being. I would argue
that the point of the cosmic order is in turn to allow for each of the entities within the
cosmos to achieve the actualization of their respective natures. It is simply true that the
various and diverse life forms living on this planet require a balanced order so that they
are able to thrive. Without the existence of some crucial part of this order, the ability to
thrive seems impossible. Without winter rain, crops will be unable to grow and thus
many life forms will be detrimentally affected. Within a polis, the various members
contribute to the good of the whole in their own way, and in the process of doing so they
provide benefits to other member of the polis despite the fact that they are not aiming
specifically at the benefit of those other members. Similarly, within the cosmos, various
entities provide benefits to other entities without essentially aiming to do so. The cosmic
teleology is found within the structured whole, which is itself good and natural and prior
and which in turn allows for and is there for the attainment of the good on the part of the
various entities within the cosmos.
One might object to this account by stating that there is a discrepancy between the
polis and the order of the whole which I am defending. One could say that the polis is
there to achieve the good life and thus the complete actualization of the individual human
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beings who make up the polis, and that it ideally succeeds in doing this. Whereas the
cosmic order only succeeds in allowing for the actualization of the individual natures of
the various entities within the cosmos, and not the highest kind of life which is only
achievable by human beings for Aristotle. However, I would respond to this criticism by
pointing out that Aristotle is quite aware that not every member of a polis will be able to
achieve the actualization of their respective natures. There are for Aristotle an
unfortunate number of people within the polis who will not be able to achieve the best
life, but only the best life available to them. Nevertheless, the polis is there in order for
each of its members to achieve the best possible life available to them. As John Cooper
states “…of course in any city…many, perhaps most, of the citizens will not attain the
highest degree of civilized perfection…The city itself, however, will live well if those
who are naturally capable of a very high degree of mental and moral perfection attain and
sustain it through life in the city, and the others attain as high a degree of perfection as
they are naturally capable of. So, at a minimum, one could say that in the best, most
successful cities an excellent life is provided for those individuals…capable of leading it,
while the others get as nearly excellent a life as they are severally able to manage, given
their natural limitations.”279 Likewise, in the cosmic order, not every entity will be
capable of attaining the highest degree of life possible, but will simply be able to attain
the highest degree possible given their limitations which is dictated to them by the very
natures that they possess. The fact of the matter is that all entities in a way for Aristotle
do indeed seek the highest degree of activity possible, and thus the best life possible. But
not all of them are able to attain this life in the same degree. Thus, each entity attains

John Cooper, “Political Animals and Civic Friendship,” in Aristotles’ ‘Politik,’ ed. G. Patzig (Gottingen:
Van den Hoeck and Ruprecht, 1990), 239.
279
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what it can, and does so through the context of a natural and prior cosmic order that
allows each entity to attain the best life possible for each of them.
One final point that I would like to address and to touch upon for my argument
concerning the cosmic whole and the polis is the further comparison between the actual
structure of the ideal polis and the structure of the cosmic order that may be compared to
it. One of the reasons that I provided for using Aristotle’s account of the nature and
priority of the polis as a way for understanding the order of the whole is due to Aristotle’s
own statement of comparing the order to a monarchy by asserting that “…the world must
not be governed badly. ‘The rule of many is not good; let there be one ruler.’”280
Aristotle is of course specifically refuting what he calls the mathematicians and their
propensity to multiply the number of principles necessary to explain the world. Aristotle
does not think that this is an appropriate way of approaching the explanation of the
cosmos, and specifically claims that one ought to presuppose one ruling principle rather
than many. However, not only does this provide us a clue into how Aristotle understood
the nature of the cosmic order he is referring to in this passage, but he also seems to be
specifically asserting that the order must be understood in terms of a certain kind of
political arrangement, namely one which possesses one ruler. When one considers the
various kinds of political ordering that Aristotle identifies as being good, one can
immediately identify monarchy as the one which possesses only one ruler. Now Aristotle
seems to specifically identify five types of monarchy.281 The type of monarchy that
Aristotle spends the most time discussing is a kind of total kingship, in which “…one
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man has the disposal of all.”282 The only way that such a polis is justifiably defensible
for Aristotle is if there is a person or family who is of such an excellence that they are a
law unto themselves. Aristotle describes such a person by stating that “…for men of preeminent excellence there is no law – they are themselves a law. Anyone would be
ridiculous who attempted to make laws for them…”283 For such men, they would have
complete disposal of the polis and its functions precisely because their excellence and
virtue would be equivalent to a perfect law, and thus there would be no need to legislate a
law concerning them. Every other person in the polis of this excellent person would
gladly give up their ability to participate in the functions of the polis, precisely because
the excellence of the individual would be equivalent to the law itself. So Aristotle goes
on to state that “But when a whole family, or some individual, happens to be so preeminent in excellence as to surpass all others, then it is just that they should be the royal
family and supreme over all, or that this one citizen should be king.”284 Aristotle thus
argues that there is a justifiable form of monarchy, and that such an institution is justified

ὅταν ᾖ πάντων κύριος εἷς ὤν Politics III 14 1285b 29-30. The kind of monarchy in which one person
has the disposal of all seems to be at odds with Aristotle’s account of citizenship, a citizen being defined by
Aristotle as someone who takes part in the political activities of the polis. Of course, in a general and total
kingship only the king will be able to take part in the political activities of the polis. This seems to make
the polis into a tyranny and certainly not a political community at all. Thus John Cooper states that
“…under the rule of a king, one of the types of constitution Aristotle counts as ‘correct,’ the monarch
reserves to himself and his personal appointees both the deliberative and the judicial function – so that, if
the aim of a king was the common advantage of what Aristotle officially counts as citizens, there would in
fact be no distinction between rule by a king and a tyranny, its deviation-form” (Cooper, “Political Animals
and Civic Friendship,” 228). Whatever may be the case concerning this definition, it is not the intention of
my argument to either justify Aristotle’s account of monarchy in general, nor is it an attempt to argue that
there is a perfect analogy between the order of the cosmos and a monarchy as it is described by Aristotle. I
merely am emphasizing one aspect of Aristotle’s account of monarchy here and attempting to emphasize
that Aristotle indeed had in mind the concept of a monarchy specifically when he described the cosmos as
an order and as possessing a good.
283
κατὰ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἔστι νόμος: αὐτοὶ γάρ εἰσι νόμος. καὶ γὰρ γελοῖος ἂν εἴη νομοθετεῖν τις
πειρώμενος κατ᾽ αὐτῶν. Politics III 13 1284a12-15.
284
ὅταν οὖν ἢ γένος ὅλον ἢ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕνα τινὰ συμβῇ διαφέροντα γενέσθαι κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν τοσοῦτον
ὥσθ᾽ ὑπερέχειν τὴν ἐκείνου τῆς τῶν ἄλλων πάντων, τότε δίκαιον τὸ γένος εἶναι τοῦτο βασιλικὸν καὶ κύριον
πάντων, καὶ βασιλέα τὸν ἕνα τοῦτον. Politics III 17 1288a16-19.
282
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precisely because of the excellence of the individual, which so surpasses all others that it
presumably cannot be helped to provide such a person the complete disposal of the polis
and its various functions, for such a person is a law unto themselves.
Now how such an institution could still be considered a polis, and whether such
an institution is practically possible are questions I will leave aside at this point. But
what this description of a general or total monarchy does represent for the purposes of my
argument is that a person of such excellence would not even really be human in an
important sense, in so far as such a person would be living the activity of the divine
through what is presumably theoretical wisdom. For the premise behind Aristotle’s
justification of such a form of rule is that the monarch would have to surpass everyone
else in excellence to such a degree that they would apparently have no desire to pass laws
controlling them, for it would be like controlling a god. What is clear is that such a
person would be living the life of the divine for Aristotle. Being human still, the perfect
king would require a polis in order to provide the king with the necessary goods for
living, such as food and water, and the king would presumably require a polis in order to
live a life of eudaimonia. But in so far as the perfect king is perfectly actualized and
living the life of eudaimonia, there would be no need for laws to control the king, and
there would be no need for the polis as such to really pass laws, as the perfect king would
represent a law unto himself. Whether or not this is possible for Aristotle is another
question, but it seems obvious that in many ways the perfect king would be living a life
resembling the divine for Aristotle. And as such they would not really be a part of the
polis, since the polis is there for the achievement of happiness and flourishing on the part
of the individuals as such. Under other forms of government, including the ideal form of
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government defended by Aristotle at the end of the Politics, the law and the participation
in the functions of the government is a part of and allows for the attainment of happiness
for the individuals that so invest themselves and are capable by nature of doing so. But in
the perfect monarchy on the other hand, such a possibility would not be available to the
members of the polis. What would rather be the case, I would argue, is that the function
and goal of the members of the polis would be to imitate and attempt to achieve the level
of excellence that their divine ruler exhibits. So that the law, and the happiness that it
allows the citizens to achieve, would be replaced by the person who is a sort of living law
that would be admired and would be a goal of all of the activity of those who make up the
polis in question.285 Moreover, as a being who has no need to be subjected to the mere
laws of imperfect human beings, the monarch would be as it were separate from the polis
which they rule, although they would still need, being human, the products and goods of
the polis. The polis would be made up of individuals who are attempting to achieve the
life that they see in the example of their ruler, but their ruler would clearly not be a part
of the daily life and the successes and failures found in that daily activity of the polis.286

285

Another point that I have yet to explore and which is related to the argument that I am providing here is
that for Aristotle there seems to be no need to speak of scientific laws in the way that modern science
seems to assume them as basic. For Aristotle, the order of the cosmos is founded upon a teleological
conception of form which allows him to account for the order exhibited throughout the cosmos without
referring to scientific laws as they are understood in modern science. In the perfect monarchy, there would
equally be no need for laws since the divine ruler would himself be the ordering law of the polis. This is a
similarity that I wish to further explore in the future but is at this point merely potential.
286
My reading of Aristotle’s account of the perfect king and thus perfect monarchy has some precedent as
well. Plato in the Statesman speaks of the best sort of king when he has the visitor states that “…it is clear
that the art of the legislator belongs to that of the king; but the best thing is not that the laws should prevail,
but rather the kingly man who possesses wisdom” (Statesman 294a6-9). And later the visitor states that
“…any one of those who had really acquired the expert knowledge of kingship would hardly put obstacles
in his own way by writing down these laws we talked about” (Statesman 295b3-5). Here Plato is speaking
of the relationship between the laws of a polis and the king who is perfectly excellent. And Plato clearly
states that such a king would merely be blocked by laws that are written down, since his excellence would
be satisfactory for the polis itself. This is what, I believe, Aristotle is stating about the perfect monarchy as
well. I do not think that Aristotle actually believed that such an organization was actually possible, but he
does believe that it is important to recognize that a perfect monarchy would be a different kind of system
altogether than the ideal polis that he later describes. I also believe that Aristotle’s account of perfect
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I admit that there is some speculation to my account of the perfect monarchy, as
Aristotle certainly does not provide the detailed account of a perfect monarchy that we
might desire. And the practicality of a divine and total monarchy may amount to
admitting that it is impossible to achieve, as no such person exists. Moreover, I will even
admit that this form of government does not seem to be the ideal one for human beings,
as the goal of a polis is in fact to allow for the achievement of happiness on the part of the
individuals, and a total monarchy does not seem to easily allow for that. However, if I
am correct in my speculative reading, the comparison of the cosmic order to a monarchy
in Metaphysics Λ 10 is not accidental. As I have attempted to show throughout this
dissertation, the cosmic order that Aristotle defends has at its heart the desire for the
UMM. The UMM is not a part of nature, and it is not one of the things that goes through
the common activities especially present in sublunar entities. Rather, the UMM is a
completely separate entity which is pure act and is the object of desire. In a very
important sense, Aristotle believes that the UMM is the law and thus has no need for a
law to govern it. What results from this is an order of the cosmos which has various
entities seeking the divine in their own way and in so far as they can attain it, and a
structure and order that emerges from these very motions which both allows for the
entities to seek the divine as well as emerging from the very motions of seeking the
divine. This order is also prior in that it simply does not make sense for an entity to be
outside of it, as it would not be able to even actualize its motions toward the UMM nor
would it be able to actualize its own nature. What results from this reading then, and

monarchy, knowing full well that it is not a practical possibility, was provided by him in order to better
understand the system which holds in the order of the cosmos, which is precisely what I am defending in
this dissertation. Once again, my evidence for such a claim is the very Homeric quote that concludes Λ 10.
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from the arguments that I have made throughout this dissertation, is that Aristotle
believed that all things are arranged in such a way as to produce an organized whole in
which the function of each thing also leads to the ability of other entities to perform their
functions, and which is entirely founded upon the eternal and everlasting desire of these
entities to imitate and obtain the actuality of their divine ruler in so far as they possibly
can.
A final point then is that a polis possesses both a form and a matter. The form of
a polis is represented by Aristotle as the constitution of that polis, whereas the matter is
the individuals that make up the polis. However, when one examines the form of a total
monarchy, one seems compelled to say that the form is the monarch.287 Since there is no
need for a law in such a community, there would presumably be no constitution at all,
since the function of both would be represented by the monarch and the imitation of the
monarch on the part of the members of the polis. It seems to follow then that the form of
such a community is the monarch. This would presumably be the case concerning the
cosmos as well, for since there is a structure and order to the cosmos it would have to
have a form corresponding to the order. However, the only form possible would
seemingly be the UMM itself, since it would represent the divine activity that is the goal
of every other entity within the cosmos. The matter then would be the entities, and the
form would be found in the UMM. The cosmic structure would be the organization that
results from the UMM, which as I have shown is established through each entities
seeking the divine activity itself, and this prior and natural structure would then allow for

Matthen in “The Holistic Presuppositions of Aristotle’s Cosmology” makes a similar argument as this.
The difference is that Matthen defends the view that the cosmos is one substance, whereas I argue that the
cosmos is an emergent entity unlike a primary substance and more akin to a polis.
287
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each entity to achieve the best life possible for each individual thing within the cosmos in
imitation of the UMM. Human beings of course through their ability to reason
theoretically are able to carry on the life of the divine in a real sense, albeit temporarily
and in a truncated form, but all entities strive toward this goal and thus work within an
order and structure that resembles, at least to a degree, the form of a divine monarchy.
5. Conclusion

The arguments of this chapter constitute a mere reading of the relevant passages
discussed throughout this dissertation. What I hoped to have shown is that the reading
that I am providing, although certainly not a demonstratively certain one, nevertheless
provides us with some useful insights into some difficult passages that have challenged
many commentators working with Aristotle. And at the very least I hope to have
demonstrated that a consistent reading of the passages can be attained without thereby
undermining or contradicting or ignoring other Aristotelian claims. A critic may contend
of my arguments here that it is mere speculation and that it has very little grounding in
what Aristotle explicitly clams about the cosmos in his cosmological works. I would
answer such a criticism by stating that I admit that Aristotle does not speak in depth about
the order of the whole and the teleology that arises from the order. However, he does
indeed mention the order, and the fact that he does so seems to compel a commentator to
at least provide an interpretation. What I have done in order to construct my account is to
take the claims of Λ 10 as basic and to provide an interpretation of these claims. What Λ
10 does claim is that there is an order, and that it is similar to the way that a political
structure works. The move to use the Politics as an interpretive lens for understanding Λ
10 is founded upon recognizing this comparison. And it is shown that by looking at the
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arguments of the Politics, one can find an ontological and teleological account that
provides us with a satisfactory reading of Λ 10. Therefore, although I have not
necessarily demonstrated that my reading is the only correct reading available, I do
believe that I have demonstrated a possible viewpoint of the relevant passages that is both
philosophically fruitful as well as faithful to the Aristotelian corpus.
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